

## Counterterrorism Strategies Influencing Performance of the National Police Service in Lamu County, Kenya

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**ABSTRACT:** Terrorism remains a cardinal threat to national, regional, and international peace and security. It violates the fundamental principles of law, order, human rights and freedom and remains an affront to the Global Charter of the United Nations (UN) and the values and principles enunciated in Africa's Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU). Moreover, it presents a grave and direct threat to the territorial integrity, security and stability of states. In this regard, effective counter terrorism strategies remain fundamental tools in curbing the threats and devastating effects of terrorism. In Kenya, the National Police Service (NPS) is one of the key agencies involved in counterterrorism operations. Given emerging trends of terrorist camps and continued attack in Kenya by terrorist elements, it is imperative that the NPS improves the overall direction of its counter terrorism strategy and adopt robust counterterrorism mechanisms in the fight against terrorism. The problem that necessitated this study was the continued and relentless attack by suspected Al-Shabaab terrorists in Lamu County despite the NPS adopting numerous counterterrorism strategies in its operations. The study sought to evaluate counterterrorism strategies influencing performance of the NPS in Lamu County. The study adopted a conceptual framework and was informed by Expectancy Theory, Control Theory and Justice Theory of Performance. The study employed survey research design which entailed the use of ex post facto research design employing mixed method approach. The target population was members of the NPS, religious leaders, council of elders and administrators (chiefs and county commissioner) in Lamu County. The study used both probability and non-probability sampling methods. Members of the NPS comprising NCOs and members of the inspectorate were first stratified then randomly sampled to generate 189 respondents. Purposive sampling was used to select 12 gazetted officers of the NPS as well as 23 chiefs, 1 county commissioner, 35 council of elders, and 54 religious leaders for the study. Data collection was both interactive (interviews and FGDs) and non-interactive (questionnaires, document analysis, photography and observation). A pilot study was carried out in Lamu. The reliability of the instruments was determined through the calculation of a correlation coefficient between the first and second administration. The instruments were tested for validity through consultation and discussion with supervisors. Data were analysed by use of descriptive statistics, through qualitative and quantitative techniques. The study found out that counterterrorism strategies employed by the NPS in Lamu County were ineffective and counterterrorism operation poorly handled. The fight against terrorism must involve all stakeholders and the strategies must take into account and address prevailing circumstances and conditions for operation to succeed. Overallly, the study concluded that as terrorism evolves so must counterterrorism strategies, taking into account the prevailing circumstances and dynamics on the ground such as socio-economic and political factors, technology, human resource and governance. The study recommended that all stakeholders be involved in counterterrorism and underlying issues and challenges be addressed for effective and efficient counterterrorism campaign.

**KEYWORDS:** Al-Shabaab, Antiterrorism, Community Policing, Counterterrorism, Counterterrorism Strategy, Terrorism, Performance, Police Officer, Terrorist

**ABBREVIATIONS:** NCOs – Non Commissioned Officers, NPS – National Police Service

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### I. INTRODUCTION

The human cost of terrorism has been felt in virtually every corner of the globe. Terrorism poses a direct threat to security of citizens in countries all over the world, and to international stability and prosperity more broadly and will remain a threat for the foreseeable future. Terrorists have demonstrated their ability to cross international borders, establish cells, survey targets and execute attacks. The threat is aggravated by

terrorist groups and individuals that continue to spread over the world. Modern technology increases the potential impact of terrorist attacks employing conventional and unconventional means, particularly as terrorists seek to acquire chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) capabilities and cyber abilities. Instability or conflict can create an environment conducive to the spread of terrorism, including fostering extremist ideologies, intolerance and fundamentalism (Hunsicker, 2006).

Terrorism is a long-standing political and religious strategy that has gained renewed international awareness following the devastating and unprecedented attacks in the United States (US) on the 11<sup>th</sup> September, 2001 (9/11). Although the events of that day have come to represent a turning point in international concern with the issue, the 9/11 attacks were not isolated events (Mahajan, 2002). The events did not reflect an unanticipated new threat to peace and security: they were the typical confirmation of a tendency that had been there before. What was witnessed brought a new dimension of terrorism worldwide. The world's trepidations about terrorism intensified following the 9/11 attack.

As far back as 1992, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopted a resolution aimed at enhancing co-operation and co-ordination between member states in order to fight the occurrence of extremism (Cilliers&Sturman, 2002). Africa recorded 6,188 casualties from 299 acts of terrorism between 1990 and 2003, making it the continent with the second most casualties in the world after Asia (United States of America, Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1990-2003). It is amazing that these figures only reflect the attacks that took place in Africa alone. Additionally, many countries in Africa have been affected by acts of terrorism that has led to displacement of people, loss of lives and decline in economic growth. As far back as 1980s there have been alerts of new form of terrorism. In divergence to terror groups of 1970s that held together, the current wave of terror groups operates in pockets. With the bombing in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in August 1998, Tanzania and Kenya were the first countries to experience this new wave of terrorism (Bunker, 2005).

Going forward, Africa has since witnessed numerous terrorist attacks. Most of the attacks are as a result of internal strife and the spill-over from regional wars, as different belligerent groups have resorted to terrorism in an attempt to advance their objectives and intentions (Goredema& Botha, 2004). Over the past years, terrorist groups such as ISIS, Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab have reinvented our thinking about terrorism and sparked debate on how to deal with the same. Their message of intolerance – religious, cultural, social – has had drastic consequences for many regions of the world. Their ability to use social media to bring to prominence their activities has challenged our core values of peace, tranquility and humanity (Onuoha, 2013).

Kenya has seen an increase in terror attacks since 2011. The government affirmed that most of the killings and explosions are perpetrated by Al-Shabaab in retaliation to Operation Linda Nchi, a synchronized military mission between the Somalia military and Kenyan military that began in October 2011, when troops from Kenya crossed the border into Somalia. According to security experts, majority of the attacks are perpetrated by youths who are radicalised. Security apparatus have also indicated that they belonged to death squads which carried out many of the killings under the orders of a government. By mid-2014, the cumulative attacks began affecting Kenya's tourism industry, as Western nations issued travel warnings to their citizens (Macharia, 2014).

On 21<sup>st</sup> September, 2013 Kenya recorded its deadliest terrorist incident since the 1998 Al-Qaeda bombing of the US embassy in Nairobi. At least 70 people were confirmed dead, 175 others reported injured, and several others held hostage, when a group of Islamists fighters stormed Kenya's high-end Westgate mall in Nairobi and randomly opened fire on weekend shoppers. The Islamist fighters reportedly shouted in the local Swahili that Muslims would be allowed to leave while all others would be killed. At least 18 foreigners were killed in the horrific attack, including citizens from Britain, France, Canada, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Australia, Peru, India, Ghana, South Africa, and China (Mamdani, 2013). The Somali-based Islamist group Harakat Al-Shabaab Al-Mujahideen Al-Shabaab, the youth, Mujahidin Al-Shabaab Movement, Mujahideen Youth Movement, Hizbul Shabaab, Hisb'ul Shabaab, Youth Wing claimed responsibility for the attack through her twitter account. During an interview with Al Jazeera, a spokesman for Al-Shabaab stated that the Westgate mall was chosen because it's frequented by foreigners (Agbiboa, 2013).

In 2014, Al-Shabaab was believed to have carried attacks in Mandera County that claimed at least 64 lives. On 22<sup>nd</sup> November 2014, a group of gunmen raided a bus which was travelling from Mandera to Nairobi. The raid claimed 28 lives who were mostly Government workers, teachers heading for the December holidays. Al-Shabaab also claimed responsibility of 36 quarry workers who were attacked and killed near Manderatown, many were non-Muslims (TheEast African Standard Newspaper, 2016).

In June, 2014 suspected Al-Shabaab carried out an attack in Mpeketoni Township in Lamu County killing more than 60 people. The gunmen raided the town, burnt down Mpeketoni Police Station and killed everyone on sight (TheEast African Standard Newspaper, 2016). In April 2015, Al-Shabaab conducted another attack at Garissa University College. The April 2015, raid at Garissa University College was planned by Mohamed KunoGamadheere who serves as Al-Shabaab's Lower Juba Commander. The terrorist attack claimed

almost 150 students and leaving hundreds with serious injuries. Al-Shabaab claimed the responsibility terming the heinous act as retaliatory over non-Muslims occupying the Muslim lands (TheEast African Standard Newspaper, 2016).

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In response to numerous attacks, NPS has adopted counterterrorism strategies that include legislative reforms, institutional building, trainings and bilateral and multilateral collaboration with like-minded states including the US and UK on the actions(s). Kenya has reported thrice pursuant to UN resolution 1373 of 2001 and taken several counterterrorism measures which include establishment of the National Intelligence Service with support from the U.S. Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program; creation of the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) in 1998, a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) in 2003; and the National Security Advisory Committee (NSAC) in 2004 which has since been scrapped. Additional measures include participation in the U.S. Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP), which provides technology to screen travellers arriving at airports and border crossings (Agbiboa, 2013).

Kenya has further re affirmed her commitment to the eleven existing international treaties and conventions it had previously signed and ratified, in relation to counter-terrorism and signed and ratified two successive conventions in 2002 and 2005. Kenya has also ratified the Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism 1999 and its 2002 Protocol at the African Union (Macharia, 2014). She has also taken into account the implementation of operational and practical actions to counter terrorism. The NPS counter terrorism actions in Kenya has been concentrated on predominantly Muslim areas in North Eastern on the border with Somalia and the Coastal strip that is inhabited with predominant Muslim Arab-Swahili communities especially Lamu County with little or no progress. That is why there was need to investigate counterterrorism strategies influencing the performance of NPS in Lamu County.

## **II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM**

Despite the NPS adopting numerous counterterrorism measures which include legislations, patrols, institutional capacity building and public awareness, acts of terrorism have continued unabated in Lamu County leading to massive loss of lives and destruction to properties. These counterterrorism measures are thus either deficient or have not been effectively implemented in the fight against terrorism in Lamu County. Terrorism remains a fundamental threat to peace and security in the world. It violates the key principles of law, order, human rights and freedom and remains an affront to the Global Charter of the United Nations (UN) and the values and principles enunciated in Africa's Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU). Worse still, it presents dangers to security and stability of nations all over the world. In this regard, effective counter terrorism strategies and approaches remain fundamental tools in curbing the threats and devastating effects of terrorism.

Weak political, economic and social structures in Africa have resulted in instability which terrorists have continued to exploit. Civil wars and ethnic strife have further worsened the situation. Counterterrorism measures in place are therefore mostly deficient given the situation in most African states. Kenya has suffered numerous terrorist attacks mainly in Nairobi, North Eastern and Coastal regions including September 2013 Westgate attack in Nairobi, June 2014 Mpeketoni and Mporomoko attacks in Lamu, November 2014 bus attack in Mandera, April 2015 Garissa University attack, and the recent January 15<sup>th</sup> Dusit D2 attack in Nairobi that left up to 21 people dead, scores maimed and properties worth millions of shillings destroyed. The National Police Service (NPS) is one of the security agencies charged with counterterrorism in Kenya. The NPS have been deployed in large numbers in terrorist attack prone areas of North Eastern and Coastal regions, particularly Lamu County in an operation known as Linda Boni, to counter terrorism but with unsatisfying result. It is because of this that the study sought to interrogate counterterrorism strategies employed by the NPS in Lamu County.

## **III. METHODOLOGY**

This study employed survey research design which entailed the use of ex post facto design employing mixed method approach in data collection and analysis. Observation, photographs, questionnaires, FGDs and interview schedules were employed. Quantitative and qualitative analysis was done with information from secondary data and holding interviews with key informants. A review of counterterrorism strategy documents and reports was carried out for a comprehensive understanding of the topical issue and clarification of intricate areas arising from the research.

The study was conducted in Lamu County, Kenya. Lamu is located in the northern coast of Kenya. Lamu County is also the home to the expansive Boni forest which covers about 1,339 square kilometres and stretches to Somali, where Al-Shabaab terrorist has established their cell and operation base that they use to

train and launch attacks in Kenya (Fergusson, 2013). It is in this forest that a multiagency operation Linda Boni to flush out terrorists is on-going.

The study employed both probability and non-probability sampling method. In this study, the target population were 1900 officers of the NPS in Lamu County. These officers work in police stations, police posts, camps and operational bases and are currently engaged in counterterrorism operation Linda Boni. Additionally, data was obtained from 35 council of elders, administrators (23 chiefs and 1 county commissioner), and 54 religious leaders affected by terrorism and counterterrorism operation and purposively chosen. Stratified random sampling technique was employed to draw respondents from the NPS target population. The researcher then used simple random sampling to pick 189 officers of Other Ranks and Members of Inspectorate who together form a huge chunk of the NPS population. They were subjected to questionnaires. Gazetted Officers, who were 12 in number, were purposively sampled and were subjected to interview schedule.

For administrators (county commissioner and chiefs), council of elders, religious leaders and gazetted officers, purposive sampling was applied to select the sample size for each case. Since they were fewer in number and crucial for the study result, total population in each case was sampled for the study. Whereas religious leaders and council of elders were subjected to focus group discussion, gazetted officers of the NPS, county commissioner and chiefs were subjected to interview schedules. The researcher used available data in literature to examine cases of terrorist attacks in Lamu County. The documents included police and judicial records, published research and reports addressing security situation in Lamu County during the period under review and journals on counterterrorism. Quantitative and qualitative analysis methods were used to transform data into the required information in line with the research objectives. Data analysis systematically followed through data processing, presentation, analysis and interpretation.

**Table 1: Sample Size**


Category	Target Population	Sampling Strategy/Procedure	Sample Size
Other Ranks & Members Of Inspectorate	1888	Simple Random Sampling (10%)	189
Gazetted Officers (Senior Officers)	12	Purposive Sampling	12
Chiefs	23	Purposive sampling	23
Council of Elders	35	Purposive Sampling	35
Religious Leaders	54	Purposive Sampling	54
County Commissioner	1	Purposive Sampling	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>2013</b>		<b>314</b>

Source: Field Data, 2018

#### IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section presents and discusses key findings of the study.

##### Frequency of Terrorist Attacks in Lamu County



**Fig. 1: Frequency of Terrorist Attacks in Lamu County**


Source: Field Data, 2018

Due to terrorist attacks in Lamu County, the government deployed a large number of security personnel in the county to counter attacks. The operation that is still continuing to date is dubbed operation Linda Boni.’ The researcher sought to find out how frequent terrorists carry out attacks in Lamu County. From the results, 17.5% (55) of respondents indicated that the attacks were very frequent. 15.6% (49) indicated that the attacks were frequent while 54.2% (170) were neutral. Lastly, 12.7% (40) of the respondents indicated that the attacks were less frequent while none of the respondents indicated that there were no attacks at all. The findings were as presented in Figure 1.

Generally, there are attacks in Lamu County based on the findings. This explains why Operation Linda Boni has not been called off. The findings agree with Saferworld (2016) who stated that terrorist have continuously attacked targets in Lamu County killing both civilians and security personnel.

**Existence of Counterterrorism Strategies in the National Police Service**

The police, alongside other security agencies, have been deployed in Lamu County in large numbers to counter terrorists who have been carrying out attacks. It is against this backdrop that the study sought to find out if counterterrorism strategies existed in the National Police Service. Data was analysed and results presented as shown in Figure 2.



**Fig. 2:** Existence of Counterterrorism Strategies in the National Police Service

**Source:** Field Data, 2018


From the findings, 12.4% (39) of respondents strongly agreed that counterterrorism strategies existed in the National Police Service, whereas 63.2% (198) of the respondents agreed. Further 18.4% (58) were indifferent, while 5.0% (16) disagreed. Only 1.0% (3) of the respondents strongly disagreed that the strategies existed in the National Police Service.

The study revealed that respondents who disagreed (5.0%) and strongly disagreed (1.0%) that counterterrorism strategies exist in the National Police Service indicated that they had not been trained on counterterrorism nor inducted on counterterrorism strategies. The majority of respondents (63.2%) who agreed that counterterrorism strategies existed indicated that they have been employing the same in Operation Linda Boni hence were aware that they existed. Further 18.4% who were indifferent indicated that they couldn’t tell because they were not sure of what counterterrorism strategies entail. From the findings, it was evident that counterterrorism strategies existed in the NPS. Despite some respondents being unaware of the strategies, they were employing them in counterterrorism operation.

**Counterterrorism Strategies Employed by the National Police Service in Lamu County**

According to Shinn (2004), the need to develop a counter-terrorism strategy only received systematic attention after the US Embassy bombing and the later designation by the US government of Kenya as ‘an anchor state’ in the Horn of Africa and a ‘frontline’ in the ‘Global War on Terror’ GWOT. The US government perception of the Horn of Africa as a new front for Al-Qaeda also raised the profile of Kenya as a staging point for combating Al-Qaeda and allied groups in the region. The prior lack of Western interest in counterterrorism in Kenya was due to the perception that the earlier terrorist incidents were too isolated and minor to warrant any

serious attention, and in any case did not seriously threaten western interests. In this context, the study sought to establish the actual counterterrorism strategies employed by National Police Service in managing terrorism in Lamu County. Data collected were analysed and results presented in Figure 3.



**Fig. 3:** Counterterrorism Strategies Employed by the National Police Service in Lamu County  
**Source:** Field Data, 2018

Findings show a number of counterterrorism strategies with patrols leading with 89.5% (281 responses) followed by erection of physical barriers at 87.6% (275 responses). The two strategies are useful in preventing smuggling of arms, goods, narcotic and persons. Patrols and barriers deny enemy the freedom of dominating the ground. Patrols also aid in quick and timely response to incidences. Other strategies are prosecution at 44.9% (141 responses), joint operation at 28.3% (89 responses), intelligence gathering at 64.6% (203 responses), raids at 62.7% (197 responses), protecting vulnerable targets at 74.5% (234 responses), surveillance at 46.8% (147 responses), and ambush at 64.6% (203 responses).

As reiterated by Wilkinson (2006), the prevention of terrorism across the globe requires robust and well-crafted counterterrorism strategies accepted by all relevant players. No single state can prevent or combat any form of terrorism without some form of counterterrorism strategies and co-operation. The definitive objective of counter-terrorism is to prevent the loss of lives by proactively preventing or decreasing the number of terrorist attacks. The consequences obviously involve the hunting down of terrorists and targeting their movements; enhancing security domestically, continentally and internationally; and any other defensive measures seeking to contain or prevent terrorist attacks from dominating the ground.

#### Areas Addressed by Counterterrorism Strategy

In establishing the areas addressed by counterterrorism strategy, the respondents were asked to indicate the level at which different thematic areas had been covered by the strategy. The findings were as presented in Figure 4.

From the findings in Figure 4, it is evident that measures to address police welfare e.g. pay, allowances, housing, transfers etc. is poorly addressed as indicated by 92.6% (291) of the respondents. Individuals are motivated to perform works that would provide greater rewards after successful accomplishment. However, when the instrumentality or reward for a number of organisational performances is inadequate, motivation to perform different kinds of work declines (Burgoon, 1993). This view was held by several respondents who revealed that the proponents of counterterrorism strategies forgot to factor police welfare, despite them being the main manpower expected to enforce the same strategies in combating terrorism in Lamu County. This has led to low morale among officers, and could be attributed to failure of counterterrorism operation in Lamu. From the findings, it is also evident that human resource aspect of the strategy should be considered if any meaningful performance is to be achieved.




Fig. 4: Areas Addressed by Counterterrorism Strategies

Source: Field Data, 2018

Burgoon (1993) points out that individuals evaluate the rewards given to them for performance based on various aspects. This includes differential needs, values, goals and sources of motivation. On the basis of valence the motivations to accomplish different tasks also vary. Thus, while deciding to perform in a particular way, individuals give importance to the variable that has the greatest motivational force and reward. Police must therefore be fully motivated.

Findings in Figure 4 also show that measures to protect citizens and infrastructure are well addressed with 63.5% (199) of respondents giving affirmation. This can be attributed to the deliberate effort by the government to deploy large number of security personnel in Lamu County. In Kenya, airlines, tourist facilities and embassies are considered particularly vulnerable. Indeed, there have been several warnings by the West of terrorist plots to attack airlines, foreign embassies and Western tourists leading them to issue adverse travel warnings, close their embassies temporary and to suspend flights to and from Kenya (Wax, 2003).

From the findings in Figure 4, measures to enhance cooperation between police, other authorities and locals (50.8%) as well as measures to enhance intelligence gathering (52.9%) have been averagely covered by counterterrorism strategy, however results shows that the same is not true on the ground because of the mistrust between the police and locals. The police – public relationship is very poor. As a result locals are not ready to volunteer information/intelligence to the police.

According to Prestholdt (2011), intelligence officials have been accused numerous times of unlawfully detaining suspected terrorists for lengthy periods of time and torturing suspects in attempts to gain confessions and further intelligence. Local people thus see police and other security forces as a threat. Police must therefore change tact on the strategy to enhance cooperation with the locals, as well as intelligence sharing, which is

an important element in prevention of terror activities. As stressed by Prestholdt (2011), coordination and cooperation are key.

### Perception of Counterterrorism Strategies

Researcher was interested in knowing how respondents perceived counterterrorism strategies. The findings were as presented in Figure 5.




Fig. 5: Perception of Counterterrorism Strategies

Source: Field Data, 2018

From the finding, 5.3% (17) of the respondents view counterterrorism strategies as very effective, 16.9% (53) view them as effective whereas 31.7% (100) are neutral. Findings also indicate that 35.5% (111) of the respondents view counterterrorism strategies as ineffective while 10.6% (33) view them as very ineffective.

Respondents who indicated that the strategies are effective said this is because the attacks have not been as they were in previously, and especially 2014. They said attacks have reduced considerably, an indication that the strategies are effective. On the other hand, respondents who indicated that the strategies are ineffective explained that most strategies are not working.

### Satisfaction with Counterterrorism Strategies

The study sought to know if the respondents were satisfied with counterterrorism strategies. The findings were as presented in Figure 6.




Fig. 6: Satisfaction with Counterterrorism Strategies

Source: Field Data, 2018




From the Figure 6, 7.1% (22) of the respondents indicated that they were very satisfied. 16.8% (53) indicated that they were satisfied whereas 26.5% (83) were neutral. Findings further indicated that 38.9% (122) of the respondents indicated they were dissatisfied while 10.7% (34) of the respondents indicated they were very dissatisfied with counterterrorism strategies.

From the findings in Figure 6, it is evident that majority of the respondents are not satisfied with counterterrorism strategies. The reasons advanced by this group are that the strategies do not take of their welfare, and that the strategies are punitive and discriminatory. Their assertions are in line with that of Lunenburg (2011) who points out that employees can achieve maximum job satisfaction if the right motivator is provided to them. Further, these inadequacies affect morale and the temptation for corruption, which breeds an environment conducive for insecurity. Therefore, there is need to inculcate welfare issues in the strategy. Police also must build confidence with the general public in order to gain their trust and good will. At the moment, this is lacking, going by the complaints from the locals that strategies as skewed. To them, the strategies are meant to punish them. Such perception must be changed.

### Influence of Counterterrorism Strategies on Performance of the National Police Service in Managing Terrorism

The study sought to know the level at which counterterrorism strategies influence performance of police in managing terrorism. The findings were as presented in Figure 7.

From Figure 7, results revealed that 6.0% (19) of the respondents indicated very positively, 19.5% (61) indicated positively, while 31.0% (97) were neutral. Further results revealed that 35.6% (112) indicated negatively whereas 7.9% (25) indicated very negatively. Respondents who indicated very positively, (6.0%) and positively (19.0%) explained that the strategies have streamlined their duties thus bringing efficiency and enhancing their performance. They further explained that the application strategies has enabled them reduce the frequency of terrorist attacks.



**Fig. 7:** Influence of Counterterrorism Strategies on Performance of the National Police Service in Managing Terrorism in Lamu County

**Source:** Field Data, 2018


Respondents who were neutral (31.0%) were indifferent on whether their performance has been enhanced or not. They also indicated that there is no influence in their performance despite the strategies. Respondents who indicated negatively (35.5%) and very negatively (7.9%) explained that the strategies have widened the rift between security officers and the locals thus negatively influencing their performance.

Generally, there is negative influence on the performance. From the interviews, a large number of respondents expressed great mistrust between the security agencies and the locals, brought about by the use of the strategies, as one major challenge hindering their performance. Chumba et al. (2016) highlights the importance of inclusivity for enhanced performance by asserting that while security apparatus have a key role to play in counterterrorism, the responsibility for implementing counterterrorism strategies should not be theirs alone. Social organizations such as the locals, religious institutions, schools etc. and the police must together

take lead in counterterrorism. This will definitely lead to positive performance being realized in the management of terrorism in Lamu County and its environs.

**Efficacy of Counterterrorism Strategies in Counterterrorism Operation**

Counterterrorism is only successful if the strategies are effective. Security agencies should strive to enhance effective strategies and re-evaluate those strategies that are not working well. Those found not to be working can be modified accordingly. It is against this backdrop that the researcher sought to know efficacy of counterterrorism strategies employed in counterterrorism operation in Lamu County. The findings were as presented in Figure 8.



**Fig. 8:** Efficacy of Counterterrorism Strategies in Counterterrorism Operation in Lamu County  
**Source:** Researcher, 2018

Based on the findings from Figure 8 majority of the respondents cited protecting vulnerable target as the most effective strategy at 84.6% (170 responses) followed by joint operations at 82.6% (166 responses). Other effective strategies include surveillance at 69.7% (140 responses), patrols at 54.7% (110 responses), erecting physical barriers at 52.2% (105 responses), ambush at 37.8% (76 responses), intelligence gathering at 23.0% (46 responses), raids at 17.4% (35 responses) and prosecution at 14.9% (30 responses).

**V. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS**

The findings revealed that terrorist attack in Lamu County continue to happen hence pose a threat to peace and security. Although majority of police officers and other stakeholders are in agreement that counterterrorism strategies exist in the service, they were hardly involved in developing these strategies, a situation that has made them not embrace these strategies fully. It is also revealed that they are not sufficiently inducted on these strategies, a situation that paints a grave picture on their preparedness to manage terrorism. Furthermore, findings also reveal that they perceive counterterrorism strategies as ineffective, and counterterrorism operation as being poorly conducted. Empirical findings shows that the National Police Service has not fully involved its rank and file as well as other stakeholders in counterterrorism, a situation that has seen resentment and dissatisfaction with the operation brew as terror attacks continue.

Among the strategies influencing performance of National Police Service in Lamu County, protecting vulnerable targets (84.6%), joint operations (82.6%) and surveillance (69.7%) were cited as most effective. Other strategies mentioned were patrols (54.7%), ambush (37.8%), erecting physical barriers (52.2%), and intelligence gathering (23.0%). Raids (17.4%) and prosecution (14.9%) were cited as the least effective strategies. This was mainly because of the existence weak laws on terrorism that hardly convict terror suspects in courts, as well as raids that do not bear fruits but breeds resentment.

On strategies influencing performance of National Police Service, measures to address police welfare e.g. police pay, allowances, housing, transfers etc. (92.6%) is poorly addressed. Other areas that are poorly addressed in the strategy are measures in addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism (53.4%), measures to ensure respect for human rights and rule of law (46.0%), and measures to build police capacity including training and weapons (44.4%). Although measures to enhance intelligence gathering, detection and prevention (52.9%) and measures to enhance cooperation with local organization and other partners (50.8%) are well addressed, they are not effective on the ground given that findings has revealed that there is mistrust between the police and the public and non-cooperation of members of the public with security agencies making intelligence sharing nearly impossible.

This study noted that the fight against terrorism must be all encompassing. Counterterrorism strategies must take into account that not only the security agencies have parts to play, but all key stakeholders must be involved to bring about ownership and rout out suspicion. Leaving anyone out at any stage will simply complicate the whole process leading to failure of strategies. Justice Theory's notion that human resource (welfare, remuneration and training) is key in performance management is also supported.

## **VI. CONCLUSIONS**

The study confirmed theoretical notion that counterterrorism strategies are as varied as organizations, and a strategy that works for one organization/situation may not work for another. Further complicating the security landscape is the fact that there are several factors on the actual ground that greatly influences the strategies. Counterterrorism strategies employed by the police in Lamu County are ineffective and counterterrorism operations are poorly handled. The fight against terrorism must involve all stakeholders for acceptability and ownership. Counterterrorism strategies must take into account and address the prevailing circumstances and conditions on the ground such as marginalization and socio-economic factors for them to succeed. Generally, as terrorism and terror acts evolve, so must counterterrorism strategies evolve too, taking into account the prevailing circumstances and dynamics on the ground such as socio – economic and political factors, technology, propaganda and general environment. It is then that the war on terrorism will be practically won.

## **RECCOMENDATION**

Commanders of the National Police Service should ensure that they involve all their rank and file in developing counterterrorism strategies, as well as properly inducting them on the same to enhance their capacity and preparedness in managing terrorism. Consequently, all stakeholders, including elders, religious leaders, civil society organizations, youths, women and the community at large should be involved in counterterrorism in order to realise sense of ownership. Furthermore, the strategies should address key underlying issues both within and without the service such as training, pay, transfers, equipment, police-public relationship, corruption, human rights and injustices, socio-economic and political factors for the strategies to be acceptable and effective.

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