

The Japanese 15th Army AndThe INA Imphal Campaign Of1944

Kezhangulie Metha

Department of History,Mount TiyiCollege, Wokha, Nagaland, 797111, India

ABSTRACT: *The occupation of Burma in 1942 by the Japanese army brought the Second World War to Northeast India. On 8 March 1944, the Japanese 15th Army in Burma under the command of Lieutenant-General Mutaguchi launched its 15th and 33rd army divisions into Imphal with the objective to destroy the British 4 Corps based there. The fear of the Japanese was that the British could use Imphal as a springboard to recapture Burma which was within Japan's 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere'. The Japanese terminated the Kohima-Imphal road which compelled the British 4 Corps at Imphal to rely on air supply throughout the battle. The Indian National Army (INA) fought at Imphal in collaboration with the Japanese. The ultimate objective of the operation 'U-Go' or the Imphal campaign was to capture Imphal, Kohima and Dimapur and to help the INA penetrate into the plains of India to stir anti British uprising to liberate India from their control. The Japanese and the INA got defeated at Imphal after fighting pitch-battles with the Allied forces.*

KEYWORDS: *Imphal, Burma, British, Japanese, INA, war*

Date of Submission: 12-11-2018

Date of acceptance:26-11-2018

I. INTRODUCTION

On 8 March 1944, the Japanese 15th Army under the command of Lieutenant-General (LTG) Renya Mutaguchi launched its 15th Division under the command of LTG Masafumi Yamauchi and its best equipped 33rd Division, commanded by LTG Genzo Yanagida, against the British 4 Corps base at Imphal. The Japanese Imphal campaign was carried out under the code name, 'Operation U-Go' or 'Operation C'. Apart from these two divisions, Mutaguchi also launched the 15th Army's 31st Division under the command of LTG Kotoku Sato to attack the British 14th Army base at Kohima and its supply depot at Dimapur (Keane, 2011, 140-141). The three Japanese divisions, including Bose's INA, estimated to be 155,000 troops, crossed the Chindwin River and had fought against the British 14th Army at Imphal and Kohima (Toland, 2003, 612).

The Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) and the INA launched this campaign to attack specific targets in Northeast India. LTG Mutaguchi who prepared the tactical and strategic plan for the Imphal-Kohima campaign identified Imphal, Kohima and Dimapur to be the three most vital positions of the British. In particular, Dimapur held stores sufficient to sustain the Japanese army for several months together and the capture of Kohima would isolate Imphal from the rest of India by land route. Mutaguchi 'reasoned that capturing the massive depot (at Dimapur) would be a devastating, possibly terminal blow to the British ability to defend Imphal, supply Stilwell and mount offensive into Burma'. Secondly, it was important to capture Dimapur to enable Bose and the INA to penetrate into Bengal to initiate the long-awaited anti-British uprising (Lyman, 2010, 23). Among the three targets, Imphal was the selected battle ground of the Japanese 15th Army (Kirby, 2004, 299) because it was a strong British military base capable of launching any large-scale military offensive into Burma against the former (Ibid., 73). Therefore, the Japanese 15th Army offensive against Imphal was a part of its strategic plan to pre-empt any British counter-offensive into Burma [Japanese Monograph (JM) 134, 2011, 38].

II. OBJECTIVE

The paper is intended to reflect 'why' and 'how' the battle of Imphal was fought. It tries to analyse the Japanese 15th Army 'military objective' and the INA 'political objective' of the Imphal campaign and some of the other aspects of the battle, including factors responsible for the defeat of the two armies.

III. METHODOLOGY

The paper is based on some of the most relevant war history books and literatures written by some of the military officers who were involved in the India-Burma theatre. It includes official versions of the war of the government of UK and India. Standard books reflecting the versions of the top brass of the British 14th Army, the Japanese 15th Army and the INA, including documentary works on the subject of study authored by some of the noted military historians have been consulted. Besides these, news articles related to the area of study have been referred to, in the preparation of this paper.

IV. SOME IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE BATTLE

The twin battles of Imphal and Kohima were a part of the Burma campaign of 1944. The two battles were treated as one, and the victory of the Allied forces at Imphal and Kohima were counted as 'single victory'. The British 14th Army fought the two battles under the command of Field Marshall William Slim and Japan, by LTG Mutaguchi's 15th Army, based in Burma. Slim stated that it was not easy to follow the prolonged and hard-fought battle of Imphal-Kohima. He added that the twin battles 'swayed back and forth through great stretches of wild country; one day its focal point was a hill named on no map, the next a miserable, unpronounceable village, a hundred miles away. Columns, brigades, divisions, marched and counter-marched, met in bloody clashes, and reeled apart, weaving a confused pattern hard to unravel (Slim, 1962, 254)'. Hence, it is difficult to trace the events of the battles of Imphal and Kohima in systematic pattern.

There are several standard works on the battle of Imphal and Kohima, sources of which are drawn basically from military history and official records. As a consequence, the Imphal-Kohima battle is often understood from these dominant perspectives, especially by the general readers and scholars. The other important aspect associated with this area of study is the political objective of the INA vis-à-vis the wartime policy of Japan towards Imphal. The political objective of the INA was to liberate India from British rule with the support of Japan, but the territorial limit of Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere (GEACS) remained undefined throughout the war. By protocol, India was never treated as part of the sphere but the likely status of Imphal (in the event of Japan winning the war) became obvious when the Japanese 'asked Bose to deliver a radio broadcast on the Emperor's birthday, offering him Imphal as a present' just before the attack started (Toland, op. cit., 613). Japan intended to promote mutual prosperity, security and ultimately world peace through its economic bloc (Lebra, 1975, 74), with the countries within the GEACS. In fact, India itself was within the vision of the sphere of influence and Imphal inside Indian border was the westward limit of the strategic operations (Ibid. x). This is one controversial aspect in respect to the Imphal campaign of 1944 by the Japanese and the INA. In the perception of the West, Japan's GEACS was an example of Japanese imperialism against China and Southeast Asia.

LTG Kawabe, the chief of the Burma Area Army (BAA), stated in his memoir that the Imphal operation by the Japanese 15th Army was conceived out of strategic consideration alone as the only objective was to neutralize the British desire to launch counter offensive for recapturing Burma. This plan was not conceived as part of India policy of Japan. Therefore, criticism levelled against the Tojo government that it took the adventurous step of Imphal operation under pressure from Bose, is incorrect (Sareen, 2004, 352). However, it is worth noting that even though the Imphal operation was initially a military programme, political significance engineered by Bose and the INA influenced the top Japanese leaders. It is clear that the operational leadership also succumbed to the political aspect of the operation, forgetting the essential objective under which the operation was conceived. At the time when the Imphal-Kohima campaign started, the tide of the WW2 was turning against Japan on the other war fronts and thereby Japan was compelled to fight with greater determination. Thus, the political significance of the campaign became an important factor for them to win the twin battles of Imphal and Kohima. Even at the time when the war situation at Imphal was turning against the Japanese, they knowingly delayed the decision to terminate the war which was indicative of the political importance attached to the campaign. LTG Kawabe had mentioned that the reluctance to leave the grand plan of Bose to its own fate influenced the purely strategic judgment of the top leaders to a considerable extent. Hence, although Bose cannot be held directly responsible for initiating the Imphal Campaign, the decision to order the Japanese force to fight to death by the top leaders was considerably influenced by Bose's attitude towards this operation (Ibid., 352-353). Major-General A.C. Chatterji of the INA stated "I must say that Japan has proved her sincerity by her deed" (Chatterji, 1947, 223).

An account based on the statement of former BAA/ 15th Army officers stated that because of the political situation within and without India, Subhas Chandra Bose strongly desired a Japanese Army invasion of India with the support of the INA. The development of Japanese political policy towards India had influenced not only the Imperial General Headquarters but also the grand strategy in Burma operations (JM, op. cit., 36). The Japanese army and the INA had understanding in both political and military affairs and the latter was carried out under the jurisdiction of the BAA during the war. The mission and sector operation of the INA was determined at liaison officers' level of the BAA and INA. The INA unit operated under the operational command of a Japanese division commander of equivalent or higher rank. "As a rule, contacts between the BAA and the INA were made through the 'Hikari Kikan' Agency, a Japanese-sponsored secret intelligence agency headed by Major-General Isoda (Ibid., 48-49)."

The complex series of battles which were fought in Manipur in 1944 collectively came to be known as the battle of Imphal. The battle lasted for five months, ranging from the banks of the Chindwin to the road beyond Kohima and well into Assam (Allen, USA, 2002, 191). Just before the Imphal operation, the Japanese launched a campaign in Arakan region in early February 1944 as part of Mutaguchi's logistical plan, aimed at diverting the attention of the British army in that direction to carry out the larger scheme at Imphal. The Arakan

operation was expected to draw in British re-enforcements thereby making it easier for the Japanese to take on Imphal. However, the British- Indian forces were able to repulse the Japanese attack with air support provided by the Allied powers (Katoch, 2016, 53). Road access into the Imphal plain was possible only through the surrounding mountains and in 1944, except for the pre-war un-metalled Dimapur-Kohima-Imphal road, the other routes were not in usable state (Edwards, 2009, 16-17).

V. ARMY SET-UP AND THE INITIAL MOVES

As per the plan of LTG Mutaguchi, the Japanese 15th and 33rd divisions moved against the British and Indian 4 Corps at Imphal, while the 31st Division climbed into the Naga Hills and managed to terminate the British line of communication at Kohima. The 15th Division, the weakest of the Japanese 15th Army under the command of LTG Masafumi Yamauchi crossed the Chindwin and terminated the Imphal-Dimapur road and turned south to attack Imphal from the north. The 33rd Division under LTG Genzo Yanagida was the best equipped division of Mutaguchi which made two-pronged attacks against the 20th Indian Division at Tamu and the 17th Indian Division from the south (Keane, op. cit., 140-411). The Japanese 31st Division under LTG Sato concentrated the majority of its forces along the Kohima-Dimapur axis. However, the swift capture of the logistics base at Imphal was the key to Japanese success, because it contained logistic stocks required to sustain their soldiers (Higgins, 1984, 43).

Subhas Chandra Bose, the Prime Minister of the Provisional Government was the Head of the State and also the Supreme Commander of the Indian National Army. Field Marshall Count Terauchi, the commander of the Japanese forces in Southeast Asia, had wanted the INA's role to be limited to field propaganda units. But Bose did not agree to the plan because his principle was that any liberation of India secured through Japanese sacrifices would be worse than slavery (Majumdar, 1996, 590-591). Therefore, the Field Marshall agreed to send a regiment of the INA, the equivalent of a British brigade into India as a test and the rest, later. The first division of the INA, some ten thousand soldiers, was put under the command of Colonel Zaman Kiani. It was divided into three regiments, or brigades, which Bose named after Gandhi, Nehru, and Azad in a deliberate effort to make common cause with the struggle. Also, in response to Terauchi's challenge, the INA selected the best soldiers from the three regiments and formed the No.1 Guerrilla Regiment (under the command of Shah Nawaz Khan), intended as the first to be sent into action (Sugata Bose, 2011, 252). The INA 1st Division fought side by side with the Japanese army against the Allied forces at Imphal. They were successful in their mission against the British in Burma and towards the end of May 1944 about 150 to 300 INA soldiers were sent to Kohima to advance towards Brahmaputra and Bengal on the fall of Imphal. Colonel Zaman Kiani commanded two regiments of the Indian National Army, the 2nd (Gandhi) Regiment and the 3rd (Azad) Regiment. The Gandhi and Azad Brigade fought at Imphal alongside the Japanese army. The Gandhi Brigade 'was put in charge of an independent sector to the south of the main Tamu-Palel road and was instructed to carry out guerrilla activity against the enemy forces at Tamu front' (Majumdar, op. cit., 599). The Azad Brigade was brought from Malaya and reached Tamu after the second week of May 1944. 'The task allotted to it was that of carrying out intensive guerrilla activity against the British forces around Palel, the area assigned being north of the Tamu-Palel road' (Ibid., 601). This brigade did not see much action at Imphal.

On the side of the British, the IV Corps (of the 14th Army) under the command of LTG Geoffrey Scoones was in-charge of the Manipur theatre, with its base at Imphal. The 17th Indian Division, under the command of Major General D.T. 'Punch' Cowen; the 20th Indian Infantry Division, under the command of Major General Douglas Gracey; the 23rd Indian Infantry Division, under the command of Major General Ouvry Roberts; the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade, under the command of Brigadier Hope-Thomson; the 254 Indian Tank Brigade, under the command of Brigadier Reginald Scoones and with Corps Troops of Infantry, Artillery and Engineers as parts of the IV Corps (Lyman, GB, 2011, pp.269-272). Slim, the commander of the British 14th Army was confident that he could destroy the whole of Mutaguchi's 84,000 hosts. Therefore, he allowed the Japanese to advance deep into Manipur province in order to destroy them on the periphery of Imphal plain (McLynn, USA, 2011, 298). This ultimately resulted in the Japanese army over-stretching its lines of communication and their supply problems mounted day by day since they did not have mastery of the air like the British (Allen, op. cit., 188).

VI. THE MAIN EVENTS OF THE BATTLE

There were six different routes intersected at Imphal plain and the Japanese attempted to break in through it. These roads were the Kohima-Imphal road and the path down the Iril River Valley from the north, the Ukhrul road from the northeast, the tarmac Tamu-Palel road from the southeast, the rugged Tiddim highway from the south and the Silchar-Bishenpur track from the west (Slim, op. cit., 277). The battle of Imphal was practically fought along the six routes. Imphal, the capital city of Manipur and the base of the 4 Corps saw very little action in 1944. The battles along the Tiddim Road were fought under the command of Major General D.T. 'Punch' Cowan of the 17th Indian Division and on the Japanese side, under Lieutenant General Yanagida and

subsequently, General Tanaka Nobuo. Of all the six routes to Imphal, the Tiddim road had experienced the heaviest fighting in the battle of Imphal where three main battles were fought between the Japanese and the British. Here, the Japanese 33rd Division attempted to destroy the British position at Potsangbam and Ningthoukhong village and further their advance towards Silchar-Bishenpur track where they had concentrated the bulk of their forces. At Ningthoukhong was fought the fiercest and the longest battle in the Imphal valley between the British-Indian forces and the Japanese during the battle of Imphal. Fierce battle also took place at Red Hill (Point 2926 or MaibangLopaching), located along the Tiddim Road. This was the closest point the Japanese had reached in their march towards Imphal from the south. The Japanese attempted to cut off the Tiddim Road at Red Hill to prevent the British from sending reinforcement to Bishenpur. In the later part of 1944, almost 500 Japanese soldiers were wiped-out from Red Hill by combined British-Indian forces under the command of Brigadier E.G. Woods. Bishenpur was the main British defensive position on the Tiddim Road and vitally important to them for the defence of Tiddim Road sector. The Japanese needed this post to launch their heavy guns and armour on Imphal but ultimately the battle for Bishenpur cost them one whole company of soldiers. The road block at Torbung by Brigadier Ronnie Cameron's 48th Brigade paralyzed the movement of the Japanese along the Tiddim Road and its surroundings. This resulted in fierce infantry and artillery battle between the two (Katoch, 2016, 75-81). Only in mid-July the 17th Division was able to take over operations on the Tiddim road after the Japanese were driven out of Imphal plain (Slim, op. cit., 260). The Tiddim Road stretches northwards from Tiddim village in the Chin Hills of Myanmar right up to Imphal and most of the battles during the withdrawal- at Tongzang, Singgel, Sakawang- were fought on the Burma side of the road (Katoch, 2014, 108).

The swift capture of the Tamu-Imphal and Tidim-Imphal roads and Imphal itself, was important for the Japanese to supply their troops from Burma by vehicles (Evan & Brett-James, 1962, 63). Therefore, the Tamu-Palel Road (Moreh Road) was the other important sector which witnessed fierce battle, especially at Shenam Saddle. From mid-March to mid-May, the 20th Indian Division under the command of Major General Douglas Gracey and later, the 23rd Indian Division commanded by Major General Ouvry Roberts fought against Major General Yamamoto of the Japanese 33rd Division's infantry group. Two battalions of the Japanese 15th Division also had fought alongside the 33rd Division on this stretch of road. The Japanese attempt to by-pass the Shenam from the north was checked but the British were able to evict them from the saddle only in the last week of July. Palel was important for the Japanese because of the all-weather airfield which kept the 4 Corps supplied during the siege of Imphal. The Japanese could replenish their supplies and weaken the defence of Imphal by capturing this airfield, but they failed in their attempts. The Gandhi and Azad Brigades of the 1st INA Division also fought on the left and right flank of Yamamoto Force on the Tamu-Palel Road. It was from this place that their 'March to Delhi' started (Grant, 2003, 95-99).

Ukhrul is located on the northeast of Manipur and in 1944 it had served as the entry and exit point of the two Japanese divisions, 31st and 15th. From mid-March to July fierce battles were fought at Kharasom and Jessami which were more connected to the battle of Kohima. The battles of Imphal and Kohima overlapped at this place because of the participation of the 1st Assam Regiment that was detailed there for the defence of Kohima. The 58th Regiment of the 31st Division under Major General Miyazaki (he later took over as the commander of the Japanese 31st Division from LTG Sato), based at Ukhrul, fought at Shangshak, which was under the control of the Japanese 15th Division. The Honda Raiding Unit under the command of Major Honda and a part of 15th Division under Lieutenant General Yamauchi terminated the Kohima-Imphal Road at 'Mission' (Kangpokpi). Successive British-Indian forces were sent to fight at Ukhrul and Shangshak sectors. Sections of the 23rd Indian Division, 50th Indian Parachute Brigade, the 5th Indian Division and the 20th Indian Division all fought in this area. In July 1944, as the final assault against the Japanese intensified the British 33 Corps took over the task from the 4 Corps. The Chindits 23rd Long Range Penetration Brigade had played an operational role on Ukhrul Road by cutting the Japanese line of communication and their escape route out of Ukhrul to Burma (Ibid. 113-14/ Ghosh, 1969, 177). During the entry of the Japanese into Imphal and Kohima, the vastly outnumbered British force at Shangshak fought for several days in the mountain village against Japanese attacks, thereby delaying the latter's march towards Kohima and Imphal. This gave just enough time for the 4th Corps in Imphal to organize itself; kept the Imphal-Kohima Road open for a few more days; and allowed the 5th Indian Division to be flown into Imphal from the Arakan and straight to this sector (Katoch, 2014, op. cit., 106).

The 2nd and 3rd Battalion of the INA 1st Division (Subhas Brigade) under the command of Shanawaz Khan was present at Ukhrul (Ibid., 115). They were to relieve the Japanese at Kohima but none of them reached the place; only Shanawaz and a few of them went a little beyond Ukhrul for reconnaissance and returned. Shahnawaz ordered the withdrawal of his force from Ukhrul on the 20th of June (Toye, 1959, 125), since the retreat of the Japanese and the INA from Kohima had already started and the order to follow the same had come from Bose (Chatterji, op. cit., 182).

The tactical plan of the Japanese 15th Army was to attack Imphal from the North but the last point they could penetrate was Nungshigum in the Iril River Valley where they faced fierce battles with the British army. The Iril River Valley in the Mapao-Molvom Range was important to the Japanese because of their supply line across the Imphal-Kohima Road from the east. The British attempted to block this supply line with reinforcement from the 5th Division (under the command of Major General Harold Briggs), flown in from the Arakan. However, the Japanese managed to capture the peaks and occupied it throughout the siege of Imphal. It was only after the British managed to re-open the Imphal-Kohima Road in June 1944 that the Japanese evacuated from this range (Katoch, 2016, 129-130). The major stretch of the Dimapur-Kohima-Imphal Road sector remained like a battle field in 1944. The termination of the road between Kohima and Imphal near Kangpokpi isolated Imphal by land throughout the war. Like-wise, the Silchar-Bishenpur route was also terminated in the middle of April by the Japanese to intensify the siege of Imphal. In April, the Japanese 15th Division attack near Sekmai was defeated by the 63rd Brigade of the 17th Indian Division. The Japanese failed to advance beyond this point on the Imphal-Kohima Road but they were able to drive out the British at Kanglatonbiand managed to block the road. Subsequently, in the month of May, sections of the 5th and 7th Indian divisions based at Sekmai attacked the Japanese at Kanglatonbi for a week and defeated them (Ibid., 146-147). With the opening of the Kohima-Imphal road on the 22nd of June, more British troops, supplies and ammunitions arrived at Manipur and the battle of Imphal reached its terminal phase (Grant, op. cit., 202). On the recommendation of the BAA, Field-Marshal Count Terauchi of the Japanese Southern Army ordered the abandonment of the Imphal offensive on the evening of 4th July (Kirby, op. cit., 368).

Several factors have been attributed to the defeat of the Japanese and the INA at Imphal. One of these factors appear to be the lack of understanding and coordination between the Military Government of General Tojo; General Kawabe, the chief of the BAA; and among the generals of the 15th Army, in respect to the execution of battle plans and the objective of the Imphal-Kohima campaign. For instance, 'Between 10th May and 27th June, in the middle of a battle, three divisional commanders had been relieved of their appointments' (Kirby, op. cit., ref. 4, 368). The Japanese also did not attach much importance to good intelligence, or if they did, they obtained it in the wrong way. On the whole, their information was poor and often inaccurate (Evan & Brett-James, op. cit., 85). The onset of monsoon and tropical diseases, lack of food supply, ammunition, medicines and air support played decisive roles in the defeat of the Japanese and the INA, both at Imphal and Kohima. Major-General Shahnawaz Khan had attributed the failure of the Japanese and the INA at Imphal to bad luck. He had stated that the Japanese and INA came very near to capturing it and at one time they were only miles away from it. He added that the British themselves tried several times to evacuate their forces from Imphal in order to retreat to Dimapur but for the Imphal-Kohima road block put up by the INA and the Japanese which prevented them. He opined that had this road been left open to the British, they would certainly have retreated from Imphal (Khan, 1946, 124). Airpower had played crucial roles in the victory of the Allied powers and the Imphal air field was mainly used for the air operations since the one at Palel remained exposed to Japanese artillery fire and commandos during the battle of Imphal (McLynn, op. cit., 325-326).

The Allies incurred an estimated 6,740 casualties, including dead and injured. The estimated number of casualties incurred by the Japanese soldiers on the Tiddim Road sector (including some portions in Burma where this road passes through) is: 7,900 killed, 2100 died of wounds, 4300 died of sickness and 12,000 wounded. The British had the advantage of air superiority and the traditionally bold Japanese method of fighting incurred tremendous losses. The Bahadur Group of the INA under the command of Colonel S.A. Malik hoisted their army flag for the first time in Indian soil at Moirang on 14 April 1944 (Grant, op. cit., 243-245).

VII. CONCLUSION

The operation U-Go was a futile military conquest carried out by the Japanese 15th Army in 1944. Senior military officers like LTGLida, the former commander of the Japanese 15th Army, considered the plan to be unrealistic and had worked against it. Even LTG Mutaguchi had advised against such campaign when he was the divisional commander of the Japanese 18th Division (Bond and Tachikawa, 2005, 105). The Imphal campaign cost heavy human casualties and the Japanese army had suffered the most. Japan's 15th, 18th, 33rd 55th and the INA divisions suffered mortal blow and lost both defensive and offensive capabilities. The defeat of the Japanese at Kohima and Imphal eliminated the Japanese threat in Burma, enabled the resupply to China and secured northeast India. The battle of Imphal-Kohima did not provide any significant advantage to the Allied powers other than to boost the morale of British who had suffered major defeats in the hands of the Japanese in 1942 (Higgins, op. cit., 80-81). The twin battles of Imphal and Kohima was adjudged as the 'greatest ever battle involving British forces' in 2013 by the National Army Museum, Britain and was followed by D-Day and Normandy and Waterloo (Royal British, Kohima, 2013). In the context of India, the INA proved that the Indian soldier was not a mere mercenary but was ready to lay down his life for the motherland; and portrayed a brilliant example of communal harmony and comradeship. The Army also had sent out a strong warning to India's foreign rulers that they could no longer depend upon the loyalty of the Indian troops to keep India under their

control. Though the role played by the INA in collaboration with Japan for the liberation of India in 1944 had failed, the provisional Government established by Bose was able to internationalize the Indian question and the recognition of India's independence by some of the foreign countries (Chand, Vol. IV, New Delhi, 1992, 422-423). It is assumed that the INA movement indirectly hastened the early declaration of India's Independence.

REFERENCE

- [1]. Keane, F. Road of bones (London, 2011)
- [2]. Toland, J. The rising sun (New York, 2003)
- [3]. Kirby, S.W. The war against Japan (England, 2004)
- [4]. Japanese monograph 134, Burma operation record, 15th army operations in Imphal area and withdrawal to northern Burma (United States Army, Japan, 2011)
- [5]. Lyman, R. Kohima 1944 (Great Britain, 2010)
- [6]. Slim, W. Defeat into victory (Great Britain, 1962)
- [7]. Lebra, J.C. Japan's greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere in World War II (Kuala Lumpur, 1975)
- [8]. Sareen, T.R. Indian National Army: a documentary study, Vol. IV (New Delhi, 2004)
- [9]. Allen, L. Burma the longest war 1941-1945 (USA, 2002)
- [10]. Katoch, H.S. The battle fields of Imphal (New York, 2016)
- [11]. Edwards, L. Kohima: The furthest battle (Great Britain, 2009)
- [12]. Lyman, R. Japan's last bid for victory (Great Britain, 2011)
- [13]. McLynn, L. The Burma campaign (USA, 2011)
- [14]. Higgins, W.J. and Staff Group 10-C, Imphal-Kohima (Kansas, May 1984)
- [15]. Majumdar, R.C. History of the freedom movement in India, Vol. III (Calcutta, 1996)
- [16]. Bose, S. His Majesty's opponent (Mumbai, 2011)
- [17]. Katoch, H.S. The battle of Imphal: March-July 1944 (Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, 2014)
- [18]. Evans, G. & Brett-James, A. Imphal (New York, 1962)
- [19]. Grant, I.L. Burma: the turning point (South Yorkshire, 2003)
- [20]. Toye, H. The springing tiger (Bombay, 1959)
- [21]. Khan, S. Ina & its netaji (Delhi, 1946)
- [22]. Chatterji, A.C. India's struggle for freedom (Calcutta, 1947)
- [23]. Bond, B. and Tachikawa, K. British and Japanese military leadership in the Far Eastern War 1941-1945 (New York, 2005)
- [24]. "Royal British Legion pays tribute to WW2 heroes" (Nagaland Post News, Kohima, October, 15, 2013)
- [25]. Chand, T. History of freedom movement in India, vol. IV (New Delhi, 1992)

Kezhangulie Metha "The Japanese 15th Army And The INA Imphal Campaign Of 1944" International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention (IJHSSI), vol. 07, no. 11, 2018, pp. 19-24