

John Locke: some of his ideas concerning knowledge, politics, religion and education for thinking over this global age (a Theoretical approach)

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ABSTRACT: *The theme of this text is like this: the importance of the thought of John Locke, British empiricist philosopher, concerning knowledge, politics, religion and education in the global age. Thereby, the question that one searches for answering is this: nowadays, inside the global age, why is a thinker like John Locke still so important in order to support reflections about epistemological, political, religious and educational questions? The kind of research here reported is a theoretical approach. The development of this discourse followed these steps, based on some works of the chosen English author: first, some considerations about his theory of knowledge; second, some approaches concerning his political theory; third, some reflections under his ideas on religion; fourth, some discussions concerning his thoughts over education. The results of this inquiry are these: Locke is one of the most eminent theorists of experience and it is essential to build knowledge; therefore, his thought must not be neglected; he is also very important to reflect about natural rights of mankind, which must be granted by Commonwealth; his ideas over toleration, that reinforce the distinction between Church and Commonwealth, are still useful to think about how to deal with several religious beliefs and political opinions; his educational thought outlines that education is a psychophysical that must equally treat both body and soul. Due to the current of his thought, it must be recommended and also revisited in order to think and make the present global age.*

Keywords: *Education. Epistemology. John Locke. Philosophy. Politics. Religion.*

I. INTRODUCTION

John Locke (1632-1704), English modern philosopher, is an empiricist thinker whose works have contributed to think about the conception of modernity. His ideas concerning knowledge, politics, religion and education, for example, have helped to make a world view based on these values: experience, science, philosophy, freedom, equality, toleration, civility, reasonableness, virtue and self-domain. Thus, he is one of the most important minds who described the modernity, which has as one of its consequences the global age. So, revisiting him means to look for one of the foundations which makes possible to explain and comprehend the present world, because John Locke's works sums the modernity up.

This text intends to select some John Locke's works, in order to respectively discuss about his conceptions of knowledge, politics, religion and education; they are these: *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Two Treatises of Government, A Letter Concerning Toleration and Some Thoughts Concerning Education*. Some of his key ideas inside those works will be brought to this discussion, because they are still profitable to reflection about global age; that is: some questions thought and answered by Locke are also present questions; so, his epistemology still offers elements to think about knowledge in general and, especially, about science and technology; his political theory is useful to treat on legal society, state and property; his ideas about religion are able to argue against the lack of toleration around the world; his educational thought may help concerning how to prepare people to be intellectually and morally virtuous, living according to reason rules.

Revisiting John Locke is an opportunity to think about questions which overcome ages, because he is a philosopher; so, his thoughts are about eternal, general or universal questions. Moreover, there are problems which are not definitively solved; thus, his reflections and answers may help to find new ways to deal with new challenges which still stay before the present mankind. Such as in Locke's times, nowadays one deals with theoretical and practical problems about knowledge, because its increasing and expansion bring another challenges; the same may be said about politics, because there are many factors which rise many questions about power, property and droit legitimacy; concerning political and religious toleration, at the present time, the mixture between politics and religion around the world rises again problems of violence against different viewpoints both in matter of faith either government; under education, the priority of moral formation in relation to intellectual formation outlines the importance of the conduct training inside the pedagogical process. Finally, this text shows, under John Locke's perspective, that is imperative to rescue the importance of the philosophical tradition, in order to rethink many ways which perhaps are not right, because there are several risks in the global age whose causes are the lack of a philosophical reflection about many ideas, values and actions; for example:

aggression to environment in a world scale; increasing of violence around the world because of ethnic, politic and religious causes; life standard in practically all countries based only on economic prosperity. Due to dangerous consequences of it, perhaps John Locke's philosophy may help how to find another way to direct the global civilization. The plan of this text is this: First topic: some of John Locke's ideas about epistemology or theory of knowledge; second topic: some ideas of his political and social theory; third topic: some of his ideas about toleration; fourth topic: some of his ideas concerning education.

II. DEVELOPMENT

II. I. Some ideas concerning epistemology or theory of knowledge, according to John Locke

Because John Locke is one of the most important authors who represent the British Empiricism, his ideas about knowledge must not be neglected. Thus, especially inside this topic, some of his epistemological ideas will be treated and his work from which his ideas will be extracted is this: *An essay concerning human understanding*; it is divided into four books; in the first of them, Locke discusses about notions or principles, both theoretical either practical; in the second of them, he treats ideas; in the third of them, he deals with words; in the four of them, he concerns with the distinction between knowledge and opinion.

This text will follow the same division adopted by Locke in his aforesaid work, in order to show his ideas which sum his epistemological thought up. However, before discussing about some of the contents of the four books of his essay, it is also profitable to offer the main topic of that work, that is: the understanding. Thereby, in *The epistle to the reader*, a kind of general introduction to his work, Locke outlines the importance of knowing the understanding, that is, according to him, the superior power of the soul, due to which, it is possible to look for truth (supposed finality of thinking), as well as to find pleasure (supposed finality of feeling). It means that, by understanding, the human being is able both to think either to feel. Thus, being both reasonable either sensible due to understanding, if he searches for knowing this own understanding, then, he will find the self-knowledge. The following quote, extracted from the aforesaid epistle, will enrich those arguments: Reader, I here put into thy hands, what has been the diversion of some of my idle and heavy hours; if it has the good luck to prove so of any of thine, and thou hast but half so much pleasure in reading, as I had in writing it, thou wilt as little think thy money, as I do my pains, ill bestowed. Mistake not this, for a commendation of my work; nor conclude, because I was pleased with the doing of it, that therefore I am fondly taken with it now it is done. He that hawks at larks and sparrows, has no less sport, though a much less considerable quarry, than he that flies at nobler game: and he is little acquainted with the subject of this treatise, the UNDERSTANDING, who does not know, that as it is the most elevated faculty of the soul, so it is employed with a greater, and more constant delight than any of the other. Its searches after truth, are a sort of hawking and hunting, wherein the very pursuit makes a great part of the pleasure. Every step the mind takes in its progress towards knowledge, makes some discovery, which is not only new, but the best too, for the time at least (LOCKE, 1996, p. 1). In the first book of his essay, Locke denies every kind of innate principles in the mind, both theoretical either practical ones. He appoints that only acquired principles are possible, because, arguing against those who defended innate principles, whose arguments based mainly on general acceptance, he wrote:

Universal consent proves nothing innate. This argument, drawn from *universal consent*, has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, there were certain truths, wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shown, how men may come to that universal agreement, in the things they do consent in; which I presume to be done (LOCKE, 1996, p. 8). If there are no innate principles, then, they cannot be supposed by acceptance or appeal, because both are only a matter of convenience and it is just how they decide or want to be not how the things really are or seem. According to Aaron: We cannot then argue from universal assent to the innateness of the knowledge of the principles. Nor again is it possible to claim for such knowledge any priority in time. Clearly the knowledge of the principles, abstract as it is, comes late. Sensation, recognition, seeing that red is not white, are all prior to our knowledge of the principle of non-contradiction. It is strange that the last named, none the less, should be singled out as a 'native inscription' (AARON, 1971, p. 85).

There is no way to Locke but this: rejecting all kind of principles, even they that can be universally accepted or requested. Therefore, there will only be principles which mind will conceive by itself, through ideas drawn from experience. Because of his position, Locke became one of the most adversaries of the doctrine of innate ideas. Summarily: According to this doctrine, certain fundamental components of human knowledge are inborn rather than acquired by processes of observation, learning and reasoning – inborn because they are part of the very frame of the human mind as God designed it. In virtue of their supposedly divine source, these components of human knowledge were not to be questioned or doubted, in the view of upholders of the doctrine – many of whom had vested interests of a religious or political character which could, by this device, be placed beyond the scope of publicly acceptable criticism. Locke's fierce opposition to the doctrine of innate ideas was

undoubtedly motivated, at least in part, by his hatred for the cloak that it provided for obscurantist and authoritarian dogmas (LOWE, 2005, p. 22).

In the second book of his essay, after denying innate principles, Locke makes his next step against innateness: there are no innate ideas. It is his second moment of his attack to the doctrine of innate ideas. Although the term 'idea' was already employed by innateness upholders, Locke assumes it and shows his own definition of that term: *Idea is the object of thinking*. Every man being conscious to himself, that he thinks, and that which his mind is employed about whilst thinking being the *ideas*, that are there, 'tis past doubt, that men have in their minds several *ideas*, such as are those expressed by the words, *whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness*, and others: it is in the first place then to be inquired, how he comes by them? I know it is a received doctrine, that men have native *ideas*, and original characters stamped upon their minds, in their very first being. This opinion I have at large examined already; and, I suppose, what I have said in the foregoing book, will be much more easily admitted, when I have shown, whence the understanding may get all the ideas it has, and by what ways and degrees they may come into the mind; for which I shall appeal to everyone's own observation and experience (LOCKE, 1996, p. 33).

If there are no innate ideas, then, they must have another origin. Like an empiricist philosopher, Locke upholds that the fountain of them is only experience. Summing up, it is both sensation either reflection. Sensation is an exterior sensorial affection (external experience). Reflection is an interior mental operation (internal experience). Together, sensation and reflection provide for mind every kind of ideas. Surely, experience is not innate, only acquired. Therefore, ideas depend of it; that is: they come from it; they are limited by it; they are changed by it; there are no ideas without experience; that is: no experience, no idea; no idea, no thinking; no thinking, no reason; no reason, no human life; no human life, no human being. This Locke's quote confirms it:

All ideas come from sensation or reflection. Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any *ideas*; how comes it to be furnished? Whence come it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from *experience*: in that, all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either about *external, sensible objects; or about the internal operations of our minds, perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that, which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking*. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the *ideas* we have, or can naturally have, do spring (LOCKE, 1996, p. 33). Along the second book of his essay, Locke works on describing his theory of ideas. It is an exhaustive discourse about the nature of ideas, which explains with a very richness of details the prime matter or the former subject (*materia prima*) of knowledge and also of reason. According to Lowe:

Locke seems at least sometimes to be using the term 'idea' to refer to such experiential features. However, he also uses the term at times to refer to what we would now call *concepts*, that is, the meaningful components of thoughts that we may entertain about the world and attempt to communicate to one another in language – such as the thought that this apple is red and that one green. But, as I also indicated earlier, it would be unfair simply to accuse Locke of a confusion between percepts and concepts, because it is part of Locke's very project in the *Essay* to forge a link between our conceptual resources and features of our perceptual experience. The dual role played by ideas in Locke's kind of empiricism is essential to this project (LOWE, 2005, p. 33). In the third book of his essay, by dealing with his conception of word, first of all, Locke upholds that language is an essential faculty of mankind, a gift of God, its creator; thanks to it, men can live together in community.

Man fitted to form articulate sounds. GOD having designed man for a sociable creature, made him not only with an inclination, and under a necessity to have fellowship with those of his own kind; but furnished him also with language, which was to be the great instrument, and common tie of society. *Man* therefore had by nature his organs so fashioned, as to be *fit frame articulate sounds*, which we call words. But this was not enough to produce language; for parrots, and several other birds, will be taught to make articulate sounds distinct enough, which yet, by no means, are capable of language (LOCKE, 1996, p. 176). However, as he also adds, language is not simply ability of producing articulate sounds (words); moreover, there must be ideas to support them; that is: according to Locke, language is an association between ideas and words, whose end is to set communication among people; so, ideas furnish meaning for words, as well as words furnish sign for ideas: that is the nature of their association. Thus:

Besides articulate sounds therefore, it was farther necessary, that he should be *able to use these sounds, as signs of internal conceptions*; and to make them stand as marks for the *ideas* within his own mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the thoughts of men's minds be conveyed from one to another (LOCKE, 1996, p. 176). Through language, ideas and words combine in order to make human beings understand one another. It is not only important to their mutual communication and their community life, but it also make

possible to share and to spread knowledge among them, although there are risks of misunderstanding, because the communication process is not perfect. It means that:

The purpose of language is to expand the knowledge of each of us by allowing us to communicate our ideas, and especially our general ideas, to others, and to acquire new ideas from them; but as we have no direct access to the ideas of others, and no way of determining upon a scheme of general terms without choosing criteria to define the boundaries of species ourselves, we can have no guarantees that we will use our language to say the same things about the same objects and thus that we will succeed in the communication of ideas at which we aim (GUYER, 2006, p. 113-114).

In the fourth book of his essay, there is his distinction between knowledge and opinion (also called assent, belief or faith by Locke); although both seem to be the same thing (because they are no doubt together), Locke occupies himself of separating them, because if there is confusion between them, therefore, there will be error and it is opposite to search of truth, indeed. Moreover, upon the question concerning the difference between knowledge and opinion there is the difference between science and religion, so precious to Locke, because, according to his thought, they are possible to coexist in harmony. According to Wolterstorff: Locke held, indeed, that assent always accompanies knowledge; but he denied what has become a fundamental tenet of epistemology in our own day, namely, that knowledge is a *species* of assent. Assent or belief, says Locke, is *taking* some proposition to be true, whereas knowledge is *seeing* it to be true. To know is to be directly acquainted with some fact, to be immediately aware of it, to perceive it; or, to put the point from the other side, knowledge occurs when some fact is presented directly to the mind (WOLTERSTORFF, 2006, p. 176).

Locke's knowledge definition reinforces his empiricist perspective, because his conception of knowledge is nothing else but the consequence of his conception of idea; that is: from his theory of idea, he comes to his theory of knowledge. Perception is the keyword; it is one of the powers of mind; by using it, mind discovers if there is connection (agreement) or disconnection (disagreement) between at least two ideas inside mind. Thus, there are two perspectives of knowledge, according to Locke; one is positive, because refers to a presence of a link between ideas; another negative, because refers to an absence of a link between them; however, in both cases, there is mind perception:

Knowledge is the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas. Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnance of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this perception is, there is knowledge, and where it is not, there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge. For when we know that *white is not black*, what do we else but perceive, that these two ideas do not agree? When we possess ourselves with the utmost security of the demonstration, that *the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones*, what do we more but perceive, that equality to two right ones necessarily agree to, and is inseparable from the three angles of a triangle? (LOCKE, 1996, p. 224).

Locke's knowledge conception is simply summed in this sentence up: ideas agreement or disagreement perception made by mind. However, not always mind is able to perceive both connection either repugnance among ideas. Then, it can resort to its other powers in order to obtain something not necessarily true, but supposedly true: that is just the nature of faith, born from probability, not from certainty: *Probability* is likeness to be true, the very notation of the word, signifying such a proposition, for which there be arguments or proofs, to make it pass or to be received for true. The entertainment the mind gives this sort of propositions, is called *belief, assent, or opinion*, which is the admitting or receiving any proposition for true, upon arguments or proofs that are found to persuade us to receive it as true, without certain knowledge that it is so. And herein lies the *difference between probability and certainty, faith and knowledge*, that in all the parts of knowledge, there is intuition; each immediate *idea*, each step has its visible and certain connection; in belief not so. That which makes me believe; something not evidently joined on both sides to, and so not manifestly showing the agreement, or disagreement of those *ideas*, that are under consideration (LOCKE, 1996, p. 303-304).

According to those aforesaid explanations about Locke's epistemology, one verifies that it is very useful in order to think about knowledge in the present global age. When Locke apologies experience like unique source of ideas, he argues against innateness that there are only acquired ideas; therefore, all knowledge is also acquired. That theory is very profitable to combat every kind of dogmatism: if experience is contingent, so, its ideas are, too. Knowledge is made by depending on ideas conceived; it is because there is no reason to conceive absolute truth, in matter of knowledge, which is circumstantial; that is: relative to human experiential capacity and limited by several factors, internally or externally; finally, experience is not perfect yet, although it is perfectible or progressive:

In the Locke's view, then, though we are fitted to know some things, we are not fitted to know everything. The most obvious and large-scale limitation is the lack of scientific knowledge in natural philosophy, but there are others that Locke cites – all of them standard and frequently cited problems in seventeenth-century philosophy (WOOLHOUSE, 2006, p. 169). Besides, experience is not only individual; it is also social. Therefore, it is generally, relative to culture, age and place; specifically, it is relative to several

factors which could be mentioned here. Anyway, according to Locke's perspective, experience is a human production. Mankind produces its experience along history, but not without difference, diversity or peculiarity; it means that: several human commonwealths, during their existence, have left behind them their legacy, according their relations with their world; that legacy is the most proof of their experience. Along ages, history has witnessed people after people disappearing, others still subsisting. In the last resort, there is no reason to appoint this civilization better than that one. It is only a matter of different experiences, extracted from these approaches about Locke's thought. Then, this apology of his thought, based on his epistemology, shows that his theory of knowledge is helpful to think about and promote respect for the diversity of experiences around the world, because each person and people deserve to be respected according to their peculiarity.

II. II Some ideas concerning political and social theory, according to John Locke

As a political and social philosopher, John Locke is a thinker whose works make him belong to liberalism. Although that term is to be very equivocal, due to many meanings which has assumed (economically, politically and religiously), summarily, liberalism is a doctrine, raised in Modern Age, which keyword is freedom. According to liberal thought, freedom is one of the fundamental or natural rights of mankind in general, and, in especial, of individual. Locke's liberalism upholds that, as well as freedom, there are other rights by nature, like these: life, equality and labour; only one word is able to sum them up: property. In Locke's *Two treatises of government*, there is his main ideas which make his political and social theory. The first part (*First treatise*), is, particularly, a refutation to Sir Robert Filmer (1588-1653), whose book, summarily entitled *Patriarcha*, is an apology to the theory of divine right to absolute monarchy. The second part (*Second treatise*) is, generally, Locke's explanation of his political and social thought, although there is another author, whose ideas are especially refuted, too, Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). According to Aaron:

The principle involves a particular view of government and of political community. Locke set himself to refute two theories which were used to justify privilege, oppression, and political slavery. The first was the theory of the divine right of kings as put forward by Robert Filmer, that the king is the divinely ordained father of his people, and that the relation between king and subjects is precisely the same as that between father and child. Locke ridicules the comparison. In the modern state, a large, highly complex organization, parental or patriarchal government is no longer possible, and the claim that it is divinely ordained cannot be substantiated. The second theory, implicit no doubt in Filmer, is to be found in its most explicit form in the works of Hobbes, although Locke does not refer to Hobbes by name, at least in the *Treatise*. Government, in this theory, necessarily involves the complete subjection of the governed to the absolute will of the governor, for without such subjection no civil society is possible. Locke denies this theory categorically. The facts of human experience are against it and reason is against it. A political community is possible in which the power of the governor is limited, in which sovereignty ultimately pertains not to the monarch, as opposed to those whom he governs, but to the people as a whole. Government becomes an instrument for securing the lives, property, and well-being of the governed, and this without enslaving the governed in any way. Government is not their master; it is created by the people voluntarily and maintained by them to secure their own good. Those who, because of their superior talent, have been set to rule by the community, rule not as masters over slaves, or even as fathers over children. They are officers elected by the people to carry out certain tasks. Their powers are to be used in accordance with 'that trust which is put into their hands by their brethren'. For Locke government is a 'trust' and a political community in an organization of equals, of 'brothers', into which men enter voluntarily in order to achieve together what they cannot achieve apart (AARON, 1971, p. 270-271).

However, there are not two independent Locke's works, because there is unity between them. Thus, what Locke particularly refuses in his first treat, by attacking Filmer's ideas, he generally affirms in his second one, by defending his ideas as principles of all rightful government, as well as he especially denies some of Hobbes' ideas. In order to demonstrate it, Filmer's and Hobbes' main tenets and arguments will be shown and then their Locke's refutation.

II.II.I About Filmer's main tenets and arguments:

1st: Freedom is not a natural right, because nobody has been born to be free:

If such as maintain the natural liberty of mankind take offence at the liberty I take to examine it, they must take heed that they do not deny by retail that liberty which they affirm by wholesale. For if their thesis be true, the hypothesis will follow, that all men may examine their own charters, deeds, or evidences by which they claim and hold the inheritance or freehold of their liberties (FILMER, 1991, p. 4);

2nd: The first kings were also fathers of families; then, their subjects ought to obey them as well as children ought to obey their parents:

It may seem absurd to maintain that kings now are the fathers of their people, since experience shows the contrary. It is true, all kings be not the natural parents of their subjects, yet they all either are, or are to be reputed as the next heirs to those progenitors who are at first the natural parents of the whole people, and in their

right succeed to the exercise of supreme jurisdiction. And such heirs are not only lords of their own children, but also of their brethren, and all others that were subject to their fathers (FILMER, 1991, p. 10);

3rd: All government is absolute monarchy, because it is the base of all kinds of governments:

Indeed, the world for a long time knew no other sort of government but only monarchy. The best order, the greatest strength, the most stability and easiest government are to be found all in monarchy, and in no other form of government. The new platforms commonwealths were first hatched in a corner of the world, amongst a few cities of Greece, which have been imitated by very few other places. Those very cities were first for many years governed by kings, until wantonness, ambition or faction made them attempt new kinds of regiments. All which mutations proved most bloody and miserable to the authors of them, happy in nothing but that they continued but a small time (FILMER, 1991, p. 24);

4th: It is unnatural for people to govern or choose their governors, then, only God loyally chooses kings to absolutely rule their subjects: "God must *eligere* [choose], and the people only do *constituere* [set up]" (FILMER, 1991, p. 22). Nevertheless, if people reprehend or uncrown their kings, therefore, it is not fair, because only God could do it: If it be unnatural for the multitude to choose their governors, or to govern or to partake in the government, what can be thought of that damnable conclusion which is made by too many, that the multitude may correct or depose their prince if need be? Surely, the unnaturalness and injustice of this position cannot sufficiently be expressed (FILMER, 1991, p. 32);

5th: Positive laws do not infringe natural and fatherly power of kings, then, they are above them and they are above them because they are before them, by will of God:

Hitherto I have endeavoured to show the natural institution of regal authority, and to free it from subjection to an arbitrary election of the people. It is necessary also to enquire whether human laws have a superiority over princes, because those that maintain the acquisition of royal jurisdiction from the people do subject the exercise of it to human positive laws. But in this also they err. For as kingly power is by the law of God, so it hath no inferior law to limit it. The father of a family governs by no other law than by his own will, not by the laws or wills of his sons or servants. There is no nation that allows children any action or remedy for being unjustly governed; and yet for all this every father is bound by the law of nature to do his best for the preservation of his family. But much more is a king always tied by the same law of nature to keep this general ground, that the safety of his kingdom be his chief law (FILMER, 1991, p. 35).

II.II.II About Hobbes' main tenets and arguments:

1st: Freedom and equality are the natural condition of mankind. This is his conception of freedom: "Liberty, or freedom, signifieth properly the absence of opposition (by opposition, I mean external impediments of motion); and may be applied no less to irrational and inanimate creatures than to rational" (HOBBS, 2017, p. 129). It is a negative definition of liberty, indeed, because it only refers to lack of obstacles, but there is also a positive definition of freedom in Hobbes' thought, if one understands that it is right to everything, like this: "For where no covenant hath preceded, there hath no right been transferred, and every man has right to everything and consequently, no action can be unjust (HOBBS, 2017, p. 88). Concerning equality, Hobbes upholds that men are essentially equal in essence, because their differences are after their creation:

Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that, though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he (HOBBS, 2017, p. 76);

2nd: Competition, diffidence and glory are the three main causes of quarrel amongst mankind, that is: although men are to be free and equal among them, there is a tendency to selfishness, because they put their own interests before others' interests; that is the path to state of war:

So that in the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, competition; secondly, diffidence; thirdly, glory.

The first maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use violence, to make themselves masters of other men's persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other sign of undervalue, either direct in their persons or by reflection in their kindred, their friends, their nation, their profession, or their name (HOBBS, 2017, p. 77);

3rd: Mankind is its own menace, because state of nature tendency is to become state of war; that is: man perverts into his own danger (*homo homini lupus*): "To speak impartially, both sayings are very true; That Man to Man is a kind of God; and that Man to Man is an arrant Wolfe. The first is true, if we compare Citizens amongst themselves; and the second, if we compare Cities" (HOBBS, 2017, p. 2). Because of the right of each individual to everything, there are who whose inclination is to the same thing, as well as to infringe others' rights. Thereby, spread violence situation (*bellum omnium contra omnes*) becomes unavoidable:

The foundation therefore which I have laid standing firme, I demonstrate in the first place, that the state of men without civill society (which state we may properly call the state of nature) is nothing else but a meere warre of all against all; and in that warre all men have equall right unto all things (HOBBS, 2017, p. 6);

4th: An artificial man is needed in order to avoid mankind's self-destruction, that is: the Commonwealth. Hobbes compares the State to the biblical Leviathan, the most powerful sea dragon, which, according to the legend, it is also described like a big fish or a big snake or a big octopus; it is a symbol of domain, force and power. Thereby, Hobbes borrows that mythological sea monster in order to offer his Commonwealth metaphor, whose domain must be absolute, whose force must be incomparable and whose power must not be restrict. It means that, in the last resort, without a supreme and absolute power to restrain mutual menace from each human individual, there is only a state of war among them, indeed. Therefore, men require an unconditional and not restrict authority over themselves, for their own good, because, according to Hobbes' thinking, it is the very way to reestablish, at last, peace among them and, overall, their mutual conservation; there is no end to Commonwealth but it, whose functions, members and organs also correspond to those ones of human body:

For by art is created that great Leviathan called a Commonwealth, or State (in Latin, *Civitas*), which is but an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the magistrates and other officers of judicature and execution, artificial joints; reward and punishment (by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty, every joint and member is moved to perform his duty) are the nerves, that do the same in the body natural; the wealth and riches of all the particular members are the strength; *salus populi* (the people's safety) its business; counsellors, by whom all things needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are the memory; equity and laws, an artificial reason and will; concord, health; sedition, sickness; and civil war, death. Lastly, the pacts and covenants, by which the parts of this body politic were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that fiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced by God in the Creation. (HOBBS, 2017, p. 7).

II.II.III About Locke's main tenets and arguments:

1st: State of nature is a condition of liberty and equality among men (against Filmer and according to Hobbes), but it is not a state of war (against Hobbes); it is also a condition of reasonableness, because everyone is under reason laws, which are, according to Locke, the same nature laws. Thus, freedom, equality, reasonableness and peace are human natural properties, because, mutually and potentially, everybody was born to be free, equal, reasonable and peaceful. Therefore, inside state of nature, there is no reason to exist slavery, superiority, inferiority nor brutality among humanity; they can only be after state of nature:

But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence: though man in that state have an uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one sovereign Master, sent into the world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not another's pleasure; and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us that may authorize us to destroy another, as if we are made for one another's uses, as the inferior ranks of creatures are for ours. Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station willfully, so by the like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do justice to an offender, take away or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation of life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another (LOCKE, 2003, p. 102);

2nd: There are differences among these powers: paternal (or maternal), despotical and political (just against Filmer; Hobbes does not develop this kind of power theory, because he is only interested in the absolute power of Commonwealth). Filmer argues that power is only one thing, emanated from God to kings over subjects, as well as the parents' authority over their children or the masters' domain over their servants; under Locke's perspective, if Filmer was right, then, there would not be freedom, neither equality, among people; moreover, the social contract would be meaningless. Thereby, there must be different kinds of powers because there are several ways of relationships among people. Basically, there are three kinds of relations among people, with their respective powers; those are:

a) Among husband, wife and children (family); paternal power of parents over their children, due to blood relations; it consists in the right of parents' care, concerning their children's breeding, before they can reach their own independence, thanks to their own reasonableness:

Children, I confess, are not born in this state of equality, though they are born to it. Their parents have a sort of rule and jurisdiction over them when they come into the world, and for some time after; but it is but a temporary one. The bonds of this subjection are like a swaddling-clothes they are wrapt up in, and supported by, in the weakness of their infancy: age and reason, as they grow up, loosen them, till at length they drop quite off, and leave a man at his own free disposal (LOCKE, 2003, p. 123);

b) Among lords and slaves (slavery); despotical power of lords over their slaves, due to permanence of state of war; it consists in the right of victorious men (lords) over lives of loser ones (slaves), because, if a man declares war against another and loses it, then, who wins becomes owner of his life and there is still state of war between them; thereby, it is part of the right of self-preservation:

This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and closely joined with, a man's preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his preservation and life together: for a man, not having the power of his own life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his life when he pleases. Nobody can give more power than he has himself; and he that cannot take away his own life, cannot give another power over it. Indeed, having by his fault forfeited his own life, by some act that deserves death; he, to whom he has forfeited it, may (when he has him in his power) delay to take it: for, whenever he finds the hardship of his slavery outweigh the value of his life, it is in his power, by resisting the will of his master, to draw on himself the death he desires (LOCKE, 2003, p. 110);

c) Among citizens (citizenship); political power of citizens over themselves, due to social contract, set under explicit or tacit consent of free and equal individuals among themselves; it consists in the right of sovereignty concerning making, exercising and protecting commonwealth laws in order to deal with properties of each member of it, internally and externally. Thus, political power is made of three parts, those are: legislative, executive and federative:

Political power, then, I take to be a right of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community, in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the commonwealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public good (LOCKE, 2003, p. 101); 3rd: There are, basically, three kinds of government: monarchy (elective or hereditary), oligarchy (or aristocracy) and democracy, it being also possible mixed forms of government, like a constitutional monarchy, which combines crown and parliament, (against Filmer e according to Hobbes). Anyway, supreme power always derives from all citizens, because sovereignty is always theirs and so they can choose how they want to exercise it. Thereby:

The majority having, as has been showed, upon men's first uniting into society, the whole power of the community naturally in them, may employ all that power in making laws for the community from time to time, and executing those laws by officers of their own appointing; and then the form of government is a perfect democracy: or else may put the power of making laws into the hands of a few select men, and their heirs or successors; and then it is an oligarchy: or else into the hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy: if to him and his heirs, it is an hereditary monarchy: if to him only for life, but upon his death the power only of nominating a successor to return to them, an elective monarchy. And so accordingly of these the community may make compounded and mixed forms of government, as they think good. And if the legislative power be at first given by the majority to one or more persons only for their lives, or any limited time, and then the supreme power to revert to them again; when it is so reverted, the community may dispose of it again anew into what hands they please, and so constitute a new form of government: for the form of government depending upon the placing the supreme power, which is the legislative (it being impossible to conceive that an inferior power should prescribe to a superior, or any but the supreme make laws), according as the power of making laws is placed, such is the form of the commonwealth (LOCKE, 2003, p. 157);

4th: Commonwealth is established by social contract, among human individuals, who are also free and equal, reciprocally; therefore, sovereignty comes from them, not from God to kings, because it is really impossible to know whom God has chosen to become some governors and others governed; on the contrary: God has become sovereign all mankind over creation, according to biblical texts, which Locke makes use in order to support his argumentation (against Filmer and according to Hobbes):

Whatever God gave by the words of his grant, Gen.i.28, it was not to Adam in particular, exclusive of all other men: whatever dominion he had thereby, it was not a private dominion, but a dominion in common with the rest of mankind. That this donation was not made in particular to Adam, appears evidently from the words of the text, it being made to more than one; for it was spoken in the plural number, God blessed them, and said unto them, have dominion. God says unto Adam and Eve, have dominion; thereby, says our author, "Adam was monarch of the world:" but the grant being to them, *i. e.* spoken to Eve also, as many interpreters think with reason, that these words were not spoken till Adam had his wife, must not she thereby be lady, as well as he lord of the world? If it be said that Eve was subjected to Adam, it seems she was not so subjected to him as to hinder her dominion over the creatures, or property in them: for shall we say that God ever made a joint grant to two,

and one only was to have the benefit of it? (LOCKE, 2003, p. 22); 5th: Governors, even kings, are people's, not God's, chosen ones, in order to accomplish their interests, that is, summing up: to protect their properties. It means that they are not owners of sovereignty, only citizens are its rightful owners, but they carry it out under their consent. Thereby, governors are just civil officers and then they can be dismissed according to citizen's will, as well as it is rightful that subjects may resist to their sovereigns, if they do not accomplish laws endorsed by social contract members, because there is nobody above any laws (against Filmer and according to Hobbes, who is, like Locke, a social contract philosopher). Therefore:

In all lawful governments, the designation of the persons, who are to bear rule, is a natural and necessary a part as the form of the government itself; and is that which had its establishment originally from the people: the anarchy being much alike to have no form of government at all, or to agree that it shall be monarchical, but to appoint no way to design the person that shall have the power, and be the monarch. – Hence all commonwealths, with the form of government established, have rules also of appointing those who are to have any share in the public authority, and settled methods of conveying the right to them: for the anarchy is much alike to have no form of government at all, or to agree that it shall be monarchical, but to appoint no way to know or design the person that shall have the power, and be the monarch. Whoever gets into the exercise of any part of the power, by other ways than what the laws of the commonwealth be still preserved; since he is not the person the laws have appointed, and consequently not the person the people have consented to. Nor can such an usurper, or any deriving from him, ever have a title, till the people are both at liberty to consent, and have actually consented to allow, and confirm in him the power he hath till then usurped (LOCKE, 2003, p. 187-188). Locke allows concluding that there is no utter power over subjects, but over sovereigns, being exercised by subjects. It is just opposite to Hobbes, whose thinking upholds that, once being established, sovereignty is unconditional, that is: it is not beneath changes of interests of subjects; so, insurrection is not lawful and civil war is like Commonwealth death, which signifies the return to state of war. According to Locke's perspective, every government gets into a tyranny, whether it does not preserve properties of its citizens, because, on doing so, it diverts of finality to which it has been made and there is no way to people unless rebellion:

The end of government is the good of mankind: and which is best for mankind, that the people should be always exposed to the boundless will of tyranny; or that the rules should be sometimes liable to be opposed, when they grow exorbitant in the use of their power, and employ it for the destruction, and not the preservation of the properties of their people? (LOCKE, 2003, p. 201). There are two columns that support Locke's political and social theory: state of nature and state of society; upon them he bears his tenets out. If there are both a natural either social dimensions inside every human being, then, he belongs both to nature either to society. Like a natural being, he has natural properties (such as aforesaid: liberty and reasonableness), which belong to him during all his life, unless he may infringe some laws that could become him unworthy of them (for example: if he unfairly makes an attempt on somebody's life, so, he will lose his freedom), or even when something happens to him that results in the loose of some of his faculties (for example: whether he achieves some kind of madness and so his reason will be unavoidably lost). Like a social being, he has social rights and duties, which there are in function of preserving his natural properties, as well as those of all the rest of limbs of political body. There is more than a concrete, economical or material perspective into Locke's political and social thought, because property is also an abstract, immaterial or moral question, derived from the natural state and granted in the civil state. According to Ashcraft:

One of the purposes of Locke's employment of the concept of the state of nature, however, is to undermine the force of the presupposition that political authority is simply derived from and reflective of the social relations of property ownership by showing that political authority must be linked with the consent given by persons who are equal and independent. Hence, there is a moral autonomy to the realm of politics. The latter, for Locke, could never be understood merely as the protective outgrowth of the interests of property owners (ASHCRAFT, 2006, p. 242).

As much in natural state as in civil state, each person is into morality, due to rationality, which is universal. Nature, society, moral, reason and property are mutually linked and thinking them utterly disconnected it would be a mistake. Thus, Locke's political and social theory is still profitable in order to think about the global age, because henceforth property is not only a national matter anymore, as well as relations among commonwealths wrap questions up, which, directly or indirectly, may affect all the rest of the world, both environments with their resorts either people with their cultures.

III. Some ideas concerning toleration, according to John Locke

Discussing about Locke's thought concerning toleration is really a current debate, because his context was not so different from the present day. During the Seventeenth Century, religious wars and political persecutions caused by intolerance were constant. Nowadays, unfortunately, intolerance is still a real menace. It can be explicitly or implicitly. Very often, it appears when some people, under the name of their beliefs, commit disrespectful acts against other people who do not share them, such as physical or moral aggressions. Rarely,

there are churches or sects that do not promote recrimination of other ones for self-profit. The same could be said of political ideologies or opinions. Therefore, dealing with intolerance, politically and religiously, is a continuous challenge; Locke's ideas about it are very useful in order to clear and to distinguish some aspects of politics and religion; it is because this of his works, entitled *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, is able to provide arguments to whom that intend to treat that theme. Just three Locke's arguments are enough to sum up his thought about political and religious toleration.

1st: The argument of the care of the own soul about religious matter: it consists in affirming that, each person, like a free and reasonable being, is able to deal with his own spiritual and secular destiny; that is: under a religious perspective, eternal happiness (redemption or salvation) supposes a belief that each individual adopts to himself; it becomes faith an intimate forum matter, because it can only be considered such as one if the person in question is convinced of it; so, nobody can exercise his own faith for nobody; thus, none should impose it to none, no matter his condition nor intention. Church, according to Locke, is a kind of society that results of the rights both of association either of expression in matter of beliefs:

Let us now consider what a church is. A church then I take to be a voluntary society of men, joining themselves together of their own accord, in order to the public worshipping of God, in such a manner as they judge acceptable to him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls (LOCKE, 2003, p. 220); Church and Commonwealth are distinct societies, not in relation to their principles, because both should suppose freedom and equality among men; however, their finalities divert, because it is supposed that the end of Commonwealth is to preserve property, as well as it is supposed that the end of Church is to deal with spirituality. Moreover, religious imposition does not take part in social contract; it would be opposite to individual natural freedom; therefore, there is no reason to public powers to occupy themselves of imposing beliefs to citizens:

First, Because the care of souls is not committed to the civil magistrate, any more than to other men. It is not committed unto him, I say, by God; because it appears not that God has ever given any such authority to one man over another, as to compel any one to his religion. Nor can any power be vested in the magistrate by the consent of the people; because no man can so far abandon the care of his own salvation as blindly to leave it to the choice of any other, whether prince or subject, to prescribe to him what faith or worship he shall embrace. All the life and power of true religion consists in the inward and full persuasion of the mind; and faith is not faith without believing (LOCKE, 2003, p. 218-219);

2nd: The argument of the exclusion of the civil or political authority in matter of religion: it consists in both enlargement either deepness of aforesaid argument, because Locke reinforces that religious or spiritual questions overcome the jurisdiction of the public power; civil authority is just able to deal with questions in matter of preservation of properties of citizens. Commonwealth has no end but protecting interests of their members, but extension of its power does not reach spiritual human dimension; however, Commonwealth must not allow nor promote religious intolerance, much less make use of violence in order to do it, because it would become a social problem due to the tendency to religious fanaticism of some citizens; on the contrary: all religions must be considered equal before it; summing up: Commonwealth should only make use of external force (coercion) in order to keep the social peace; Church should only make use of internal force (persuasion) in order to keep the spiritual peace:

In the second place. The care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power consists only in outward force: but true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief of any thing by outward force. Confiscation of estate, imprisonment, torments, nothing of that nature can have any such efficacy as to make men change the inward judgment that they have framed of things (LOCKE, 2003, p. 219); 3rd: The argument of the inefficacy of the coercion of the civil or political authority in matter of religion: it consists in this reasoning: if somebody is not persuaded concerning whether a religion is really the best for him, among the several ones that are at his disposal, then, why sovereigns would be rightful about repressing who is not adept of his personal religion or even of the official religion of his country, for being it just out of use? Locke outlines the personal responsibility that each one has about his own beliefs, adding that all legislation that may incite religious intolerance is as unnecessary as useless. Besides, it would be as lawless as unreasonable, for being opposite to reason. Because of reason is before social contract, civil, political or social laws have no end but to enlarge and to deepen and to reinforce natural, reasonable or universal laws to which all mankind is subjected:

In the third place, The care of the salvation of men's souls cannot belong to the magistrate; because, though the rigour of laws and the force of penalties were capable to convince and change men's minds, yet would not that help at all to the salvation of their souls. For, there being but one truth, one way to heaven; what hopes is there that more men would be led into it, if they had no other rule to follow but the religion of the court, and were put under a necessity to quit the light of their own reason, to oppose the dictates of their own consciences, and blindly to resign up themselves to the will of their governors, and to the religion, which either ignorance, ambition, or superstition had chanced to establish in the countries where they were born? In the

variety and contradiction of opinions in religion, wherein the princes of the world are as much divided as in their secular interests, the narrow way would be much straitened; one country alone would be in the right, and all the rest of the world put under an obligation of following their princes in the ways that lead to destruction: and that which heightens the absurdity, and very ill suits the notion of a Deity, men would owe their eternal happiness or misery to the places of their nativity (LOCKE, 2003, p. 220). According to Locke, intolerance, politically and religiously, is opposite to: freedom, equality and reasonableness; then, it is also opposite to property. Thus, if Commonwealth makes use of political and religious intolerance, so, it will be not lawful. However, there is a way to justify intolerance, that is: when Commonwealth turns to it in order to avoid or to stop social chaos, nurtured by political or religious fanaticism. Therefore, intolerance is paradoxically lawful, whether it is at service of reason, in order to preserve every member of social contract; that is:

If an individual as the result of his religion does positive harm either to another individual or to the state, then he cannot be permitted to practise his religion. For instance, a religion having human sacrifice as part of its ritual could not be tolerated in any modern community (AARON, 1971, p. 294-295). Although Locke's thought was concentrated into his contemporary questions concerning religion, due to dissents among Seventeenth Century English Christians, which were already divided into Papists (Catholics) and Protestants (Anglicans, Calvinists, Lutherans etc.), his ideas still allow thinking about ways to be found in order to promote dialogues among different believers, because, in order to live in a global age, the respect for the human person is necessary and, indeed, it also means the respect for his beliefs.

IV. Some ideas concerning education, according to John Locke

Locke's thought about education, at the first sight, seems to be, exclusively, an elitist propose, because he is only interested in gentleman's breeding. His main aforesaid work about education (*Some Thoughts Concerning Education*) is made of his correspondence with one of his friends (Sir Edward Clarke of Chipley, Esquire), a British nobleman to whom Locke wrote letters in order to help him to train his children. Thus, it is very clear that Locke practically thought about how to breed a child born into nobility. However, his educational ideas may be rethought under another angle, if one understands that his ideal of individual is someone whose training is to be able to become him the best possible human being. Thereby, the importance that he attributed to education is unquestionable, because, according to him, due to their education, people are able both to their own improvement either to their own ruin. Therefore, in order to train utterly the human being, education is an activity that deals with both body and mind; that is: education is a psychophysical process:

A sound mind in a sound body is a short but full description of a happy state in this world: he that has these two has little more to wish for, and he that wants either of them will be but little the better for anything else. Men's happiness or misery is most part of their own making. He whose mind directs not wisely will never take the right way; and he whose body is crazy and feeble will never be able to advance in it. I confess there are some men's constitutions of body and mind so vigorous and well framed by nature that they need not much assistance from others, but by the strength of their natural genius they are from their cradles carried towards what is excellent, and by the privilege of their happy constitutions are able to do wonders; but examples of this kind are but few, and I think I may say that of all the men meet with, nine parts of ten are what they are, good or evil, useful or not, by their education. 'Tis that which makes the great difference in mankind. The little and almost insensible impressions on our tender infancies have very important and lasting consequences: and there it is as in the fountains of some rivers, where a gentle application of the hand turns the flexible waters into channels that make them take quite contrary courses, and by this little direction given them at first in the source, they receive different tendencies and arrive at last at very remote and distant places (LOCKE, 1996, p. 10).

According to aforesaid quote, Locke is really persuaded concerning the powers of education, which, summarily, consists in teaching body and mind habits to child. Like a psychophysical process, he divides education into two main dimensions; these are:

IV. I. Physical Dimension: it refers to body cares; it is also divided into parts like these:

- Hygienic Dimension: it consists in teaching habits that may provide a very good body health: "How necessary *health* is to our business and happiness, and how requisite a strong constitution, able to endure hardships and fatigue, is to one that will make any figure in the world, is too obvious to need any proof" (LOCKE, 1996, p. 10);
- Nutritional Dimension: it consists in teaching habits that provide a suitable selection of drink and food to be consumed: "As for his *diet*, it ought to be very *plain* and simple" (LOCKE, 1996, p. 16);
- Sporting Dimension: it consists in teaching habits that, by practicing some kind of sport (for example: swimming), may provide body skills and health improvement, too:

I shall not need here to mention *swimming* when he is of an age able to learn and has anyone to teach him. 'Tis that saves many a man's life: and the Romans thought it so necessary that they ranked it with letters; and it was the common phrase to mark one ill educated and good for nothing that he had neither learned to read nor to swim. *Nec literas didicit nec nature*. But besides the gaining a skill which may serve him at need, the

advantages to health, by often *bathing in cold water* during the heat of summer, are so many that I think nothing need to be said to encourage it, provided this one caution be used that he never go into the water when exercise has at all warmed him or left any emotion in his blood or pulse (LOCKE, 1996, p. 14);

➤ **Manual Dimension:** it consists in teaching a manual ability, profession or trade:

I have one thing more to add, which as soon I mention, I shall run in danger of being suspected to have forgot what I am about and what I have above written concerning education, all tending towards a gentleman's calling, with which a *trade* seems wholly to be inconsistent. And yet, I cannot forbear to say, I would have him *learn a trade, a manual trade*, nay, two or three, but one more particularly (LOCKE, 1996, p. 153);

IV. II. Psychological Dimension: it refers to mind cares; it is also divided into parts like these:

➤ **Behaviour Dimension:** it consists in teaching good manners or etiquette in order to suitably or wisely behave in social relations:

Manners, as they call it, about which children are so often perplexed and have so many goodly exhortations made them by their wise maids and governesses, I think, are rather to be learned by example than rules; and then children, if kept out of ill company, will take a pride to behave themselves prettily, after the fashion of others, perceiving themselves esteemed and commended for it (LOCKE, 1996, p. 43);

➤ **Intellectual Dimension:** summarily, it consists in teaching everything knowable; methodically, elementary skills (like reading and writing), foreign and vernacular languages (classical and modern) and scientific disciplines in order to train mind, intellectually; to inspire good feelings about knowledge, emotionally; to promote self-improvement, personally:

To conclude this part which concerns a young gentleman's studies, his tutor should remember that his business is not so much to teach him all that is knowable, as to raise in him a love and esteem of knowledge and to put him in the right way of knowing, and improving himself, when he has a mind to it (LOCKE, 1996, p. 148);

➤ **Civic Dimension:** it consists in teaching civil laws in order to be aware of citizenship, belonging to social body as a member with both rights and duties:

Wherein he will be instructed in the natural rights of men, and the origin and foundations of society, and the duties resulting from thence. This *general part of civil law* and history are studies which a gentleman should not barely touch at, but constantly dwell upon and never have done with. A virtuous and well behaved young man that is well versed in the *general part of the civil law* (which concerns not the chicane of private cases, but the affairs and intercourse of civilized nations in general grounded upon principles of reason) (LOCKE, 1996, p. 139);

➤ **Moral Dimension:** it consists in teaching virtue, that is: intellectual and moral excellence:

It seems plain to me that the principle of all virtue and excellency lies in a power of denying ourselves the satisfaction of our own desires where reason does not authorize them. This power is to be got and improved by custom, made easy and familiar by an *early* practice. If therefore I might be heard, I would advise that, contrary to the ordinary way, children should be used to submit their desires and go without their longings ever *from their very cradles*. The first thing they should learn to know should be that they were not to have anything because it please them, but because it was thought fit for them. If things suitable to their wants were supplied to them, so that they were never suffered to have what they once cried for, they would learn to be content without it, would never with bawling and peevishness contend for mastery, nor be half so uneasy to themselves and others as they are because *from the first* beginning they are not thus handled. If they were never suffered to obtain their desire by the impatience they expressed for it, they would no more cry for other things than they do for the moon (LOCKE, 1996, p. 29-30);

➤ **Religious Dimension:** it consists in teaching things concerning the existence of God (summarily, Absolute and Supreme Being, Author of the Universe and Giver of All Gifts), as well as everything concerning him (Revelation); moreover, according to Locke, God is the foundation of virtue:

As the foundation of this, there ought very early to be imprinted on his mind a true notion of *God*, as of the independent Supreme Being, Author and Maker of all things, from whom we received all our good, who loves us and gives us all things. And consequent to this, instill into him a love and reverence of this Supreme Being (LOCKE, 1996, p. 102-103);

➤ **Playful Dimension:** it consists in reinforcing the importance of entertainment to teaching and learning process or to affirm the pedagogical worth of games:

Playthings I think children should have, and of diverse sorts; but still to be in the custody of their tutors or somebody else, whereof the child should have in his power but one at once, and should not be suffered to have another but when he restored that. This teaches them betimes to be careful of not losing or spoiling the things they have; whereas plenty and variety in their own keeping makes them wanton and careless and teaches them from beginning to be squanderers and wasters. These, I confess, are little things and such as will seem beneath the care of a governor: but nothing that may form children's minds is to be overlooked and neglected, and whatsoever introduces habits and settles customs in them deserves the care and attention of their governors

and is not a small thing in its consequences (LOCKE, 1996, p. 99-100). Summarily, Locke conceives education like a process that turns mainly around these four aspects, especially concerning gentlemen's training: virtue, wisdom, breeding and learning. They sum all the aforesaid dimensions and their subdivisions up. In fact, without them, there is no education. Therefore, they are things that every gentleman must desire to himself, as well as to his descending, because they must be part of his legacy: "That which every gentleman (that takes any care of his education) desires for his son, besides the estate he leaves him, is contained (I suppose) in these four things: *virtue, wisdom, breeding, and learning*" (LOCKE, 1996, p. 102).

V. CONCLUSION

Although Locke belongs to a different age from the present one, he treated questions that, nowadays, are still present and he did very well, because his arguments are still worthy. Therefore, Locke's thought is very useful to think about how to find ways in order to make a global age. His epistemological ideas suggest that several kinds of knowledge should be respected, because experience can be made on several ways; it means that: if, on one side, Locke supports that experience is the only way to achieve knowledge, on the other side, however, it does not mean that everybody follow or must follow the same way to reach their knowledge. His political and social ideas offer a lawful way to set a society based on freedom and equality among its members; surely, they must not be overlooked, whether one understands that democracy is the best possible way of living in a commonwealth. His religious ideas are a very powerful antidote against the poison of intolerance, because his demonstration reveals that choosing a religion should only be a matter of persuasion, not of imposition. His educational ideas reinforce the importance of conceiving education like a human psychophysical activity in order to breed both body and mind, because it is just the way to arrive to the best human being possible, whose example is the gentleman.

The global age is not only a presence or a reality, yet; it is an ideality or a project, too. Thus, there are many challenges and hindrances to be overcome in order to include the most possible part of people around the world. Surely, it is a time of rethinking many values, such as: educational, intellectual, moral, political and religious ones, because the present times are also times of crisis or lack of hopes, due to several factors, such as: increasing of poverty, ascension of terrorism and environmental aggression. Thereby, the temptation to fall into dogmatism is very great. In a global age, it is imperative to combat any kind of dogmatism, educationally, epistemologically, politically and religiously, because it is the root of lack of toleration, violence and every kind of physical and moral aggression. Education, knowledge, politics and religion are questions that must not be overlooked, because they are ways to be citizens aware of the present worldwide situation and thus they may work on the necessary changes in order to establish values that can promote human development, without disrespect for people neither for environment: that is why, nowadays, John Locke's ideas are still so important to be revisited.

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