Growth & Development of Intelligence Apparatus during British Colonial Era in India

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ABSTRACT: There is no yard stick for success and failure in any intelligence agency. Any such analysis has to look at its resources, manpower and intelligence gathering processes. In India intelligence gathering processes and the institutions involved in the same developed and took shape from time to time. The earliest mention of the activity of secret agents is found in the Vedic samhitas. In ancient India, the organization of intelligence activity was such as to encompass every sphere affecting the state and its people. Kautilya's Arthashastra lays out the detailed responsibilities and use of the secret agents for the maintenance of state affairs. Later, the system of intelligence and its uses were felt by different dynasties in the Indian subcontinent. However, the more sophisticated system of intelligence gathering and institutions which shape the present intelligence system of India developed during the british colonization of India.

KEY WORDS: Intelligence, Thugee, Intelligence Bureau, CID, Provincial Special Branches

I. INTRODUCTION:

The mention of Intelligence gathering in the ancient texts like Vedic Samhitas encompasses every sphere of life for the security of the people. In the ancient and medieval periods, the engagement and deployment of spies and informers was by and large personalised; an institutionalised intelligence system grew up only with the arrival of British in the scene of India. In first half of the 19th century, the Company's Government in India came to possess immense knowledge from the reports and write-ups on trade and commerce, socio-economic and religious practices and various other matters. Such knowledge became useful in formulating policies on education, social reform, land revenue etc., but had little to do with security. Since army was the mainstay of British rule, threat to security, both internal and external was largely taken care of by it. After 1857, the Government had realized that India could not be ruled by the sword alone. When the Wahabi movement broke out in 1860s, followed by the Hindu revivalist movement, the Government's anxiety about a possible connection between religious revivalism and political unrest increased and in dealing with the Wahabis, the concept of 'sedition' was introduced in criminal jurisprudence by adding section 124A to the Indian Penal Code. When one Wahabi convict assassinated Viceroy Mayo in the Andaman jail in 1872, Viceroy Northbrook (1872-1876) felt the need for "a detective police for political purposes" and asked the Thugee and Dacoity Department to handle the same. But, Northbrook's experiment evidently had failed. Lytton's advice to the Local Governments, to adopt the experiment of 'Special Branch', set up in 1876 in Punjab, was not followed. Viceroy Ripon (1880-1884) had a consensual approach to the problems of administration. "We cannot now rely on military force alone; policy as well as justice ought to prompt our endeavor to govern more and more by means of, and in accordance with, the growing public opinion, which is beginning to show itself throughout the country." Evidently Ripon implied that the Government should keep track of the public opinion in India through an alternative method.

II. METHODOLOGY:

Documents related to the intelligence and the reports submitted by the intelligence wings during British era are scattered and kept away from the loop of common man due to the security reasons. However, with an intention to establish the authenticities and creditability of the documents available to us, the method of corroborative evidences has been followed wherever necessary. While utilising the diaries and memories personal prejudices and biases have been eliminated to the extent possible. Simply narration of facts and historical method of exposition has been followed in the development of the present article.

III. OBJECTIVES:

- To trace the growth and evolution of intelligence institutions in India during british period
- To propound the genesis of intelligence gathering processes in India
- Trace the role of nationalist movement in modifying the intelligence gathering and other related processes during freedom movement.
- To establish the chronological detail of the evolution of different intelligence wings in the police departments associated with british colonization

IV. DISCUSSION:

The development of intelligence can be illicitly seen in the british policy of tackling Thugee and the Policy of Go Forward by Lord Bentinck which was advantageous to Sleeman as compared to Do Nothing policy of Lord Amherst. Earlier, in 1826, Sleeman had already been given the additional charge of tackling and coordinating Thuggee crimes over a large area. Bentinck was impressed with the reports of Sleeman. Those who had scoffed at Sleeman's single-handed operation, started co-operating. If the Thugs considered it a duty ordained by 'kali' to kill, so Sleeman thought it his duty ordained by God to exterminate the Thugs. Sleeman was trying to reach to the roots of the Thuggee tree and cut it. More than half a century before Frazer commission recommended a number register for the police station, as a part of police records of the criminals, Sleeman had already created a methodology based on history sheets, gang history sheets, village crime note books, conviction register, etc. and used them against the Thugs and Dacoits. In 1829, Sleeman sent a report to Curween Smith, agent to Governor General at Sagar, to be forwarded to the Government. It proposed a need for a more efficient police establishment, and the creation of out-posts along roads. In August 1830, Bentinck accepted the recommendations, ordering liberal rewards to informers and branding of convicted Thugs on their back. The practice to employ spies as an extra ordinary measure to deal with extra ordinary crimes like Thuggee, was suggested in 1810 by O. W. Steer, who was Assistant to the Magistrate of Etawah. The Government approved of the use of spies as suggested by Steer, acknowledging that it was a necessity in Police work. The expenses for the pay of spies was to be listed under the heading 'Secret Service'. Bentinck impressed by the report asked for a master plan. Sleeman prepared a blue print, namely, a 'Plan' for the eventual destruction of the association of Thugs infesting central India. Bentinck immediately agreed for the creation of a separate department with Sleeman as its first Superintendent. Act XXX of 1836 made convictions possible, even for association with the Thug gangs. This legal *carte-blanche* was extended to all the British provinces. In the meantime, Sleeman worked on two projects, one to complete genealogical table by removing discrepancies, by cross checking with police and revenue records. With it, the entire hereditary tree of the Thugs was completed. The second project was the completion of his book, the secret language of the Thugs 'Ramaseena', for the benefit of the investigating officers to identify the Thugs in public places. In 1835, to coordinate and collate records of over a dozen offices of superintendents, working all over the country, a post of General Superintendent was created and Sleeman was the first choice. By then he had been promoted as a Major with Headquarters at Jabalpur, to concentrate solely on Thuggee operations. This was the first attempt by a Central authority to collate and disseminate Intelligence to all field officers. It goes to the credit of Sleeman that he laid the foundation of the present Intelligence Bureau, as a constitutional body, as per VII schedule of Indian Constitution. A small cell for a "Special Branch" was established in 1887, as by that time the Thuggee and Dacoity department had more or less ceased to exist. In 1904, on Frazer Commission's recommendations, a Central Criminal Intelligence Department, under an IG was created, in line with the provincial CID to collect, collate and communicate information, under condition of frank and cordial cooperation, between the Centre and the provinces, without taking away the responsibilities of the local Government. Later the word criminal was deleted and thereafter the bulk of the Intelligence collected was no longer related to criminal activities only.

The clear picture for establishing intelligence gathering institutions in India for the smooth functioning of the state affairs including curbing any political unrest against the british got an administrative sanction with the Secret dispatch No. 11, dated March, 25th, 1887 by Secretary of State on the subject of 'collection of secret and political intelligence in India' was issued after the formation of Indian National Congress. After consulting the Governors and top officials of the Presidencies, Viceroy Dufferin (1884-1888) wrote to the Secretary of State: "I desire to utilise in British India, the services of the Police force, and in Native States, the existing means at the disposal of Political Officers, for collection of intelligence on political, social and religious movements." Dufferin then gave out the details of his scheme. "Being of opinion that the formation of a large detective staff would be open to very serious objections, I propose to work as far as possible, through the Local Governments, imposing on them the responsibility of collecting such intelligence as may be necessary for their own purposes and of reporting to Government of India, whatever may be desirable for the latter to know. At the headquarters of the Government of India and the Local Governments, I desire to employ special agencies of the

lowest possible strength, consistent with the work of collecting and recording intelligence received, and of initiating and conducting at the instance of the Government of India, such enquiries as may be necessary in special cases." Dufferin's secret despatch had, thus, broadly divided the responsibilities of the proposed Central and the Provincial Special Branches, and also laid down the roles of the Central and the Local Governments, with regard to the Central and the Local outfits. The provincial Special Branches would remain under the control of the Local Government but it would be obligatory on their part to share all relevant intelligence with the Central Special Branch.

To curtail the cost, Dufferin suggested the use of the office and the manpower of the Thugee and Dacoity Department as a launching pad. "The privileges and facilities that the Department had acquired over the years should be shared." The General Superintendent of the Department was entrusted with "the supervision of the newly constituted "Special Branch." The financial commitment of the Government would be Rs 46,800 per annum. Dufferin selected D McCracken, an officer of the Punjab Cadre, to head the Central Special Branch, and will be called on to be present at the headquarters of the Government at Calcutta or Shimla, and that during the absence of the General Superintendent of the Thugee Department on tour, he will be obliged to conduct the responsibilities and confidentialities of the Special Branch". Its headquarters would be at Shimla, but the Chief of the Special Branch was to remain present at Calcutta, when required. Thus, the premier intelligence agency of the sub-continent came into existence officially on 23rd December, 1887, when the Secretary of State approved the proposal for improving the means of obtaining secret and political intelligence.

However, setting up of the institution for collection of secret political intelligence, may be briefly touched upon here. But in the accounts of the Crimean War (1856), the annexation of Oudh, and the first war of Indian independence, 1857, when spies were recruited and used rampantly by the regiments and administrative officers. Writing to Lord Cross on 15th November,1887, Dufferin underscored the secrecy of the communications, as "it would not do for the native press to get it into their heads, that we were about to establish a *Third Section* after the Russian pattern." The dispatch dated 25th March, 1887 of Lord Cross, Secretary of State, on "the collection of secret and political intelligence in India", suggests that the birth of the Congress, specially its second well-attended session in Calcutta, in 1886, did not go unnoticed in London and suggested the creation of an institution for collection of "secret political intelligence", and approved the proposal for the Central Special Branch and the Provincial Special Branches. The birth and growth of the Congress, being the only political event of significance during 1885-1887, the intelligence organisation that came into existence in 1887, was evidently in response to the new political development.

4.1 FROM SPECIAL BRANCH TO INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

McCracken, stationed at Shimla along with staff of the Thugee Department, failed to produce much intelligence except few important reports because of the very nature of information collection. The Provincial Special Branches (SB's) were attached to the offices of either Inspector General of Police or of Chief Secretary of the province. The staff was so meagre and so inept in intelligence collection, that the Government of Bengal described its Special Branch as 'a farce'. In Bombay Presidency, however, on account of political murders and Tilak's prosecution for sedition in 1897-98, the Special Branch became little active. At the turn of the century, when secret societies started proliferating in Western India and Bengal, the Special Branches increased the staff strength and improved the techniques of intelligence collection.

The Police Commission (1901-1902) under Andrew Fraser recommended the setting up of Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in each province, under a Deputy Inspector, General of Police, for "collating and distributing information regarding organized crime and to assist in investigation of crimes when they are of special character" including to collect, collate and communicate information, obtained from the Provincial CID or otherwise. To rectify the lacunae and other resentments of Provincial autonomy, the Government of India intervened. It abolished the Thugee Department and merged the Central Special Branch with the proposed Central CID, renaming it as Central Criminal Intelligence Department (DCI). The power of supervision over the Provincial CIDs was scrapped on the ground of Provincial autonomy. Its power of investigation of cases was greatly circumscribed, and it was tasked, "to collect and communicate information with regard to special forms of crime, some of which have been rendered more difficult for suppression, by the recent expansion of railways and the increased use of Post Offices and the Telegraph by the natives". Under this head, the Department could "organize and supervise operations directed against criminal tribes, organized dacoits working over large areas, wandering gangs of criminals, note forgers, coiners, and professional prisoners etc. Besides, "collecting and testing intelligence upon matters, including social, religious and political movements, not necessarily of criminal nature, should also be the duty of the Central Criminal Intelligence Department." While the Government of India sought to make it a department for criminal intelligence and marginally, for political intelligence, the

Home Government made political intelligence its primary responsibility. The Secretary of State scrapped the power of investigation of certain criminal cases bestowed on the Central Intelligence, on the ground of provincial autonomy. Further, in the context of the political unrest then brewing in several provinces, the Central Intelligence was to collect political intelligence alone. In his Dispatch No.70, dated April, 22nd, 1904, the Secretary of State asserted that the provincial autonomy had been working satisfactorily, and therefore, nothing should be done to disturb it. He warned that he "would not regard with approval any attempt to share for the Supreme Government by means of an establishment, working under their direct order, the duty of investigating crime". Thus, shorn off the investigation duties, the Central Criminal Intelligence Department was left with the responsibility of "collecting and testing intelligence upon matters including social, religious and political movements, not necessarily of criminal nature." The Secretary of State, through his judicious intervention, made it essentially an agency for collection of political intelligence, while Curzon's administration wanted to make it a central authority, for coordinating the activities of the Provincial police forces. The name suggested by the Government of India, however, remained unchanged, though the term 'criminal' in the nomenclature, evidently became anomalous. The appointment of Harold A. Stuart, ICS, Inspector General of Police, Madras Presidency, as Director of the Central Criminal Intelligence and McCracken joined as Deputy Director on April, 19th, 1904. The Secretary of State declined to communalize the Department by appointing one Hindu and one Muslim Assistant Director and the existing staff of the Thugee Department was absorbed in the DCI. Though, Home Secretary Risley stated that the DCI "would be located at the headquarters of the Government of India," Stuart, however, continued the practice of going to Calcutta in cold weather, while the headquarters of the Department remained at Shimla. Later, in the Government of India Act, 1919, the change of name was first indicated in section 40(2) which enjoined, inter alia, that the Intelligence Bureau should keep the Government posted with matters relating to the security of the Indian Empire. Even before the Act came into force in 1921, the name was changed to Intelligence Bureau in 1920.

4.2 PROVINCIAL SPECIAL BRANCHES

Provincial Special Branches were ignored till the anti-Partition *swadeshi* movement broke out in 1905 and the underground terrorist activities came to the in Bengal presidency. When in April, 1906, the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) was set up in Bengal, as also in other provinces, the Special Branches were made a part of the Provincial CIDs under one DIG. Later on, with the increase in the work-load of the Special Branches and due to growing political unrest, in the big provinces, the Special Branches were delinked from CID. Bengal's Special Branch had a faster growth, both in size as well as in quality of intelligence output, due to strident political movement, both surface and underground. In September, 1907, Stevenson-Moore, Director, Criminal Intelligence Department, predicted in his report that the Bengalis 'had no capacity for violence'. One district magistrate of Dacca, who held the view that *bhadralok* Bengalis were incapable of physical aggression, was shot at the station, while he was leaving Dacca on transfer. In this context, the discovery of arms and explosives in Muraripukur Garden at Calcutta, and the arrest of Aurobindo Ghose along with 40 educated *bhadralok* youths, made them change their ideas. Home Secretary, Harold Stuart wrote, "the revolutionary movement will gain in influence and strength until, at no distant date, it will become a serious menace to law and order." But the Government was of the considered view that "while a revolutionary rising is out of the question", an efficient secret service was essential" to contain any widespread disturbance in the province.

The Provincial Special Branches had to improve their collection and processing of intelligence in the face of growing terrorist activities. Though, both the Central and Provincial intelligence used to work together, often the Central Intelligence worked as an umbrella agency for the Provincial Branches. Between 1908 and 1916, there was a spate of dacoities and assassination of lower level intelligence and CID officers in Bengal, leading to a crisis of morale and efficiency, as the Indian officer declined to work in these organisations. Both, Home Member, Reginald Craddock and Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Charles Cleveland, were seriously concerned and extended full support to the Indian officers "who have been murdered, ostracized and threatened." Reginald Craddock expressed similar concerns and condemned the terrorists for "murdering informers and zealous Criminal Investigation Department officers, supplemented by murder of school masters who have faithfully done their best to suppress sedition under their charge." With the moral support and material assistance of the Central Intelligence, and under the inspiring leadership of Charles Tegart, DIG of the Intelligence Branch, the morale and efficiency of the organization was restored.

The nerves of the Intelligence wings were shacked during Delhi Bomb attack, 1912. On December, 23rd, 1912 Viceroy Hardinge narrowly escaped death in the in Delhi bomb attack. The intelligence organizations had no information about the existence of any secret society in North India. The Central Intelligence and its Director, Cleveland, came under severe attack for failure to prevent the outrage. As the normal investigation failed to produce any result and the pressure on Cleveland increased, a special team was formed under David

Petrie, with 34 Intelligence and CID officers from Punjab, UP, Bengal, Bombay and Central Provinces. When this team also failed to show any positive result, even after ten months, the Viceroy's Executive Council passed a formal vote of censure on Cleveland. On Harcourt Butler's advice, Cleveland consulted Sir Edward Henry, Commissioner, Metropolitan Police, London for lending English and French detectives. But Henry, pointing out the constraints of geography, language and people for foreign detectives, advised that the local detective talents in India were superior to English detectives. It was really embarrassing that one of the most comprehensive investigations ever launched in India, failed to trace the culprit. Then, after about 14 months, Denham of the Special Team and Tegart of Bengal Intelligence succeeded in identifying the revolutionary group from the remnants of the bombs which exploded in Sylhet, Calcutta, Lahore and Delhi and from a revolutionary leaflet printed in Calcutta and circulated in the Punjab and UP. All the culprits were brought to book, except Rash Behari Bose, who could never be arrested. Thereafter, the Secret Service grant of the DCI was doubled from 50 thousand rupees to one lakh rupees. The Government's decision to enact a new legislation (Rowlatt Act), to take the place of the Defense of India Act, 1915, which would lapse after the World War, was the result of persistent prodding by the Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Branch, Bengal. Two intelligence officers namely J.C.Ker, Personal Assistant to the Director of Central Criminal Intelligence and Charles Tegart, DIG of Bengal Intelligence Branch had assisted the Rowlatt Committee from the preliminary stage of their investigation to the drafting of the Bill. The Report and the Bill evidently reflected the attitude of the Police and Intelligence to the terrorist movement in the country. But, by 1919, public resentment was so strong against repressive measures that the Government had to permanently shelve the Act. The intelligence failed to gauge the depth of public resentment and the magnitude of the protest, which eventually resulted in the Jallianwalla Bagh Massacre in April, 1919.

The Government having appreciated the usefulness of the intelligence agencies in containing revolutionary terrorism, especially in Bengal, readily sanctioned the creation of District Intelligence Branches in every district of Bengal in 1917, bringing all important localities and endemic areas under intelligence scanner. The agency more and more fine-tuned their trade-craft by adopting still more rigorous system of recruitment and screening of the sources and keeping them under deep cover. Armed with wide knowledge about the terrorists and their outfits, they acquired the ability to influence the groups and even engineer a split in the group. Thus, the agencies emerged not only as the most powerful instruments against the underground movement, but also as advisors to the Government in formulating the policy towards the revolutionary movement, in particular and the political movement, in general. Secret intelligence operatives were later sent to places like Japan, Paris, New York, Lahore etc aimed at monitoring the activities of the revolutionaries and subverting their plans in all the three continents of Europe, America and South East.

4.3 CHANGE IN THE FUNCTIONING AND AUTONOMY:

The Intelligence agency of British in India, Intelligence Bureau, till early 1930s, was merely a compiling and collating agency, as it had, hardly any independent channel of intelligence. The idea of the Central Intelligence agency collecting intelligence by sending agents and spies to the Provinces, without their knowledge was considered as interference with the provincial autonomy and was rejected way back in 1909-1910. As a matter of fact, there was so much homogeneity in the functioning of the Centre and the Provinces that the provincial Special Branches acted almost as subordinate offices of the Central Intelligence, leaving no scope for an alternative system of intelligence collection by the Central Intelligence. But, when in response to political agitation, introduction of the federal system became a distinct possibility, the control over the Intelligence Bureau and the Provincial Special Branches posed a serious problem. In the early 1930s, the Government of India prepared a 'White Paper', wherein the issues of their status and control were reiterated. The first issue was that the existing set up of the Intelligence Bureau was functionally inadequate and structurally unsound in a federal system for effectively handling the subversive movements, such as terrorism and communism. One of its weaknesses is its total dependence on the Provincial Special Branches for intelligence collection, which would be badly affected under a regime of provincial autonomy.

A system of intelligence collection, directly under the Bureau, was necessary. It also suggested in the "White Paper" that the Intelligence Bureau should be at the disposal of the federal minister in the proposed federation, was turned down by the Secretary of State and the Home Government, as "inappropriate and unworkable". According to the Secretary of State, "The authority in the last resort, responsible for the maintenance of the internal security, is the Secretary of State as the mouthpiece of the Imperial Parliament, operating through the instrumentality of the Governor General." In fact, the British Government was unwilling to accept the situation in which the Indian representative body should be vested with the ultimate responsibility of security of the country. Under no circumstances, therefore, sensitive institution like Intelligence Bureau, and matters like internal security would be entrusted to a person who was not directly responsible to the British

Crown. Having decided that the Governor General should control the Intelligence Bureau, which was to be "so organized as to be in a position to obtain for the use of the Governor General, full information as to the internal political situation and the activities in the Provinces, of forces likely to impair peace and order, and the staff acting in liaison with the corresponding staff of the Governors, would form the channel of communication between the Governors and the Governor General in the performance of this branch of their duties." The suggestion was to create a separate set up for intelligence collection, directly under the IB. Later in the third annual conference of the Inspectors General of Police at Shimla, from May, 23rd to 26th, 1932, it was recommended that the IB should be placed directly under the control of the Governor General, and that it should employ a number of Indian Police Service officers as intelligence officers in the Provinces, under IB's direct control. These officers were to be designated as Central Intelligence Officers (CIO) and the units in the provinces should be known as "Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau" (SIB). On June 30, 1933, in a high level meeting at Shimla, presided over the Viceroy, it was decided that the Governor General should have at his disposal, a system of intelligence collection throughout India, along with an agency for processing such intelligence. The need for IB's own intelligence collection network was recognized and recommended. The proposal was tentatively approved by the Secretary of State, pending the results of deliberations of the Joint Select Committee of Parliament, under the Chairmanship of Lord Linlithgo. The recommendations of the Joint Committee on the Intelligence Bureau and the provincial Special Branches were as follows:

- Firstly, the Committee was much concerned with the protection of the identity of the informers / agents, in case the Bureau and the Special Branches came under the control of Indian ministers. They recommended that "the records of any such intelligence department should be protected from even the slightest danger of leakage." To obviate the possibility of the Indian ministers coming to know the names of such agents, the Committee recommended that "the instruments and instructions of the Government should specifically require them to give directions that no record relating to intelligence affecting terrorism, should be disclosed to anyone other than one or two persons, who are directly dealing with them."
- Secondly, the Committee was of the view that no purpose would be adequately served by placing the Special Branch of the province under the Governor. Instead, they recommended that the Governor should be empowered to assume charge of the department, if, according to him, the peace and tranquility of the province is endangered, by overt or secret activities of persons who intend to overthrow the Government.
- Thirdly, the Committee did not agree with the suggestion that the IB should be under the exclusive control of the Governor General and that the provincial Special Branches will be controlled by the IB. There should, however, be close touch between the two, but to put the provincial intelligence units under the Intelligence Bureau will tend "to break up the organic unity of the provincial police force."
- Fourthly, on the question of exclusive control of the Governor General over the IB, the Committee stated that the IB "should, under the new constitution, be assigned one of the Governor General's reserved departments, as part of its normal activities." The Committee, however, hoped that "the change in the form of Government, whether in the Centre or in the Provinces, should not involve any change in the relationship, which at present exists between the Intelligence Bureau and the Provincial Intelligence departments."

The Government of India Act, 1935 gave legal sanction to the suggestions. The Intelligence Bureau remained, by and large, under the direct control of the Governor General, though the Home Department of the Federal Government remained its immediate controlling authority.

The fear among IB officers, both at the Centre and in the Provinces, was that when the Provincial Special Branches would come under the Indian Home Ministers, classified information about the Non-Cooperation and Civil Disobedience movements, as well as some records of terrorist activities, might be leaked, resulting in exposure of sources, jeopardizing the safety of the agents and informers. Thus, the credibility of entire organization will be demolished. When the new ministers assumed office in the Provinces under the Government of India Act, 1935, the mutual distrust between the intelligence agencies and the people's representatives went on increasing. Many important secret and top secret files, relating to the Non-cooperation and Civil Disobedience movements, were sent to the office of CIO of the Intelligence Bureau, which was statutorily secured from ministerial interference, or to the Governor's secretariat, either for destruction or for transfer to more secured places. The Provincial Governments frequently complained of spying on them by the Central Intelligence. Control over the Intelligence organizations remained a contentious issue till the outbreak of the Second World War, when under the Defence of India Act, ministerial authority over the intelligence

organizations was reduced. Again, on the eve of independence there was great confusion about the sensitive records of the IB. Eventually, many records, especially those relating to the identity of the sources and informers were destroyed. Many sensitive files were removed to England. From many files, which are still in IB records, relevant papers have been removed, with a note in the notesheet.

V. FINDINGS:

- 1. As covertly obtained information began to take on an increasing importance in the formulation of policy and decision making, british in India started to develop the intelligence apparatus mainly in the post Curzon era.
- 2. The evolution of the Intelligence related organization was not the result of the political activities of Indian National Congress, but it was a general aversion in the British administration for spy system and the reform of police intelligence under Curzon and was in no way stimulated by the existence of Indian nationalism.
- 3. During discontent among Indians abroad, British government sort the services of Indian intelligence officers which remains an important helping hand for the units earlier created (India Office based unit under Wallinger, Britain's domestic counter intelligence agency) for monitoring the activities of Indians abroad especially during war times.

VI. SUGGESTIONS:

- During Pre- Non cooperation movement, British police officers as well as the government of the time ignored the reports of Intelligence officers. In the modern times, blunders in ignoring reports prepared by the officers of intelligence bureau should not be repeated to avoid any terrorism and related activities.
- The autonomy of the intelligence agency is essential for the smooth functioning and operation of intelligence operations in order to get maximum out of the reports furnished by the intelligence officers.
- The intelligence and the other related processes may be kept away from the political interference and the Intelligence agency should work for the government and not for the political party of the time.

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