

Cognitive Warfare: Al-Qaeda's Narrative Strategy as a Virtual State

Emrah Aydemir

Associate Professor. Dr., Department of Journalism, Fırat University, Turkey

Abstract: *Terrorism is a war of ideas, and cognitive warfare between terrorist organizations and countries in the international arena is gradually increasing. In cognitive warfare, narratives reinforce the sense of collective identity and frame the perception of the external environment. Al-Qaeda's narratives are worth considering in cognitive warfare, and a global narrative scheme expands the scope of action. There are very few discussions to stand out against the narratives of terrorist organizations. In counterterrorism, it is necessary to analyze the narrative strategy of an organization. Designing political, economic and religious narratives for the narratives of terrorist organizations and conducting the cognitive warfare with narratives that will influence people are important issues to prevent vulnerable groups from being pushed into terrorism. Therefore, the question of what elements the Al-Qaeda narrative is based on and how Al-Qaeda uses it still needs to be explained with an extraordinary and logical answer. The aim of this article is to understand how Al-Qaeda uses narrative strategy as a virtual state in the cognitive battlefield and to describe what the origins of Al-Qaeda's narrative are based on. This study examines the problems in defining the narrative strategy of Al-Qaeda and deals with the cognitive warfare that Al-Qaeda wages against the West through the discourse of "us and them" by highlighting the main sources with which Al-Qaeda nourishes itself. The study develops new narratives to counter the narratives used by Al-Qaeda, which has a "franchise" structure, in the Muslim world and sheds light on the literature, policy makers and practitioners about these narratives.*

Keywords: *Cognitive warfare, Al-Qaeda, terrorism, virtual state, narrative strategy, counterterrorism, franchise*

Date of Submission: 06-07-2023

Date of Acceptance: 17-07-2023

I. Introduction

Sun Tzu (2016:49) says: "In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good." Tzu emphasizes the importance of knowing yourself and your enemy well. Generally, everyone admits that they know themselves. Superficial measures such as the number of battleships, number of weapons, state of readiness, number of personnel are taken into account in a war. However, what is important in war is to gather information about cognitive abilities and turn this knowledge into an operational advantage (Kozloski 2018). Modern developments revolutionize the way cognitive function is understood. Despite the enormous losses of life and property, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan served as a valuable ground for understanding what cognitive warfare is. Recent military and non-military cognitive findings have shown that it's not all about fighting in a disputed territory, in an environment of turmoil. The spread of technology and the use of cognitive warfare create a new battlefield arising from the dialectics and political motives of past wars. Considering the strategic and operational lines and the success in battles, it is not just the traditional hard power that enables a party to win the war. The party that is ready for the cognitive warfare gains an advantage over its opponent, regardless of the strength of the opponent (Cheatham 2018). While a mass shooting practice, standardized approaches, technological weapons are suitable for war models, warfare in the information age is different. Individual and organizational cognitive warfare skill is more important those models due to the speed and volume of information available on the battlefield (Kozloski 2018).

Pierre de Coubertin says "The most important thing in life is not victory, but race. What is essential is not to win, but to fight well." If your theory involves some form of cognitive property (preponderance), the competing theories will be defeated before they realize that the cognitive warfare has begun. Cognitive warfare must be used in order to have fought well. Why did Hussites lose while Martin Luther won? Hussites had a strong army. The looting behavior of the Hussites soldiers was not accepted. But Martin Luther invented the modern German language and won the cognitive warfare. The vehement demonstrations that took place in Washington DC in 2020 are a perfect example of cognitive warfare. Trump and the police claimed that the other party was terrorists, while the Americans and the rest of the world did not describe the events as terrorism. The CIA used "Dr. Zhivago" as a tool to undermine Soviet Union during the Cold War. Effective cognitive warfare against persecution was based on the moral dimension of Boris Pasternak. The Soviet Union banned The Soviet

Union banned Pasternak's book from being published, and the UK suggested that the CIA should take copies of the novel that included what happened behind the Iron Curtain. The reason the book attracted so much attention was because a literary work was not published in its own country, and Soviet citizens wondered what was wrong with their government. The CIA sponsored edition of "Doctor Zhivago" was finally in the hands of Soviet citizens. "Doctor Zhivago" was just a basic theme of the book. The book was a cry for the freedom and dignity of the individual, and its value was indisputable in terms of addressing the situation of a person in a Communist society. The publication of the book and the awarding of the Nobel Prize for Literature to Pasternak was a great cultural and cognitive triumph of the Cold War.

Mental functions such as thinking, reasoning, emotions, problem solving, attention, language, and perception are important issues in cognitive warfare. Depending on the examples in question, the field of cognitive warfare occupies a large place in the struggles between terrorist organizations and states fighting against terrorism. In this respect, it is essential to address narrative strategies within the scope of cognitive warfare. Because terrorism is being updated day by day, and in the new terrorism, terrorists are not particularly poor, ignorant and mentally ill. The most notable characteristics of the organization's members are normality, and terrorists are unlikely to be psychologically abnormal (Berrebi 2009). Al-Qaeda, which is composed of members of a terrorist organization who is unlikely to be abnormal, has a radical Islamic ideology and operates in different parts of the world under the banner of Jihad, carries out its activities like an official organization. Adopting ideological and inspiring features, Al-Qaeda further expanded its cognitive warfare worldwide after September 11 as the "Global Jihad Movement". Protecting its official infrastructure and continuing to work with its network-based structure, Al-Qaeda maintains its status as the biggest terrorist threat to Western powers (Gunaratna and Oreg 2010). Al-Qaeda is often referred to as a "brand" in various contexts by many officials, journalists and academics. The brand of Al-Qaeda, which is carried out through propaganda, and the increasing number of 'franchise' attacks coincide with the 'narrative strategy' promoted (Archetti 2013).

With the importance narratives attach to events, ideologies can be accepted without questioning. In the narratives, there are a series of events described for certain reasons and heroes who are given identities. Motivations are the driving force; events and heroes are relational. Real and potential heroes and events make sense with the motivational narratives of terrorist organizations. Narratives reflect choices about what is relevant and irrelevant and highlight certain events (9/11 attacks) and heroes (Osama bin Laden). Narrative scenarios involve confusion or confrontation that must be resolved through some action (Gunaratna and Hennessy 2012). As a matter of fact, the aim of Al-Qaeda is to create a clash environment and to turn the reaction of the United States to the September 11 attack into a war between Islam and the West (Stern 2003:269). In this cognitive warfare, the United States loses the narrative war against Al-Qaeda, and Al-Qaeda maintains its success in the narrative impact on human cognition (Marca 2012). The unique strategy of Al-Qaeda is at the heart of this success and the organization makes use of inclusive narratives common to the audience it addresses. In Al-Qaeda narratives, the importance given to events and the sequence of events described for specific reasons are effective (Gunaratna and Hennessy 2012).

The article will first address terrorism, change from old terrorism to new terrorism, and cognitive warfare in order to explain the subject clearly. Then, the characteristics of Al-Qaeda as a virtual state and Al-Qaeda's narrative strategy will be examined.

II. Terrorism

The concept of terrorism is as old as the state phenomenon. Terrorism and terrorist actions have their origins in the death of Caesar in 44 BC. The beginning of modern terrorism in international character dates back to the 1960s (Ari 2013:519). As a unified political and ideological motive, "terrorism" did not spontaneously appear in response to specific instances of political violence or a series of such developments (Burnett and Whyte 2005:2). The term "terrorism" was first coined during the French Revolution (1789-1799) and the years 1783-1784 were called as the *Reign of Terror* (Weil 2004:5).

Terrorism has been one of the most controversial and frequently used words in recent years. The nature of terrorist actions varies around the world, and the fact that terrorism differs among countries, with or without weapons, diversifies the definitions of terrorism. As a complex phenomenon, the goals and methodology of terrorism diverge, and the more the effect transforms, the more it differs from other forms of violence. The differences between acts such as non-state conflict, state-based armed conflict, hate crimes, murder, violence and political violence pose problems of understanding terrorism (Aydemir 2020:25). One of these problems is that returning violence with interest has become the norm in managing conflicts and riots in the 21st century. On the other hand, since managing security and countering threats was considered as the domain of military forces, law enforcement and national security institutions, peace-building measures were disregarded (Gunaratna 2017:1).

Terrorism is basically a political phenomenon, driven by political motives and directed towards political ends (Cronin 2004:22). In today's world of globalized communication, terrorism is a psychological

weapon whose target is not immediately clear (Cronin 2004:26). For many years, terrorism was an untouchable subject. Despite its practical impact, terrorism has been isolated from scientific research for years. Books and articles of experts on this topic were not brilliant. Most of the analyzes were superficial and ideological. This formerly untouchable issue is now worth exploring (Wieviorka 1995:597). Defining terrorism is important not only for what actions can be considered terrorists, but also for how to deal with terrorism. There is no common definition of terrorism in the literature, countries and institutions (Al-Khattar 2003:18). In this context, some different definitions of terrorism are as follows:

According to Article 1 of the European Union Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2002), it is explained that terrorist crimes are mostly serious crimes against individuals and property. Terrorism is also defined as seriously damaging a country or an international organization, forcing a government or organization to take or refrain from any action, seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.

United Nations General Assembly Resolution No 49/60 (adopted on December 9, 1994) titled "Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism" contains a provision explaining terrorism. According to this provision, it is the aim and design of criminal acts to unlawfully provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes, regardless of whether they are political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.

United States Code Title 22, Section 2656f (d) guides the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the definition of terrorism. According to this definition, the term "terrorism" refers to the practice of politically motivated violent crime by subnational groups or secret agents against non-war purposes.

According to the United States Department of Defense, terrorism is the use or threat of violence or force against individuals or property, typically with the intention of coercing or intimidating governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological goals.

According to the UK's Terrorism Act (2000), terrorism is an act or threat designed to affect the government or an international government agency or to intimidate the public or part of the public. The definition of a political, religious, racial or ideological motive includes serious violence against a person, serious damage to property, a threat to a person's life, a serious risk to the health and safety of the public, and serious interference with an electronic system.

In order to suppress terrorism, the Arab Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism was adopted by the Arab Council of Justice Ministers and the Council of Arab Interior Ministers in the capital of Egypt, Cairo, in 1998. According to the convention, terrorism is any act of violence and threat, regardless of their motives and intentions. Terrorism also spreads panic among people, causes individual or collective crime; endangers people's lives, freedom and security by harming people; causes damage to the environment, public and private facilities or property, or causes them to occupy or seize or endanger national resources.

In the 2019 edition of the NATO, AAP-06 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, terrorism is to gain control over an audience in order to achieve the political, religious and ideological purpose that is illegal or threatened; it is the use of violence and force to create fear and threat against individuals or goods/property in order to coerce or intimidate governments or communities.

Title 18 of the United States Code (U.S.C.) "Crimes and Criminal Procedure" (113B. Terrorism / 18 U.S. Code §2331) also defines terrorism. According to this definition, terrorism is acts that involve violence or threaten human life. Violating the criminal laws of the United States or any state, intimidating or coercing the civilian population, manipulating a government's policy through threat and domination, kidnapping, assassination and murder are terrorism.

There is no clear definition of terrorism yet agreed, and this constitutes an obstacle for international countermeasures in the fight against terrorism. What a state describes as terrorist can be interpreted as a freedom fighter for another state and this situation makes it difficult to agree on the definition (Aydemir 2020:28). However, there is a consensus regarding Al-Qaeda. In accordance with the United Nations Security Council resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015), there are freezing of assets and travel ban sanctions against ISIS and Al-Qaeda. The United Nations Security Council recently called for the activation of sanctions lists in 2018 to draw uninterrupted attention to the threat of terrorist attacks. The repatriation of foreign terrorists, relocation and Al-Qaeda affiliates filling the space cleared by ISIS has been a concern. On the other hand, the fear that ISIS has turned into a secret network despite its decline and the dynamic organizations of ISIS and Al-Qaeda made it necessary to update and implement the criminal measures.

III. The Transition from Old Terrorism to New Terrorism

There is a shift from old terrorism to new terrorism. Ancient terrorism often operated with a nationalist or separatist agenda and was associated with the political situation in a country or region. In this respect, the aims of the old terrorism were nationalist and/or Marxist. The structure of ancient terrorism was hierarchical and

was mainly focused on a point. The method of old terrorism covered legitimate targets. The method included engagement rules/conflict rules. The new terrorism has a broad geographic agenda, involves the global status quo and the establishment of a new religious world order. The new terrorism, beyond being a threat to a single state, represents a challenge for the international system as a whole. The nature of the new terrorism encompasses a networking approach that includes international access and orientation. The aim of the new terrorism is to create religious fanaticism. In the new terrorism, there are mass destruction attacks and excessive use of violence against civilians (Field 2009:198; Neumann 2009:29). Religious doctrines that emphasize transformation and doomsday beliefs associated with Islam are effective in the motivation sources of new terrorism (Crenshaw 2008:122), and organization members perpetrate violence in an extremist manner. Violence is a simple task for new terrorists. Al-Qaeda's 9/11 attacks were not only a punishment for Catholics, but also contained a broad strategic goal to change the foreign policy of the United States Government (Field 2009:203). Contrary to the traditional attitude, organizations have an increasing desire to use excessive and indiscriminate violence in the new terrorism as seen in the September 11 attacks. Compared to previous years, there has been an increase in the number of deaths in terrorist attacks, the increase in civilian casualties is remarkable and there are mass attacks without discrimination (Spencer 2010:7-10).

The effect of globalization is inevitable in the increase of mass attacks, and the "franchise" organizational structure that provides a global power is the product of new terrorism. Al-Qaeda is a "franchise" organization and offers a global framework as a variant of local struggles. Al-Qaeda provides a popular image with local struggles and a global structure. The structural organization of Al-Qaeda is divided into three. One of these is the "spider web" system in which the leader (such as Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri) has a hierarchical structure in the command center. Another is the "franchise" image of Al-Qaeda acting on behalf of the organization instead of directly committing terrorist acts. "Franchise" means that local groups acting on behalf of Al-Qaeda will serve Al-Qaeda as subcontractors. The last is the image of Al-Qaeda as a "social movement", not a coherent and autonomous organization, but a broad ideological umbrella that does not have any unmediated connotations and inspires various local groups (Neumann 2009). With its aforementioned structure and images, Al-Qaeda describes itself as a regular army. The cell leader of organizations such as Al-Qaeda, which adopts the cell system, has a wide network of contacts or relationships. Thus, when the members are caught, it opens up the possibility that they can only betray other members of the cells, instead of affecting the whole organization. The damage to the organization due to arrests or informers is also limited (Neumann 2009:17). There is a horizontal organization in Al-Qaeda, which is the most striking organization of the new terrorism. Organized as scattered and disconnected cells, Al-Qaeda is motivated by religious fanaticism and its tactic is based on violence. The operation area of Al-Qaeda, which is engaged in mass destruction attacks against civilians, is not only the regions where it is located, but also the countries outside their region. For example, on July 7, 2005, London was subjected to a series of bomb attacks. In the attacks undertaken by Al-Qaeda, the bus station and metro station were targeted and fifty-two people were killed. Extremely violent attacks targeting civilians affected the whole world and for some time the interest in the subway dropped around the world. Two weeks after the attack, a similar attack attempt occurred on July 21, 2005 and police found unexploded bomb assemblies in three subway stations and a bus. On July 23, 2005, a bomb was detected hidden in the bushes in Little Wormwood Scrubs Park.

The new terrorism poses obvious threats to the population at an apparent time. Although the limits of the threat of new terrorism are predicted, its potential remains unknown. But its upper limit is a disaster. The attacks on New York and the Pentagon on September 11 are only the known part of this. It is known that the attacks on Bali and Madrid were carried out by Al-Qaeda. All of these attacks are combined with a modern way of thinking called "netwar", in other words network warfare. The new terrorism provides the necessary basis for keeping terrorists knowledgeable (Burnett and Whyte 2005:6). Especially the terrorist attacks of Al-Qaeda on September 11, 2001 are the beginning of a new page in the world. There is a wide consensus that with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, a new era in which everything will be different in the world has entered. The name of this era is called as the Age of Terror. The September 11 attacks focused on innocent people and brought about a novelty in the culture of terrorism (Chomsky 2002:1-3). After the 9/11 attacks, governments have failed to contain, isolate and eliminate terrorism, and there have been fluctuations between hard and soft approaches to combating terrorism (Gunaratna 2017:1). Thus, structural changes in the fight against terrorism have gained momentum since September 11. Internationally, a rethinking phase on terrorism occurred, and this contemplation reshaped the field and understanding of security (Palmer and Whelan 2014).

IV. Cognitive Warfare

The counterterrorism is generally addressed within the framework of three models. These models are listed as the criminal justice, war and extended criminal justice model (Steven and Gunaratna 2004:100-101). These three models provide a framework for state interests, democratic acceptability, constitutional, legal and operational aspects, and these models are inadequate. For this reason, counterterrorism measures and

psychological counterterrorism, in which individuals can be involved in defense against terrorism and participation in terrorist organizations can be prevented, have come to the fore. Preventing potentially radicalized people from joining terrorist groups, creating disagreement between members of a terrorist group, encouraging individuals to leave the organization and reducing their support for the group are among the measures for psychological counterterrorism (Hamden 2019:102). Terrorism and counterterrorism represent not only traditional military engagement but also cognitive warfare. Terrorist organizations that comply with the new terrorism framework activate the cognitive dynamics. The search for understanding the mind is necessary in terrorism. In the search for understanding the mind, approaches such as human perception, attention, learning, concept formation, reasoning, judgement and decision making, problem solving, language processing, social cultural factors, emotion, consciousness, and evolutionary approaches (Lu and Doshier 2007), which are the subfields of cognitive psychology, are included in the scope of cognitive warfare. Based on these elements in cognitive psychology, neuroscientist James Giardona defined the human brain as the battlefield of the 21st century, and the term cognitive warfare has been started to be used in the last few years. With the transition from attrition-based operations to effects-based operations, the foundation of modern warfare has become increasingly digital, and in parallel with the networked infrastructure, cognitive warfare has changed the culture of strategy (Bienvenue, Rogers and Troath 2019). With the combination of organizational, doctrinal, and technological innovations, cognitive warfare has become the war of the modern age, and it has changed the modes of warfare and cause and effect relationships (Cheatham 2018). Terrorist organizations began to exploit intellectual property without any limitations, cognitive supremacy became necessary to succeed in modern war, and a war of will ensued. The indispensable part of this war is cognitive warfare. Cognitive warfare is a strategic and tactical force multiplier; it is an attack on the way of thinking; it is an attempt to enter the decision cycle of vulnerable groups¹, and it prepares the infrastructure for participation in organizations.

The cognitive warfare includes specific political goals sought through the use of violence, and these goals do not distinguish terrorism from non-terrorist acts (Lewis 2017:16). Therefore, whether terrorism involves violence or not, it is an important component of cognitive warfare (Green 2008:87). Terrorist organizations use cognitive warfare, even if they use other tactics. Terrorism serves to advance and increase conflict in several important ways, mobilizes support, polarizes the population into opposing camps, and prepares people for further exploitation with new or strengthened social identities (Green 2008:91). Recently, terrorist organizations have benefited from cognitive warfare to recruit people to organizations, and participation in terrorist organizations continues uninterruptedly. Thus, a challenge arises between states and terrorist organizations to end their strategic advantages.

Terrorism is used to exert significant effects on a certain group of people. Considering traditional warfare, the aim of the terrorism strategy is not to kill or destroy, but to subvert the mood and create a sense of fear that will cause a political change within the target group. Hence terrorism is a specific form of cognitive warfare. It is a battle of wills played out in people's minds (Neumann and Smith 2008:9). In this battle of wills, it is possible to deduce possible policy positions about the cognitive domain of war and the appropriate use of conventional power. The cognitive domain of war is a tool that explains both general and specific attitudes (Brunk, Secrest and Tamashiro 1996). Threats and terror should not only be evaluated physically and socially, but also cognitively. Because cognitive warfare is important in decision-making processes (Thomas 2004). Terrorist organizations constantly emphasize true injustices in these processes and feel resentment towards mainstream society. Vulnerable groups are contacted before they get involved in disappointment and violence. People affect how society is perceived. Because the social environment has a strong influence on beliefs and behaviors. In the 1950s, conformity experiments conducted by social psychologist Solomon Asch showed that some people would ignore objective facts if everyone opposed them. This similarity gives clues about the underlying processes why a person becomes a terrorist. Social contacts and the dominance of the media offer a range of beliefs and behaviors. Objectionable presentations such as extreme nationalism, insulting entire ethnic or religious groups affect the cognitive process. The media used in the cognitive warfare reveals chauvinistic and violent thoughts. In this case, the individual who tends to be a terrorist by being influenced by the messages may move away from peaceful ways that will hinder his ideas with internal role models. Terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, who desire to move away from peace, strive to activate the cognitive dynamics at every stage of the struggle. In time, cognitive processes become a practice for information and cognitive processes in order to spread the unique culture of terrorist organizations, to reach their goals, to disseminate information to communicate with the members of the organization/the public/ vulnerable groups in the world. The process turns into terrorist attacks over time. Terrorist attacks are palliative events. The experience generated by the

¹Those who sympathize with the organization, and those who have unity of mind and heart with the organization are defined as vulnerable groups. In order not to exclude them and characterize them as antagonists, I decided to use the concept of vulnerable groups.

attacks creates certain forms of behavior and emotions, and cognitive warfare is aimed at undermining the states fighting against terrorism.

Terrorist organizations manage information operations aimed at threatening, terrorizing and intimidating people in cognitive warfare operations with narrative strategies. Cognitive warfare strategies are not just a technical configuration. Cognitive warfare involves more than making fake news read by mass media, opening fake accounts and following accounts on social media, editing videos, eliminating the dialogue that countries have established with vulnerable groups through propaganda. Terrorist organizations design their view of the world with language and discourses in cognitive warfare, focus on disinformation, distort information, deepen their relations with vulnerable groups, pursue segregation policies for minority populations, and determine their positions by preparing discriminatory narratives. In particular, terrorist organizations try to weaken the unity between countries and their citizens with a permanent cognitive warfare strategy. Cognitive warfare is a strategy that focuses on changing how the target population thinks and acts. Terrorist organizations use cognitive warfare for purposes such as breaking the ties between the citizens of the countries specific to local, national and international information environments, weakening the institutions, advancing the forces on their side, and creating internal instability in the countries. On the other hand, countries also use cognitive warfare to undermine the process between organizations and vulnerable groups, change the mentality of organization members and potentially vulnerable groups, and persuade the public to support the fight against terrorism. In fact, cognitive warfare is involved in the overall strategy of both sides, whether they are aware of it or not. The battleground for cognitive warfare is the mentality of society. This is what states and international organizations fighting against terrorism overlook. Because terrorism is not only in mountains and caves.

At the operational level, the cognitive warfare strategy is used for political moves, and at the tactical level, fake or real information is collected and distributed through traditional and new media. For example, the cognitive warfare staged by Hamas and Hezbollah consists of various communication tools such as TV, movies, internet posts that interpret daily situations by combining short words and images, cartoons and the internet platform. In their cognitive warfare, Hamas and Hezbollah focus on messages of hatred against Israel and Zionism. Utilizing movies, websites and social networking sites that promote hatred and propaganda against Israel, Hamas and Hezbollah (Mackiewicz 2019) pursue an anti-Israel narrative strategy to provide humanitarian aid to Palestinians worldwide. Moreover, here on the other side of the cognitive warfare, the aim is not only to influence audiences around the world, but also to raise generations that are unquestionably devoted to the struggle (Green 2008:226). In response to this, Israel wages its own cognitive warfare. As a result of the clashes between Israel and Hezbollah in 2006, Israel conducted a psychological warfare campaign, and the "psyop" attack, not only targeted Hezbollah, but also involved Hezbollah's supporters, opponents and unstable Lebanese on the street. Hezbollah, on the other hand, aimed to improve the general political and economic status of the Shiites in Lebanon, to establish an Iranian-style Islamic Republic and to remove Israeli forces from the region. Therefore, conflicts have been brought together with cognitive warfare (Schleifer 2009). As can be seen in the problems between Hezbollah and Israel, countries or terrorist organizations engage in cognitive warfare operations in order to break societies into deep political, economic and socio-cultural fragments. By keeping current issues on the agenda, the tendency to violence within people can be revealed. It should be noted that life is an open monologue. It is the relational dialectic that individuals experience collisions between their opposing desires and needs in relational communication. Emotional values are always in motion and any value pushed to the extreme contains the seed of its opposite. In this respect, cognitive warfare is also to change what individuals think. At this stage, information is like a weapon, and weapon is to affect emotion.

V. Al-Qaeda as a Virtual State

Virtual situations should be accepted as real and definitions should be made accordingly. Virtual states are an important element that deals with various topics from terrorism to public diplomacy, from public diplomacy to counterterrorism. Virtual states exist at three levels. One of them are diasporas (recognized states whose policies have been reformulated by having technologically developed links with the Motherland). Another is the de facto people/ countries/ nations (their boundaries and legitimacy are defined not by traditional maps and international law, but by new realities shaped by global communication platforms). The last one is non-state actors who, like terrorist organizations, use the media to advertise themselves as state-like (Seib 2011:17-18). One of them is Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is today a resilient virtual state with its features such as the London attacks in 2005, its impact on the war in Iraq, its role in the deteriorating security of Afghanistan, its ideological beliefs and organizational networks (Bergen 2008). Amir is at the top of the organizational structure and hierarchy of this virtual state. It is followed by Secretary, Deputy and Command Council. Under the Command Council, the organization includes the Political Committee, Religious Committee, Military Committee, Administrative and Financial Committee, Security Committee, and Media Committee (Gunaratna and Oreg 2010:1055). Al-Qaeda, which is accepted as a terrorist organization by international organizations

such as the European Union, NATO, United Nations Security Council and many countries, operates worldwide with its organizational structure and hierarchy.

The founding elements of Al-Qaeda, a malicious virtual state, are common, and Al-Qaeda constitutes a dispersed global presence. As an organization or network, Al-Qaeda primarily lives in the form of a virtual mass. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and the affiliated elements from the substantial groups to small cells on earth are parts of the Al-Qaeda virtual state (Seib 2011:23). Multiethnic Al-Qaeda uses the concept of "all citizens" for strategic purposes and aims to preserve the threatening ability to attack antagonists. To describe their collective organism as a virtual state, a group may inappropriately honor the mass murderer (Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri). The directors of the organization, using the media wisely in the arena of nations (Seib 2011:23), spread Al-Qaeda's strategic communication initiatives to a wide area, inform the audience that are interested in them and increase their resilience. Thus, Al-Qaeda leaders can become a global cult figure, status symbol, and fashion icon, and become a revolt of symbols.

Al-Qaeda, deprived of a concrete homeland, communicating with its "citizens" other than outposts scattered around the nature, using the media skillfully and reaching a wider audience by relying heavily on the internet, establishes its virtual state on these foundations (Seib 2008:74). Seeing Al-Qaeda as a virtual state can facilitate understanding of Al-Qaeda's recruitment, educational process, financial situation, and how it would develop if the leader of the organization was killed or captured. Doing so can bring the needed reality to the counterterrorism strategy. The United States has consistently underestimated the power of Al-Qaeda. It is risky to not act with the proper seriousness of the organization, and the virtual state concept is a planning framework for counter-terrorism efforts. In addressing all issues related to virtual states, it is necessary to get rid of the dictations of traditional political geography and to recognize the scope of the limitless virtual world. For this purpose, the fact that states become more amorphous when the citizens of a country move away from the homeland without actually leaving the homeland (Seib 2011:24) makes it mandatory to be cautious.

Al-Qaeda either maintains the tension in the areas where its enemies are located or prefers calmness from time to time. Blocking the mass media cannot easily cut the relations between virtual states and people, and virtual states generally act according to the atmosphere. Virtual states tend to distribute their messages on a personal level, and the media is a complementary need for the transmission of messages. Because the media turns terrorist organizations into a virtual state and legitimizes terrorist organizations. For years, terrorist organizations have had no difficulty in spreading their messages to local and international public opinion and decision-makers. Conversations and interviews were held with the leaders of terrorist organizations. Al-Qaeda's messages were occasionally transmitted globally to the Al Jazeera network or published on jihadist websites. In both cases, the national and international news media clearly announced the content of these communications to everyone and presented them over and over again. In this case, the media can be characterized as both pro-terrorist and anti-terrorist. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations depend on the media to get their messages out. The media is the promotional tool of Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations. Broadcasting news on Al-Qaeda is also a product of press freedom. The relationship between Al-Qaeda and the media is a symbiosis. Al-Qaeda helps the media on news, the media willingly or unwillingly promote Al-Qaeda, draw attention to the organization, and symbiosis occurs. As Margaret Thatcher, the UK's first female prime minister suggested, "promotion is the oxygen of terrorism." While publicity is not the ultimate goal for terrorist organizations, terrorists see advertising and launching as a way for their larger political purpose. In this respect, the reflection of the September 11 attacks on the media has made a great contribution to the promotion of Al-Qaeda and the virtual state structure.

In the process of shaping public opinion by virtual states, metaphors are vitally important to the cognitive thought process and terrorism is an industry for the world. Governments, media, intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, private security companies, mercenaries, global companies, terrorist organizations, non-state actors and many other elements that we can list cannot be separated from terrorism and the fight against terrorism. In this multi-player environment, there is an extreme competition with narrative strategies for media attention. According to the attacks made in this competitive environment, the expenditures made and the attention of the organization in the media, the brand value of Al-Qaeda is formed, the brand value contributes to the virtual state organization and the attack becomes a marketing for Al-Qaeda. Brand value and virtual state structure facilitates participation in Al-Qaeda and accelerates the flow of money to the organization. Brand value and virtual state structure means that countries design relationships with Al-Qaeda according to their interests in the field. The brand value of terrorism and the virtual state are important for exploring the visual identities and minds of terrorist organizations. Because terrorist organizations can be distinguished and recognized by their brands and virtual state structure.

There are regions where terrorist organizations will pose a threat and societies and centers that they can motivate and benefit from. Today, Al-Qaeda is like a multinational corporation. In the whole spectrum of global communication, the "franchise" attack structure and the support it receives plays an enormous role in complaint

narrative. In this narrative, Al-Qaeda's symbols, words, and style help the organization to destroy enemies, recruit potential people, attract followers, encourage loyalty, and gain legitimacy. Subsequently, Al-Qaeda wants to occupy minds with basic values and narratives, focuses on identity construction using communication, and strengthens the virtual state view with its social movement features.

VI. Al-Qaeda's Narrative Strategy

There is little consensus on what a narrative is and how it is used. The narrative is a system of stories that share themes, forms, and archetypes (Corman 2011:36-37). The narrative is an interrelated and sequentially organized assembly that creates audience expectations, shares a common rhetorical desire. A masterful narrative is deeply embedded in a particular culture (Halverson, Goodall and Corman 2011:13-14). Narratives make things real as systems of phonetic signification linked to the material world that surrounds people and give meaning to what is otherwise incomprehensible. Using coordinated violence tactics is a way for terrorists to get more media coverage. Exclusively attacking emotional places provides organizations with intensive publicity opportunities. Keeping terrorist actions on the agenda and their face value can create a sense of importance and power in people who feel sympathy for the organization; it may cause participation in a terrorist organization to be perceived as an exciting lifestyle, and even boredom can encourage participation in terrorist organizations. Participation in a terrorist organization can be seen as a profession. Dissatisfied members of the society may be prone to violence in the axis of motive-consequence relations. Current efforts to correct social wrongs may not eradicate injustices either.

Narrative strategies polarize people on many issues such as sectarian, identity, ethnic, and political values (Gerges 2016). Al-Qaeda's narrative based on the repetition that the West is fighting Islam using elements of Islamic myth and symbolism and based on the idea that Muslims are humiliated is a reflection of this polarization (Hafez 2007). Knowing the meaning helps fill in the gaps, and there is a concept in cognitive psychology called the word frequency effect. Reacting to high frequency words (home) faster than low frequency words (hike) shows the word frequency effect (Goldstein 2013:515). Al-Qaeda uses its soft power with the narrative-world-mind relationship in order to share its ideological agenda and gain members of the organization by influencing vulnerable groups, and the frequency of the words it uses is articulated with soft power. With this awareness, Al-Qaeda's narratives are shaped as a result of their interactions with their social environment. One of the most important factors in cognitive psychology is to distinguish the boundaries of the words spoken by the speaker and to recognize a word (Smith and Kosslyn 2017:500-502). The word Allah and the name of the leader are frequently used in Al-Qaeda, which aims to "glorify the name of Allah and make the religion of Allah victorious", the words in question are distinguished and recognized. In cognitive psychology, emotional responses are one of the sources of people's goals. The word Allah and the name of the organization leader also cause emotional reactions. The death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 became an international agenda. For some, Osama bin Laden was seen as a charismatic and unifying figure.

Al-Qaeda's narrative is partially inspired by traditional Arab and Muslim cultural narratives and ideas, but it also has a narrative against common interpretations of Islam that disapproves of suicide or attacks on women and children. In the narrative, the suicide/martyrdom operation is seen as legitimate as an asymmetrical war tactic against the enemy. In the fight against enemies, no distinction is made between civilian and military targets. The killing of other Muslims has a justifiable reason if there is a situation related to the West as per Sharia law. Excommunication of Muslims who do not follow the rules of Sharia, the necessity of pursuing jihad as an individual imperative for every genuine Muslim, and the establishment of a government ruled by Sharia are other elements of the narrative (Schmid 2010:47-48). The media cite the words of terrorist organizations and attributes a meaning to them. The reality perceived by people is the notion presented by the media. Terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, the PKK, and ISIS use the narrative from various angles in their conversations with vulnerable groups with whom they are ideologically, religiously, historically and politically related. For organizations, narrative becomes a reason for announcing grievances, uniting people locally or globally, and depicting terrorist organizations as heroes fighting against injustice. In response, countries also use narratives. However, polyphony pushes the facts back into the background and implies that there is fiction. Terrorist organizations become legitimate thanks to the questions that come to mind, the stories of the organization inspire groups and increase social ties. Rhetoric shapes society's political behavior and plays an important role in the sensory and cognitive processes between organization and structure.

Al-Qaeda expands its narratives in cognitive warfare through networks and renews its organizational style in response to new situations and needs. Today, Al-Qaeda adapts to this by communicating on the Internet, broadcasting messages aimed at intimidating Americans and boosting the morale of its followers. The challenges of the Al-Qaeda group network balance its endurance and capacity needs. Moreover, flexibility causes the durability of a network to decrease. Technology greatly enhances the capacity and narratives of Al-Qaeda networks (Stern 2003:269-272). There are communication rituals in states and terrorist organizations that

bring people together in friendship and society. There are also communication rituals that divide and separate communities instead of bringing them together. There is competition between countries and institutions that fight against terrorism and terrorists who have embraced violence to use customary communication such as bringing together, dividing, demonizing communities. The language and discourse used in the United States trying to establish a society after 9/11 generated sympathy for Osama bin Laden in the Arab geography. Thus, shared feelings within communities created a wide division. The contradiction between the narratives and practices used by the United States in this isolation/fragmentation has pushed the logic of meaning into the background and being a terrorist has made sense for those who sympathize with the organization by paving the way for the formation of discursive connections between Muslims and segments whose feelings of isolation are incomprehensible.

Terrorist rhetoric and propaganda can blind terrorist supporters and members to alternative methods and options (Crelinsten 2014:6). Al-Qaeda's ideology is driven by the "Single Narrative", which provides its followers with an emotionally satisfying description of the world they live in and their role in the world, gives them a sense of identity, and presents a unifying framework of explanation (Schmid 2010:47). This narrative seeks to blind those who are sympathetic to the organization to alternative methods and options. There is a complaint in Al-Qaeda narratives that the Muslim world is in chaos. As the structure of the virtual state, the vision of a good society is emphasized and it is underlined that wherever there are Muslims, the will of Allah and Sharia order should be applied. There is an understanding that the realization of these goals depends on a violent jihad led by Al-Qaeda (Schmid 2014:5-6). For Al-Qaeda, threatening is a form of communication. Violence aims to change behavior through domination. Propaganda aims to modify the attitude through persuasion. For Al-Qaeda, propaganda is a special form of manipulative knowledge. Al-Qaeda creates "us and them" by simplifying complex phenomena and tries to raise its status through discourses. Al-Qaeda embraces extremist ideas to strengthen its status. Terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Boko Haram are not clearly indistinguishable human populations that are somewhat isolated from the rest of society. Terrorist organizations are social movements. Organizations often produce a rhetoric that creates stories with uninterrupted attacks as a result of their actions. Therefore, Al-Qaeda tries to emotionally describe the world they live in and their role in the earth. It offers a notional narrative to vulnerable groups. It uses religious exegesis to motivate and educate Muslims and propaganda to demoralize the West. In the Al-Qaeda narrative, which repeatedly expresses the statements that the West shed the blood of Muslims, is oppressive and unjust against Islam, and supports Israel, the hero Al-Qaeda saves the Muslim world from Western influence with a violent jihad. Many people in the Islamic world may be sensitive to Al-Qaeda's determinations regarding the source of the problems in the Muslim world, and the pursuit of martyrdom can be perceived as a matter of pride. It should be noted that children who are under the influence of Al-Qaeda grow up hearing that they will go to heaven if they commit suicide attacks, and the word jihad is used by terrorist organizations to combat evil. However, according to Islam, Allah does not approve of these. Because the purpose of jihad is to protect the innocent and the weak people, not to kill them.

After developing a strategic narrative, it is necessary to spread it in sophistication. It is important that communication is multidimensional and persuasive (Maley 2018). Indeed, the inclusion of Salafi and jihadist Islamism in the Islamic tradition gives Al-Qaeda's narrative a clear rationale and a unique appeal. An attack on Al-Qaeda is defined as an attack on Islam itself (Cook 2006). Al-Qaeda strives to differentiate with these strategic narratives and is a base that supports terrorist groups around the world by training people on terrorism. These characteristics can direct the behavior of Al-Qaeda members and their relations with the outside world.

Only Jihad and Pleasing Allah

In cognitive warfare, perceptions, decision procedures, experience, education, tradition, and culture are important factors that make up decision-making. Increasing the pace of operations reduces the enemy's decision-making time. Uncertainty and high risk affect cognitive warfare (Dahl 1996). According to Al-Qaeda, the West poses a major risk, and Al-Qaeda's "only jihad" value is a remarkable narrative. In cognitive warfare, presenting stimuli with emotional connotations such as "only jihad" creates emotional reactions in individuals. Stimuli reminiscent of emotional experiences are presented to the target audience in order to use words with different arousal levels and to discover the effect of emotional experience on mental and physical behaviors and neural responses (Smith and Kosslyn 2017:334). In this reminder, another word with a different level of arousal in the struggle, including the vulnerable groups, is about "*pleasing God*"; this word is not for earthly gain. "*Pleasing God*" is essential to the pace of operations, and Al-Qaeda uses Islamic descriptions in its narratives to clarify global events. The descriptions are strategic narratives, and the depictions being reliable and convincing mean expansion of the virtual state structure.

In cognitive psychology, it is common for words to correspond to more than one meaning, and this is called word ambiguity. It is important to understand sentences in conjunction with words, and words should not be ambiguous. Some words attract more attention (Goldstein 2013:517-521). "*Only Jihad*" and "*pleasing God*"

are more noticeable to Muslims in cognitive warfare. “*Only Jihad*” and “*Pleasing God*” are not words that came about by chance in terms of cognitive warfare. Because these words are rarely used in isolation by Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is inspired by words and values. The greatest value that inspires al-Zawahiri is “God’s Shari’ah”.

The reason why Al-Qaeda narratives are so powerful is that they have an internal consistency for their target audience that connects them with culturally deeply embedded historical views. Al-Qaeda is waging cognitive warfare strategies of easy comprehension, identification with the narrative or little need for questioning in order to master the narratives that spread among Muslims. Al-Qaeda’s narratives are not just to resonate with the public or to make certain things seem true; it also contains powerful persuasive messages that force a particular ideological identification, behavior and actions (Halverson, Goodall and Corman 2011:14). Al-Qaeda, in particular, demonstrates consistency in its complaints against the United States and defines terrorism as the only language understood by the West. Stating that Americans indifferently cause Muslims to suffer and American policies cause to shed blood, Al-Qaeda determines its international position in this way by trying to convince the world (Abrahms 2005). In this way, Al-Qaeda further expands the organization’s access to people and its resource pool with its virtual state structure and narratives (For example, Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb further expanded the organization’s reach to people and pool of resources.).

Actions taken by other individuals can be mentally represented. When the movement of another individual is observed, they can produce the same type of representations as the representations created when they perform that action themselves. Shared representations are widely used in the field of communication. In order for a successful communication to be realized, the speaker and the listener must attribute the same meanings to the words and their understanding of communication must be the same (Krauss and Fussell 1991). The terrorist organizations in the region state that they protect Al-Qaeda’s name, reputation, credibility and core ideology because they attribute the same meanings to the narratives, and this is a result of cognitive warfare. Al-Qaeda combines decentralization and multidimensionality with terror under the same meanings and turns it into a global cognitive warfare. Terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba in Kashmir affiliated to Al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah in Indonesia, and the reconstructed threat in Pakistan act as products of Al-Qaeda’s cognitive approaches. Because the multinational structure of Al-Qaeda can open new doors for potential members of the organization. Terrorist organizations being regional or global, receiving and using personal or local complaints cause a sense of belonging and importance. People can also evaluate their perspective on these organizations within the framework of responsibility.

The most important elements of cognitive warfare approaches are observation, orientation, decision and action. A cognitive warfare strategy can be considered in terms of slowing the speed of the opponent’s decision process, degrading its accuracy, or both. Anti-speed strategy also prevents the opponent from keeping up with events (Dahl 1996). Al-Qaeda wages a cognitive warfare against its enemies with these approaches and strategies. In order to win the war of ideas in the cognitive warfare, it is necessary to understand the narrative of Al-Qaeda clearly. Terrorism has long been understood primarily as political violence. Over time, it was concluded that terrorism should be understood more in terms of communication and propaganda. Violence and propaganda have a lot in common. Violence aims to change behavior through coercion. Propaganda aims the same through persuasion (Schmid 2014:1). Al-Qaeda brings these two together.

VII. Conclusion

According to Tzu, superior success is breaking the resistance of the enemy without fighting. Zhang Yu interprets this statement as follows: “Achieving victory at the end of great wars is not good as there will be a lot of losses. If you make the war rewards and punishments clear and understandable, keep the war machines well-maintained, train your troops and commanders thoroughly, and if you can psychologically collapse the enemy by imposing your superior position on the enemy, I would call it success(Tzu 2016:123-124).” The way to win the war against the enemy is to be successful in cognitive warfare. Al-Qaeda operates with a variety of narratives, manipulating people’s minds and emotions. Narrative is important for winning “hearts and minds” in strategic communication. Al-Qaeda strives to win hearts and minds by portraying Muslims as victims, telling idealized dreams with the word God and its leader, and generating imagination from messages. The documentary “Al-Qaeda Informant”, prepared by the Al Jazeera team years ago, reveals how the heart and mind of an organization member is won through narratives. The statements of Hani Muhammad Mujahid, who first joined Al-Qaeda terrorist organization, then was imprisoned for two years, released from prison in August 2006 and started working as an Al-Qaeda informant in Yemen months later, show how effective the narratives of the organization are. Mujahid:“God bless him, I first met Osama bin Laden at Aynak Camp in Lugar. I was bond with him with my heart. Because I believed in Jihad against America and the West. I also believed in his support for the Palestinian issue (Al Jazeera 2015)”. Although Mujahid left the organization, he still maintains his sense of respect for Laden by saying God bless him. In cognitive warfare, code designation (such as visual, semantic or phonological design of information conveyed to members of the organization and vulnerable groups/ glorification of martyrdom) and coding (acquiring and transferring information to memory) are important

factors in taking action to achieve the goal. As seen in the example of Mujahid, if the vulnerable groups see the organization and its leader as the same object, despite the changing conditions and the style of the terrorist organizations, the immutability here is a deep commitment to the vision of Al-Qaeda.

Al-Qaeda spread its narrative for a long time until the beginning of the Arab Spring. Mass-based nonviolent uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Libya were initially interpreted as obsolete in Al-Qaeda's narrative that the violent call for jihad was the solution to many Muslims. Al-Qaeda leaders, like almost everyone, were stunned by the Arab awakening (Holbrook 2012). But this did not bring the end of the organization, and today Al-Qaeda's narrative is largely maintained. Despite the destruction of the Al-Qaeda core in Waziristan, drone attacks and the figure who was killed by the United States operation, bin Laden, the organization's ideology and propaganda narrative remain alive. The ideology and propaganda of Al-Qaeda extends from the Philippines in the East to Mali in the West and affect many people, from Western Muslim diasporas in the North to the perceptions and behavior of thousands of Muslim youths (Schmid 2014:8).

In a war environment, input often cannot be controlled. Its interpretation is controllable and variable. Cognitive load management is a vital skill. Therefore, organizations can consciously develop their cognitive power capacity (Cheatham 2018). As a matter of fact, terrorist organizations are virtual states that can improve their cognitive power capacities and are subcultures of nationality and organization. A proactive cognitive warfare is essential to challenge the legitimacy of extremist narratives, reduce their attractiveness, and combat 'franchise' terrorism. For this reason, the narrative strategies of terrorist organizations should be discovered and communication strategies should be developed to prevent participation in organizations. Choosing only traditional war models against terrorist organizations and not waging a cognitive warfare against the narratives of the organizations, which consists of sophisticated narratives and covers the needed hope and belief, means that we will not be able to prevent participation in terrorist organizations and we will constantly face the danger of terrorism.

References

- [1]. Abrahms, Max (2005) "Al Qaeda's Miscommunication War: The Terrorism Paradox", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 17:4, 529-549.
- [2]. Al Jazeera (2015) "El Kaide Muhbiri". <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hpWLFQd-Da8>. Accessed on 3 February, 2021.
- [3]. Al-Khattar, Aref M. (2003) *Religion and Terrorism: An Interfaith Perspective*, Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
- [4]. Archetti, Cristina (2013) *Understanding Terrorism in the Age of Global Media: A Communication Approach*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- [5]. Arı, Tayyar (2013) *Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Dış Politika*, Bursa: MKM Yayıncılık.
- [6]. Aydemir, Emrah (2020) *Terörizmle Mücadele ve Kamu Diplomasisi: Bilişsel Savaş*, 2. Baskı, Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi.
- [7]. Bergen, Peter (2008) *Al Qaeda, the Organization: A Five-Year Forecast*, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol 618, 14-30.
- [8]. Berrebi, Claude (2009) "The Economics of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: What Matters and Is Rational-Choice Theory Helpful?", In Paul K. Davis ve Kim Cragin, eds., *Social Science for Counterterrorism Putting the Pieces Together*, 151-208. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.
- [9]. Bienvenue, Emily, Zac Rogers and Sian Troath (2019) "Innovation and Adaptation Cognitive Warfare", *The Cove*. Available online at <<https://cove.army.gov.au/article/cognitive-warfare>>. Accessed on 26 January, 2021.
- [10]. Burnett, Jonny and Dave Whyte (2005) "Embedded Expertise and the New Terrorism", *Journal for Crime, Conflict and the Media* 1 (4) 1-18.
- [11]. Brunk, Gregory G., Donald Secrest and Howard Tamashiro (1996) *Understanding Attitudes War: Modeling Moral Judgments*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- [12]. Cheatham, Maj Michael J. (2018) "Wars of Cognition: How Clausewitz and Neuroscience Influence Future War-Fighter Readiness" *Air & Space Power Journal*, 16-30.
- [13]. Chomsky, Noam (2002) *Pirates and Emperors, Old and New International Terrorism in the Real World*, Cambridge: South End Press.
- [14]. Cook, David B. (2006) "The Role of Islam as a Motivating Factor in Usama bin Ladin's Appeal within the Muslim World", In David G. Kamien, ed. *The McGraw-Hill Homeland Security Handbook: The Definitive Guide for Law Enforcement, EMT, and all other Security Professionals*, 37-52. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- [15]. Corman, Steven R. (2011) "Understanding the Role of Narrative in Extremist Strategic Communication", In Laurie Fenstermacher and Todd Leventhal eds. *Countering Violent Extremism: Scientific Methods and Strategies*, 36-43. Washington, DC: NSI Inc.
- [16]. Crelinsten, Ronald (2014) "Perspectives on Counterterrorism: From Stovepipes to a Comprehensive Approach", *Terrorism Research Initiative*, Vol 8 Issue 1, 2-15.
- [17]. Crenshaw, Martha (2008) "The Debate over 'New' vs. 'Old' Terrorism", In Ibrahim A. Karawan, Wayne McCormack, and Stephen E. Reynolds, eds. *Values and Violence: Intangible Aspects of Terrorism*, 117-136. Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
- [18]. Cronin, Audrey Kurth (2004) "Sources of Contemporary Terrorism", In Audrey Kurth Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds. *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of Grand Strategy*, 19-45. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
- [19]. Dahl, Arden B. (1996) *Command Dysfunction: Minding The Cognitive War*, Alabama: School of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University.
- [20]. Field, Antony (2009) "The 'New Terrorism': Revolution or Evolution?", *Political Studies Review*, Vol 7, No 2, 195-207.
- [21]. Gerges, Fawaz A. (2016) *ISIS: A History* Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- [22]. Goldstein, E. Bruce (2013) *Bilişsel Psikoloji*, İstanbul: Kaknüs Yayınları.
- [23]. Green, Stuart A. (2008) *Cognitive Warfare*, Lieutenant, USN NDIC Class
- [24]. Gunaratna, Rohan (2017) "Strategic Counter-Terrorism: A Game Changer in Fighting Terrorism?", *International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research*, Vol 9 No 6, 1-5.

- [25]. Gunaratna, Rohan and Aviv Oreg (2010) "Al Qaeda's Organizational Structure and its Evolution", *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 33:12, 1043-1078.
- [26]. Gunaratna, Rohan and Orla Hennessy (2012) *Through the Militant Lens: The Power of Ideology and Narratives*, The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism.
- [27]. Hafez, Mohammed M. (2007) "Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists Frame Suicide Terrorism in Videos and Biographies", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol 19 Issue 1, 99-115.
- [28]. Halverson, Jeffry R., H. L. Goodall, Jr., and Steven R. Corman (2011) *Master Narratives of Islamist Extremism*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- [29]. Hamden, Raymond H. (2019) *Psychology of Terrorists: Profiling and CounterAction*, Boca Raton FL: CRC Press.
- [30]. Holbrook, Donald (2012) "Al Qaeda's Response to the Arab Spring", *Perspectives on Terrorism* 6, No. 6, 4-20.
- [31]. Kozlozki, Robert P. (2018) "Knowing Yourself is Key in Cognitive Warfare", *The Department of the Navy's Information Technology Magazine*.
- [32]. Krauss, Robert M. and Susan R. Fussell (1991) "Perspective-taking in Communication: Representations of Others' Knowledge in Reference", *Social Cognition*, Vol 9, 2-24.
- [33]. Lewis, Olivier (2017) "Conceptualizing State Counterterrorism", In Scott Nicholas Romaniuk, Francis Grice, Daniela Irrera, Stewart Webb, eds. *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Counterterrorism Policy*, 3-37. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- [34]. Lu, Zhong-Lin and Barbara Anne Doshier (2007) "Cognitive Psychology", *Scholarpedia*, 2(8): 2769.
- [35]. Mackiewicz, Diana T. (2019) *Cognitive Warfare: Hamas & Hezbollah and Their Insidious Efforts*, Tel Aviv: INSS
- [36]. Maley, William (2018) "Terrorism, Diplomacy, and State Communications", *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism- The Hague* 8, No 16.
- [37]. Marca, Mike La (2012) "Defeating al-Qaeda in the "Battle of Ideas": The Case for a U.S. Counter-Narrative", Thesis, Department of Political Science Duke University.
- [38]. Neumann, Peter R. (2009) *Old and New Terrorism*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
- [39]. Neumann, Peter R. and Michael L. R. Smith (2008) *The Strategy of Terrorism: How it Works, and Why it Fails (Contemporary Terrorism Studies)*, New York: Routledge.
- [40]. Palmer, Darren and Chad Whelan (2014) "Policing and Networks in the Field of Counterterrorism", In David Lowe, Austin Turk, Dilip K. Das, eds. *Examining Political Violence: Studies of Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Internal War*, 145-166. CRC Press.
- [41]. Schleifer, Ron (2009) "Psyoping Hezbollah: The Israeli Psychological Warfare Campaign During the 2006 Lebanon War", *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 21:2, 221-238.
- [42]. Schmid, Alex P. (2010) "The Importance of Countering al Qaeda's 'Single Narrative'", In E.J.A.M. Kessels, ed. *Countering Violent Extremist Narratives*, 46-57. The Hague: National Coordinator for Counterterrorism.
- [43]. Schmid, Alex P. (2014) *Al-Qaeda's "Single Narrative" and Attempts to Develop Counter-Narratives: The State of Knowledge*, The Hague: The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT).
- [44]. Seib, Philip (2008) "The Al-Qaeda Media Machine", *Military Review*, May- June, 74-80.
- [45]. Seib, Philip (2011) *Public Diplomacy, New Media, and Counterterrorism*, Los Angeles: Figueroa Press.
- [46]. Smith, E. Edward and Stephen M. Koslyn (2017) *Bilişsel Psikoloji: Zihin ve Beyin*, Ankara: Nobel.
- [47]. Sönmezoglu, Faruk (2010) *Uluslararası İlişkiler Sözlüğü*, İstanbul: Der Yayınları.
- [48]. Spencer, Alexander (2010) "The 'new terrorism' of al-Qaeda is not so new", In Stuart Gottlieb, ed. *Debating Terrorism and Counterterrorism*, 4-15. Washington, D.C: CQ Press.
- [49]. Stern, Jessica (2003) *Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill*, New York: HarperCollins Publishers.
- [50]. Steven, Graeme C. S. and Rohan Gunaratna (2004) *Counterterrorism: A Reference Handbook*, Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO.
- [51]. Thomas, Troy S. (2004) *Beneath the surface: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace for Counterterrorism*, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Intelligence Research.
- [52]. Tzu, Sun (2016) *Savaş Sanatı*, Çev. Adil Demir, İstanbul: Kastaş Yayınevi.
- [53]. Weil, Ann (2004) *Terrorism (Disasters)*, Irvine: Saddleback Educational Publishing.
- [54]. Wiewiorka, Michel (1995) "Terrorism in the Context of Academic Research", In Martha Crenshaw, ed. *Terrorism in Context*, 597-606. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.