

Xenophobia or Afro-phobia: A Threat to South Africa’s Hegemonic Ambition in Africa?

Dr. Nnanyere Chukwu Ogo

*Department of History and International Relations
Ebonyi State University Abakaliki Nigeria*

Dr. Kenneth I. Nwokike

*Department of History and International Relations
Ebonyi State University Abakaliki Nigeria*

Abstract

South Africa emerged as a multi-racial and multicultural democratic state in 1994 and was welcomed by the international community especially, Africans. The country’s adoption of the most liberal constitution that emphasised democracy, freedom, and fundamental human rights, not only to her nationals but to foreigners too caused an upsurge of Africans who trooped into South Africa looking for better life conditions or escaping from political turmoil in their home countries. However, because of certain domestic challenges that left most black South Africans poor, they saw other Africans as threats to their well-being. Sequel to that, xenophobia/Afrophobia started manifesting as early as 1995. In 2008 and 2015 this menace reached great magnitude resulting in the death of many foreign nationals, especially those from the African continent. Against this backdrop, this article traced the history and causal factors of xenophobic or Afrophobic attacks in South Africa; the impact on South Africa’s bilateral relations with Africa, and on South Africa’s hegemonic ambition in Africa. The work used the hegemonic stability theory as a guide and the content analytical framework to dissect and integrate the data to arrive at a logical conclusion. We argued that the xenophobic attacks are inimical to South Africa’s desire to be the moral hegemon in Africa. Indeed, Afrophobia in South Africa increased Africa’s problem and pitched South Africa(ns) against other African states and people.

Key words: *Afrophobia, Xenophobia, hegemonic stability, Africa*

I. Introduction

Africa is bedevilled by several challenges that threaten her well-being. During the Cold War, African countries were prey to superpowers’ manipulations as clientele states. After the end of the Cold War, South Africa emerged a strong independent African state free from apartheid, embracing multi-party and racial democracy and parading one of the most promising liberal constitutions in the world that preaches freedom, respect for fundamental human rights, and tolerance as the best approach to the realisation of both national and Africa’s interests. Presidents Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki were instrumental in integrating South Africa into the mainstream of Africa’s international relations where the country is placed at an enviable position because of her peculiar characteristics compared to other African states; strongest and most diversified economy in Africa, well developed infrastructure, technological superiority, and the most promising liberal constitution, among others that made her the envy of other African states and beyond.

Having been accepted into the community of Nations, South Africa was courted, admired, and cherished by many African states and their people. Consequently, many Africans found favour in living and working in South Africa while most African states developed bilateral relations with South Africa. Nigeria and South Africa entered into official bilateral relations in 1994. Although the relationship was not very cordial, they managed their differences till General Sani Abacha’s government executed Ken Saro Wiwa and his eight other kinsmen from Ogoni state. President Nelson Mandela championed the expulsion of Nigeria from the Commonwealth, among other sanctions. In 2008, a strange development was witnessed in South Africa, although that was not the first show of disaffection of the black South Africans against black immigrants. There was massive xenophobic or Afrophobic attacks against black immigrants. This became a dangerous omen in Africa’s international relations.

This study investigates the effects of such development with regards to the image of the country, effects on her numerous interests in Africa – especially Nigeria, and how such affects the much touted “African solutions to Africa’s challenges” bearing in mind that Africa lacks any hegemon to provide Africa’s goods. South Africa and Nigeria’s bilateral relations are studied since both countries are seen as the bedrock for the realisation of the African solution project. While Nigerians constitute a huge chunk of black immigrants in

South Africa, South Africa has a very impressive presence in Nigeria's economic life through their investments and trade. Thus, both countries have strong stake in Africa's socio-economic investments and relations.

Hegemonic stability

Hegemonic stability theory is traced to Charles Kindleberger's *The World in Depression, 1929-1939* (1973). He was the first author that popularised this theory (Brown and Ainley 2005) when he argued that "for the world economy to be stabilised, there has to be a stabiliser" (Kindleberger 1973, 305). The hegemon provides the "market for distressed goods, producing a steady if not countercyclical flow of capital, maintaining a rediscount mechanism for providing liquidity when the monetary system is frozen in panic, managing the structure of foreign exchange rates, and providing a degree of coordination of domestic monetary policies (Kindleberger 1981, 247). A single hegemon is necessary because, "the difficulties and costs of bargaining between two or more states are likely to thwart international cooperation" (Lake 1993, 463). However, the argument that there has to be a single stabiliser for order to be guaranteed in the system has been challenged by otherscholars such as Lake (1993), Strange (2009), Grunberg (1990), Keohane (1984), Snidal (1985). Thus, in line with the latter's argument, in Africa where none exists, sub-regional hegemons have to cooperate to provide Africa's public good.

Hegemonic stability theory comprises leadership and hegemony theories. Countries can be leaders and hegemons at the same time (Lake 1993, 460-461). It views stability in dominance (D'Anieri 2010, 70), capacity, will and legitimacy (Brown with Ainley, 2005) as well as willingness to exercise unilateral leadership and to act rather than react (Rourke 2008, 51) to succeed. Openness (Lake 1993, 470), co-operation (Pedersen 2002, 682), and tolerance (Chua 2009, xxiii) are also some of the major attributes that a hegemonic stabiliser[s] must possess to accommodate and by extension sustain her leadership over others. It is seen as "another strand of realist thought which finds the stability results from unipolarity, in which one state is clearly more powerful and able to act to ensure some degree of order in the system" (D'Anieri 2010, 69).

The theory entails, first, the presence of a dominant actor that will lead to the provision of a stable international regime of free trade. Second, although the dominant leader benefits from this situation (i.e., it turns a net "profit" from providing the good), smaller states gain even more (Snidal 1985, 581). Therefore, in hegemonic stability theory, there is the existence of a hegemon and the weaker ones that are not her subordinates, but simply weaker in strength and capability. This does not make them inferior. They may be influenced or led, by the hegemon, but may not always be willing and happy to be ruled by force. As such, the degree of success achieved by the hegemon and the length of such leadership may, to a large extent, depend on her capability (military and economic) as well as ability to carry others along through soft power.

Tolerance and co-operation are important ingredients for any form of hegemony to work in Africa. Tolerance means letting very different kinds of people live, work, and prosper in your society – even if only for instrumental or strategic reasons (Chua 2009, xxiii). Chua, historically, narrates how, from the first hegemon – Achaemenid to the present 'hyperpower' – the United States benefitted from strategic tolerance. Chua (2009, 322) believes that "if the key to wealth was military might, then the key to military might was strategic tolerance". Tolerance is of two types. The first is the ability to consider allowing 'others' to belong to your group; that is, the ability to accommodate foreigners to live and work, with relative freedom, within your state. Often, such foreigners are experts in their chosen fields of endeavour. Undoubtedly, the system needs them for progress and sustenance. Chua's work proves this. The second is the ability to accommodate other states that are willing and unwilling to partner and join the leadership of the hegemon. Such tolerance gives them a sense of belonging and makes them have the feeling of being stakeholders in the issues that concern them. This is necessary because "hegemony is not omnipotence" (Layne 2006, 43).

Consequently, carrying others along helps to legitimise the actions and beliefs of the hegemon[s]. This could be done through unilateral, bilateral or multilateral approach, recognising that "multilateral/unilateral disjuncture is more about the approval of others than about how many states act jointly and how much each contributes. ... It is the presence or absence of disapproval that is the key (Stein 2008, 62). Moreover, because no country is an island, "the requisites of daily life, and the solutions to most of the problems states face, require international cooperation" (Stein 2008, 75; Rourke 2008, 50). Since the system is inter-dependent, the hegemon could reduce the excesses of power and mistrusts from the weaker states when others are tolerated and accommodated in the power relations. Such is enhanced by the activities of "transnational elite that has become increasingly aware of shared values and interests that transcend petty and immediate strategies" (Taylor and Nel 2002, 167). Indeed, the benefits of tolerance to the hegemon[s] are enormous

South Africa's policy in Africa

After apartheid regime in South Africa, South Africa declared that Africa shall be central and key to her foreign policy. This principle and policy is important in many ways: first, being grateful to Africa "where a debt was owed for support in the liberation struggle" (Barber 2005, 1080); secondly, "South Africa cannot

escape it's African destiny" (Mandela 1993, 89) reiterated by Mbeki when he argued that "the fate of a democratic South Africa is inextricably bound up with what happens in the rest of the continent" (Mbeki 1991, 234; Department of Foreign Affairs 2006, 306; The Presidency 2008, 58); and, thirdly, it is the foothold to assert South Africa's new identity and influence in the international system. It is important to state that the factors are very important, especially the last one, because it asserts the hegemonic ambition, role, and leadership that South Africa would play in the international system using Africa as the test case through her economic, technological, strategic superior and even personality advantage over many other African states. Consequently, "Pretoria saw and presented itself as a *leader* on the continent, generously offering economic, technological and other assistance" (Pfister 2000, 11). To that effect, South Africa was seen as the "natural and moral leader of the region" (Venter 1997, 76; Kagwanja 2009, 4) while Nelson Mandela was projected as "the symbol of continental leadership" (Venter, 80) expected to be the voice of reason and a force of stability in Africa and elsewhere (Wyk 2002, 111).

It takes power, hard and soft, to project ambitious foreign policies across borders. This is why weak states do not adopt ambitious foreign policies of a continental scale but that which guarantees their survival and improvement in their immediate environment. Hence, when South Africa denied, at the early stage, her hegemonic ambitions within the sub-regional and continental context, it was just to be diplomatic and nice to avoid "being branded as a bully; of stepping into the shoes of the apartheid regime" (Barber 2005, 1085). Adopting Africa as a principle in South Africa's foreign policy is a necessity, not necessarily a choice, bearing in mind the danger of living around conflict zones as a prosperous and peaceful state especially bearing in mind that "expectations were that South Africa would be a more benevolent hegemon" (Venter 1997, 76). Consequently, South African policy makers reasoned that "unless a considerable improvement of the situation in neighbouring countries is ensured, the internal conflicts there will spill over South Africa's borders and the influx of refugees into South Africa will grow" (Shubin 1995, 7; Department of Foreign Affairs 1998, 22; Defence Department 2012, 64). With an estimate of "some eight million illegal immigrants" (Frost 1997) already living in South Africa and many more finding their ways to the country, such triggers off social tension between the immigrants and the citizens, leading to immigration and xenophobic challenges described as "immigration terrorism" (Akokpari 2002, 221).

As a proactive measure towards tackling the above challenge, South Africa's foreign policy principle towards Africa is a measure to engage all African leaders to be responsible and responsive to their people to ensure peace, progress and development in all parts of Africa that would encourage healthy living, cooperation and competition among African states eliminating conflict and rancour that are key to the destabilising factors that are endangering the continent. It included "strengthening the African Union and its structures; contribute towards the SADC Common Agenda; strengthening the governance and technical decision-making capacities of the SADC; contribute to Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) in Africa; and contribute towards peace, security and stability in Africa" (Landsberg 2007, 1-2). To this effect, South Africa preaches "peace, justice and reconciliation which remained a very crucial matter for our continent in promoting nation-building and reconciliation to enable societies, especially in post-conflict settings, to heal, reconstruct and develop" (Nkoana-Mashabane 2015, 7) in addition to (promoting) structures for the mediation and arbitration of intra-state and inter-state conflicts (Venter 1997, 77). In doing so, South Africa arrived at a better option that would "persuade the governments of neighbouring states to limit the flow of illegal immigrants" into South Africa (Frost 1997, 234).

As a corollary, South Africa's businesses needed new market frontiers for expansion and profit after many decades of isolation and sanctions that caused stagnation in her domestic market environment in a changing world of globalisation where "heightened competition for scarce resources" market for goods and services were the order of the day (Venter 1997, 79). The market exists in Africa because "so many South African products are tailor-made for the African market, and regional integration" (Games 2003, 13). Thus, by 2003, there was "virtually no sector in South Africa that [was] not doing business with, or investing in, the rest of Africa (ibid.) courtesy the South African Reserve Bank's effort which in 2002 "eased capital controls on local companies wishing to invest in other Africa countries or wanting to expand existing ventures ... (raising the limits) from \$79 million to \$216 million with immediate effect" (ibid.). The effect was spontaneous. South African trade with African countries which stood at R8 billion in 1993 increased to R24 billion (ibid. 13; Alden and Mills 2005, 380) and R27 billion (Barber 2005, 1084) between 1999 and 2000. With the Reserve Bank's assistance, "by 2003 it stood at around R47 billion" (ibid.). Therefore, making Africa the focal point of South Africa's foreign policy was a necessity because it is a virgin market and opportunity that South Africa needed to conquer and dominate economically, politically and otherwise to operate from a position of strength that her new status requires in a world of globalisation.

Indeed, South Africa was committed to Africa's project first because it is an African state, second because it is a foremost African state politically, economically, socio-culturally and militarily that ascribes leadership role on her and finally because it is in her interest to do so as a regional hegemon whose actions and inactions in Africa could spell doom for her interest and that of the continent if she ignores her new position and influence in Africa. That was the reason Habib (2009) disagreed with describing South Africa as merely a 'pivotal state'. It does not accord her the right description in African politics, hegemonic status does. He argues that "hegemonic leadership is not about militaristic adventurism, as often assumed, and need not be hostile to partnership" (Habib 2009, 150), a position this work agrees with. Thus, South Africa's Africa-centred approach to foreign policy "is not based on political emotionalism: it is in South Africa's own interest that it plays an active role in Africa (through the OAU [now AU]) generally, and in the Southern African region (through the SADC) especially" (Venter 1997, 82). The outcome is that while she acts "as the agent of globalisation, the continent will offer South Africa a preferential option on its traditionally promised largesse of oil, minerals and mining" (Vale and Maseko 1998, 279) and it reaps other benefits of a hegemon, prestige, respect and admiration, as well as criticisms and opposition that go with it.

However, from 1994 when South Africa denounced her destabilisation policy and emphasised that "no longer shall South Africa be the fountainhead of our neighbours' woes. No longer shall South Africa's government operate in isolation without due recognition of our neighbours interests" (Shubin 1995, 9), there were still pockets of doubt by "African partners beyond its borders who remain sceptical of South Africa's aspirations to continental leadership" (Alden and le Pere 2003, 10), "regional giantism" or supremacy" (Neethling 2002, 133), and the fear of domination, influence, and control. In fact, some countries like Zimbabwe directly accused South Africa of being arrogant and playing big instead of bending to learn the rudiments of African politics and relations, see Vale and Maseko 1998, 284.

The doubts notwithstanding, South Africa's African foreign policy principle, as enumerated by Pahad, consistently rested on: "first, the promotion of human rights, democracy, and good governance in Africa; second, the furtherance of the political, economic and social wellbeing of the Southern African region; third, the establishment of constructive and mutually beneficial interactions with the African countries; and last, finding solutions to the issues of environmental degradation, arms proliferation, drug trafficking, discrimination against women, mass migration, uncontrolled refugee flows, endemic disease, ravaging drought, and other natural disasters" (Venter 1997, 79). Thus, South Africa's engagement in Africa is to act as the regional hegemon in Africa for the good of all Africans. The Mbeki renaissance was the bedrock of South Africa's engagement in Africa.

Xenophobia or Afrophobia in South Africa?

Xenophobia or Afrophobia is a great challenge facing South Africa in her Africa's bilateral relations, especially towards the realisation of her African vision built around "Ubuntu". An understanding of the concepts "xenophobia" and "Afrophobia" is important to enable one to appreciate the enormity of damage that it causes to South Africa's international relations. Xenophobia is "social/psychological anomies that negate the principles of accommodation and tolerance, fragmenting society into 'we' and 'them', creating a model of social division upon which all forms of contestations are premised" (Idehen and Osaghae 2015, 80). It is "attitudes, prejudices, and behaviour that reject, exclude and often vilify persons based on the perception that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society or national identity" (Masenya 2017, 81). Its attributes are hatred, fear, envy, distrust, insecurity, intolerance, and violence occasionally fuelled by nationalist instincts. Thus, xenophobia entails the hatred, intolerance, fear, and violence attacks on foreigners. The distinguishing attribute of xenophobia is a sharp distinction between "we" and "they", accompanied by intolerance and sustained by fear, violence and destruction of the "they" by the "we". Xenophobia is often likened to racism as they both deal with profiling and hating others. However, "the profiling in the case of racism is on the basis of race, in the case of xenophobia on the basis of nationality" (SAHO 2015).

Afro-phobia, on the other hand, bears semblance to xenophobia, sharing in all the attributes except that it targets, other black Africans. It is the expression of hate and violence by black South Africans against black "foreigners". In South Africa, black immigrants and their property are the major targets of xenophobic violence. It is a "manifestation of distrust and envy towards black foreigners, seen as a threat because they are able to slip undetected into the black community and thus potentially steal the jobs and women of the indigenous black South African men" (Tshaka n.d.). Unfortunately, because Afrophobic attacks are in the form of mob action while the objects of attacks are blacks, black South Africans are sometimes victims as well. That was why 21 of the 62 people killed in the 2008 xenophobic attacks were black South Africans (Mngxitama 2010). Similarly, between 1996 and 1999, "nearly 25 percent of those arrested by the police as "illegal aliens" are in fact

South African citizens who either could not produce their identification documents or had them torn up by officers who refused to believe their legitimacy” (Valji 2003).

The Whites and other coloured people are not threatened, not hated nor harmed by South Africans because they are “potential employer[s] by virtue of their skin colour” (Tshaka n.d.; see Punch Editorial 2017, SAHO 2015). They are seen as legal and those from outside are welcomed as tourists (Mngxitama 2010) even when ordinarily they should have been the enemies of the black South Africans by virtue of the apartheid policies and legacies. To make matters worse, the government and security agents of South Africa have not helped to integrate South Africans and other Africans in Africa to see themselves as brothers owing to how the “Home Affairs and the police treat black Africans. Blacks are illegal by mere appearance. The blacker you are the more likely you are to be in danger of being arrested by the police or being killed by an angry mob” (Mngxitama 2010). Also, the situation is more disturbing since “suspected undocumented migrants detained by the police are for all purposes treated as criminals” (Valji 2003).

Therefore, Afrophobia is a condition whereby some black South Africans fear and hate other black African immigrants, unleash maximum violence on them aimed at either eliminating them and or deterring them/others from staying or migrating to their country or region for fear of taking over their jobs, women, and houses. Black South Africans, not the whites, are at the centre of the Afrophobic attacks on Africans since “whenever the attacks start, black immigrants residing in white dominated areas were always safe, as the native residents hardly participate in such attacks” (Kumulolu 2017). The distinction between xenophobia and Afrophobia is that while “xenophobia is fear of the other; Afrophobia is fear of the specific other – the black” (Tshaka n.d.). Every other element or attribute is shared by the two. The forgoing is significant to understanding that what happens in South Africa is not necessarily xenophobia but Afrophobia. It is so because, first, the hatred is not from all South Africans but some “miscreants” from the black population targeted at fellow black foreigners. Xenophobia is the fear of and attack on foreigners, but in this case, the foreigners targeted are only black foreigners, who one way or the other, assisted the black South Africans to overcome apartheid. It is important to note that foreigners in South Africa are of diverse states and races. Notwithstanding the races who are citizens of South Africa, the country hosts a significant numbers of people on temporary basis. Of the 75 076 recipients, 48,5% were from overseas and 51,0% from African countries (Statistics South Africa, p. 12 <http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P03514/P035142015.pdf> accessed 11 September 2019).

Then, why are the black foreigners in South Africa the objects of Afrophobic attacks? There are many reasons adduced for the attack on black foreign immigrants to South Africa. Prominent among the reasons is that the black immigrants take over the jobs meant for South Africans. The types of jobs been referred to here is very important to understanding why it is the black South Africans that attack the black immigrants rather than all immigrants. The jobs been referred to are menial jobs that the white, colored, and educated black South Africans are not ready to do. This jobs are ordinarily meant to be reserved for the uneducated black South Africans who would have been happier to make do with the left over jobs. But why are the company owners and miners unwilling to employ South African blacks but would prefer to employ other black immigrants in South Africa? This is important to understanding why the black South Africans see African immigrants from other countries as rivals in job opportunities which fuels the hatred towards them and eventual Afrophobic attacks on them. Indeed, the challenge is with menial jobs rather than decent jobs as bankers, doctors, lecturers, etc. form the statistics below, evidence showed that decent job offers for immigrants in South Africa, the black immigrants did not significantly, dominate South Africa's job opportunities. Of the 12,354 work permits issued in 2015, about 40% of work permits were received by nationals from four African countries, namely Zimbabwe (20,8%), Nigeria (14,2%), DRC (2,6%) and Ghana (1,9%), whilst 38,3% were received by nationals from six overseas countries, namely India (14,6%), China (9,9%), Pakistan (6,3%), Bangladesh (3,5%), UK (2,1%) and Germany (1,9%) (Statistics South Africa, p. 21). If 38.3% of work permits granted in 2015 were to India, China, Pakistan, Bangladesh, UK and Germany, why was it that none of the citizens of such countries had been attacked or challenged for taking over South African jobs? The answer is located in our earlier argument that the jobs in contention are menial jobs that the black uneducated and unemployed black South Africans felt they were well suited to perform but which the owners prefer to give to other more industrious and persevering black Africans. Similarly, it is important to state that other black immigrants in other formal sectors of the economy, education, health, telecommunication, etc. do not receive the same kind of Afrophobic treatments from black South Africans like their counterparts in the informal sector. This shows that the jobs under contention is not formal but informal jobs.

Equally, black South Africans claim that Afrophobia is because other Africans are taking over their opportunities may not follow a logical sequence, like the issues raised in the above paragraph. Such is only seen in the informal sector too. For instance, there is no trace of black South African students threatening or harassing black immigrants for taking up spaces in South African Universities. For instance, out of the 12, 998 study permits approved by South Africa for immigrants, 58% from the 57% occupied by nationals of ten

leading countries in South Africa, are from seven African countries namely; Zimbabwe 20.8%, Nigeria 15.1%, Democratic Republic of Congo 8.5%, Angola 5.2%, Cameroon 3.3%, Libya 2.8, and Kenya 2.3% (Statistics South Africa, p. 20). From the discussion above, 57% of 12998 is about 7409 persons. From the 7,409 student visas approved, the seven African countries received about 4,297 slots in 2015 alone, not minding other years. The implication is that the majority of foreign students in South Africa are black immigrant students. However, the significant number of them notwithstanding, black South Africans do not extend their Afrophobic acts to them. This shows that the major area fuelling the Afrophobic attacks is not the race, the opportunities or the nationality but rather the little opportunities that exist in the informal sector of the South African economy where the unemployed and uneducated black “miscreants” see slight opportunities that they feel are been threatened by other foreign black nationals ready to do any job to sustain their lives.

Afrophobia in South Africa started as soon as the country got rid of apartheid. In December 1994 and January 1995, armed youth gangs in the Alexandra Township, near Johannesburg attacked and “arrested” undocumented migrants, marched them to the police station and demanded their immediate repatriation. In 1997, a survey revealed that “just six percent of South Africans were tolerant to immigration. In another survey cited by Danso and McDonald in 2001, 75 percent of South Africans held negative perceptions about black African foreigners” (Petal and Essa 2015). In 1998, two Senegalese and a Mozambican were thrown out from a moving train in Johannesburg. Prior to 2008 xenophobic attacks, “the South African Migration Project in 2006 found xenophobia to be widespread: South Africans do not want it to be easier for foreign nationals to trade informally with South Africa (59 percent opposed), to start small businesses in South Africa (61 percent opposed) or to obtain South African citizenship (68 percent opposed)” (ibid.). The 2008 xenophobic attacks were massive, causing the death of 62 persons, the displacement of thousands, the looting of 342 immigrant-owned shops, while 213 others were burnt down (Chutel 2017). Between 1995 and 2017, xenophobic attacks on foreigners in South Africa occurred in fifteen (15) years, and in some years occurring in several times at different provinces and lasting several weeks (see Wikipedia 2017).

Table 1: Showing the xenophobic occurrences in South Africa since 1994

S/No	Period	Venue/Province	Casualty	Reason
1	Dec 1994 to Jan 1995	Gauteng	Armed gang identified some illegal migrants living in Alexandra, marched them to police station and demanded their immediate deportation	To ‘clean’ the townships from foreigners blamed for crimes, unemployment, and sexual attacks
2	September 1998	Johannesburg	3 persons, a Mozambican and 2 Senegalese were thrown out of a moving train by youths returning from a rally	Rally blamed foreigners for crimes, unemployment, and spread of diseases in SA
3	2000	Cape Flats, Cape Town	7 foreigners were killed on the Cape Flats within 5 weeks	Foreigners were accused of claiming property that belongs to locals
4	October 2001	Zanspruit, Gauteng	Locals forcefully evicted Zimbabweans burnt and looted their shacks	Blamed them for unemployment and crimes
5	Late 2005/early 2006	Olievehoutbosch settlement, Gauteng	4 foreigners were killed and the shacks set alight with a demand that foreigners leave the settlement	Foreigners blamed for the death of a local man
6	July-August 2006	Western Cape	47 Somalis were killed	Under contention
7	2008 (several attacks in several regions)	Eastern Cape, Gauteng, Durban, Cape Town, Southern Cape, Mpumalanga, North West and Free State	62 persons were killed, thousands displaced, 342 immigrant-owned shops looted, while 213 others were burnt down	Foreigners blamed for crimes, unemployment, competition for jobs, housing, and other social amenities, spread of diseases, etc.
8	2009	Western Cape	1500-2500 Zimbabwean farm workers were forcefully evicted from their homes	Competition over available job opportunities
9	2012	Johannesburg, North West, and Free State	Six reported attacks resulted in the injury of at least 8 victims, with 42 shops and businesses burnt or looted, 273 people arrested, and more than 600 displaced	Protests about service delivery or unemployment – legitimate protests that turned to xenophobic violence
10	2013 (27 February)	Johannesburg and Gauteng	A 27 years old Mozambican was tied to a police van and dragged through a street close to Johannesburg by 8 police officers. He died thereafter. Similarly, 4 Somalis were killed between May and June. On 26 May 2013, 2 Zimbabwean men were killed by South Africans mob in Diepsloot	Wrongful parking of his taxi along the road.
11	2015 (January-October)	KwaZulu Natal, Gauteng,	In April, 7 persons including an Ethiopian, a Mozambican, a Bangladeshi, a	A Somali shop owner shot and killed a 14 year old boy,

		Limpopo and Eastern Cape	Zimbabwean and three South Africans who were all killed in KwaZulu-Natal. On 8 April, 2015, 2 Ethiopian brothers were set on fire, trapped in their shipping container shop. One died while the other struggled for life in hospital. On 2 April, foreign owned shop and property in G-section, in Umlazu and Kwamashu, outside Durban, with almost 2000 foreigners displaced while 5 people were killed. On October 2015, Muslims in Grahamstown were attacked, more than 500 persons were displaced with about 300 shops and homes looted and or destroyed	Siphiwe Mahori, during an armed robbery in Soweto township triggering waves of attacks and looting; foreign shop owner's possession of a murdered local's phone; and Zulu King Goodwill Zwelithini's comment about foreigners demanding they go back to their homes
12	2016	Gauteng	Tshwane riots led to attacking of foreigners and looting of foreign owned shops	Dissatisfaction in ANC's nomination for South Africa's Municipal Election
13	2017	Gauteng	Anti-immigration protests in Pretoria	Foreigners accused of crimes, grabbing jobs and been arrogant

Sources: News24 2012; Patel and Essa 2015; SAHO 2015; Wikipedia 2017, the Authors

The hydra-headed monster in South Africa is a function of several factors, ranging from poverty and unemployment to envy and suspicion. Fear of crime, disease and threats to jobs are the leading reasons for opposition to immigration (Crush 2000, 109). The CRAI identified five main causal factors responsible for the xenophobic violence in South Africa. These included: failure of the government of South Africa to meet post-apartheid expectations with regard to economic conditions and service delivery; competition in the informal business sector; media portrayals of foreigners which reinforce prejudice; perceived tolerance by state institutions to increasing intolerance against foreign nationals; and South Africa's legacy of apartheid and isolation (Citizenship Rights in Africa Initiative (CRAI 2009, 6-7). Another reason is traced to why the attacks are directed at the black foreigners alone and not on all foreigners. Understanding the meaning of "foreigner" from the ordinary South African parlance is important here.

Pejoratively, the term "foreigner" in South Africa usually refers to African and Asian non-nationals (Tshabalala 2015). This is attributed to "a hangover from the past, fuelled by present" (ibid.), that is, the black South Africans' social attitudes that view the Caucasians as tourists or expatriates who come with foreign currency and investment, while Africans and afro-Asians are viewed as foreigners who come to take over small business sectors and low paid jobs (Punch Editorial 2017) to the detriment of the nationals. While another is "political scapegoating" wherein "political leaders and officials of national, provincial and local government often blame foreign nationals for their systematic failures to deliver on the political promises and satisfy the citizenry's growing expectations" (Misago 2017).

Similarly, Xenophobia in South Africa has been attributed to the nature of her nation-building and the peculiar but exceptionality status the citizens were meant to believe they occupy in Africa. During apartheid, South Africa was seen as a significant and distinct other, different from the rest of other Africans. Such has not changed. "[T]his thinking has not shifted enough since the end of apartheid, and contemporary references to other African countries are frequently derogatory" (Bridger, 2015). Consequently, "foreigners today are often blamed for the country's high crime rate, or for bringing disease into the country" (ibid.), traced to "contestation over scarce resources in a climate of unemployment, poverty and other socio-economic challenges" (Gigaba 2017) as well as competition over access to South African women. Hence, xenophobia in South Africa has a correlation with apartheid at one hand, and with history on the other.

On the other hand, another cause of Afrophobia in South Africa could be traced to ignorance. South African youths are not taught the history of how African countries stood by the black South Africans in the fight against apartheid. That is part of the reasons black South Africans see other Africans as 'others', rivals and parasites rather than as brothers or partners worth accommodating considering their support during apartheid. Ordinarily, Africans are not ingrates but they must be aware of any favour done them before they can appreciate it. Because the youths are not taught about these, they are not aware of these historical facts and shall not appreciate foreigners whose contribution to the South African struggle they do not know. Similarly, another aspect is the fact that most South African youths are unaware of the implication of their actions on the interest and image of South Africa in other African countries. This is perhaps because they do not travel or because most of the businesses that expanded outside South Africa are owned by the whites and or coloured South Africans. As the xenophobic attacks continue, the ever expanding businesses of South Africans in Africa are threatened by the xenophobic attacks of their countrymen on other African 'foreigners' and migrants to South Africa. It is due to the ignorance of the people that myopic politicians and local leaders (who themselves are ignorant of South

Africa's national interests in other parts of Africa or tend to ignore it), exploit to instigate xenophobic attacks on foreigners. For instance, President Zuma once said that

South African blacks should not behave as if they were typical blacks from Africa. The African National Congress Secretary-General, Gwede Mantashe, blamed foreigners for stoking unrest in South Africa's platinum belt. Small business development minister Lindiwe Zulu, said the businesses of foreign Africans based in township could not expect to coexist peacefully with local business owners unless they shared their trade secret". King Goodwill Zwelithini said "African migrants should take their things and go (Masenya 2017, 86).

All the instances pointed above contributed to xenophobia in South Africa. The 2017 attacks are traced to the Johannesburg's Mayor, Mashaba's comment on his 1 December 2016 100-days in office media conference wherein he declared that all "illegal immigrants are criminals"(Mashego and Malefane 2016) and must be treated as such. According to him, "when young girls are turned into prostitutes and our houses are hijacked then our people don't have rights. I find it completely unfortunate and unacceptable"(Lindeque 2017). Such hate speeches, even when the speakers do not intend harm, like Mashaba explained thereafter noting that "not all foreigners are criminals"(Lindeque 2017) have detrimental effects and cause irreparable damage. Of course, the outcome has serious implications to the bilateral and mutual interests of the countries concerned and Africa.

The culture of violence, force, and hatred was sown into the socio-economic and political life of black South Africans by the apartheid policy. The brutality of apartheid ascribed violence in the South African society, and fostered a culture in which violence is regularly used to solve conflicts, gain power or inflict punishment (Bridger, 2015). The fact that xenophobic attacks are often traced to the black South Africans is a cause for concern, especially since the majority of South Africans are blacks. The fact that many of them (black South Africans) lack skills, are less enterprising and adventurous as to travel to other countries for business or pleasure is more worrisome as it makes it more difficult for them to understand, appreciate, and accommodate other black foreigners. Gumede, Nwanma and Patrick (2006); Adichie (2009) and Eke (2009) see such challenge as one of the negative effects of apartheid on the black South Africans. Prior to the end of apartheid, black South Africans were "expressly forbidden to run businesses or own property" (Gumede *et al.* 2006). In addition, most of the arable land in South Africa is under the control of the whites, even to this day. After 1994, while the White South Africans with huge capital and state support moved and expanded to and invested in other African states, some of the blacks felt it was time to control the resources of their country, long denied them. As they were settling down to begin the 'enjoyment', many other Africans bulldozed their way into South Africa in search of greener pastures, leading to the struggle and competition for the available scarce resources of the state.

The black South Africans felt that they would not tolerate or accommodate a repeat of what happened during the apartheid era i.e. others, this time, other Africans competing with or denying them opportunities they were initially deprived of by the Whites. To avoid undue competition with the other Africans, violent attacks on them became inevitable to frighten or force them to leave South Africa. Thus, Xenophobia/Afrophobia is in part, "a logical hangover of long years of discrimination and deprivation" (Eke 2009, 137). Also, it is a reaction or consequence of unfulfilled hope brought about by the "wear and tear of the country's own domestic democratic project, including an economy that has not lived up to the aspirations of the majority" (Hengari 2016, 2) black South Africans. Unfortunately, however, the attacks had not deterred or discouraged other Africans from seeking to enter South Africa. While the quest to live and work in South Africa by other Africans is still high, xenophobic attacks on black foreigners threatens it.

Xenophobia/Afrophobia and effects on South Africa's African Relations, especially with Nigeria

Xenophobia or Afrophobia is the most dangerous, delicate, and harmful factor against South Africa's hegemonic ambition in Africa as well as a threat to the mutual interests of South Africa and other Africans and their countries. This is because it threatens the foundation upon which any relationship could be built and sustained. The foundation of South Africa's bilateral relations in Africa is the people/nationals of both countries involved. People-to-people relations, the civil society groups, and the private-sector investors are the fulcrum upon which Africa's bilateral relations reside. During the confrontational period between governments, relations at the unofficial levels continue to flourish due to the activities of the citizens on both states. When attacks are targeted on the people, it means that the confidence that exists between the people on both sides will start to wane while bilateral relations suffer. Similarly, the soft power appeal that South Africa has over other African states and citizens starts to dwindle due to the nature of treatment being meted to their citizens resident in South Africa.

The implication is the weakening of businesses and the enthronement of fear of each other and the accompanying threats thereto. For instance, using the South Africa and Nigeria's bilateral relations during the

periods of Afrophobic attacks in South Africa, rather than emphasising on the mutual interests of both countries, the Nigerian government officials were reminding their South African counterparts that South Africans have their businesses in Nigeria and could suffer reprisal attacks by Nigerians. In one of such instances, the Chairman, House Committee on Diaspora Matters, Rep. Rita Orji, while condemning the xenophobic attack on Nigerians and their business interests in South Africa reminded the South Africans that nobody or country has monopoly of violence. Addressing journalists in Abuja, she argued that “the South African Government should bear in mind that Nigerians know that they have interests, they have businesses here, they have South Africans here, they should not put their people in jeopardy” (Ovuakporie and Agbakuru 2017). In a similar vein, the National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) went an extra mile by directing South Africans “to leave Nigerian soil before 48 hours (Vanguard News 2017).

While the aggrieved NANS organised a peaceful demonstration to convey their feelings, the hoodlums from among them took advantage of the demonstration to “vandalise MTN head office in Abuja”(Times Live News 2017; Adepegba, et al. 2017). Similarly, the aggrieved students went as far as burning a South African flag arguing that “we don't have relationship with them any longer” (Adepegba, et al. 2017). Although Orji and NANS both alleged that the Nigerian and South African governments are not responsive to forestall the xenophobic attacks, evidence available indicates that the South African government had always condemned the attacks and made efforts to reduce tensions when provocative statements were made by the South African elite capable of causing Afrophobia although she may not have done enough to entirely tame the monster. For instance, when Mashaba made his comment that “all illegal immigrants as criminals”, the Home Affairs Minister condemned the statement and maintained that “while we note those challenges, we can never say it is justified for a person to make sweeping generalisations about criminality or even about the integrity of a certain people based on how or the type of movement they used coming into the country” (Magwedze 2016).

On the other hand, the government of South Africa is investing in its people to ensure that they are taken care of and possibly eliminate xenophobia. The government had made and is still making efforts to contain xenophobia in South Africa rejecting insinuations that South Africans are “mere xenophobes”(Gigaba 2017). The government described those involved in the act as “opportunistic individuals” whose actions “erode the human face we have struggled very hard to acquire” and cautioned that “the dynamics of migration, crime, drugs, prostitution, fraud and unfair labour practices are too serious to be turned into populists politicking (Gigaba 2017). That is because South Africa's

democracy enshrines our hard-earned human rights. We are first and foremost humans. This reality cannot be diluted by your country of origin or what documents you hold, or lack thereof. Humanity, within the context of our Constitution, is not only a cultural prescription of Ubuntu, it is also about legal compliance, and respect for rights of all persons(Gigaba 2017).

The foundation of South Africa as enshrined in the constitution upholds humanity, fundamental human rights and dignity of persons. Such could not subscribe to the kind of discrimination of the magnitude of xenophobia. With such arrangements in place, and the multi-coloured citizenship, how xenophobic attacks occur becomes more worrisome. On the other hand, the Nigerian government could do little because she believes the South African government does not support the activities of the xenophobes. Consequently, there was no basis to cause serious strain or damage to her bilateral relationship with South Africa, a position many Nigerians see as being complacent while Nigerians suffer in South Africa.

However, as stated earlier, the xenophobic attacks have not been in the interest of the bilateral relations of both countries or that of Africa. Xenophobic attacks caused serious cracks in the relationship “reaching a low point in April (2015) when Nigeria recalled its acting High-Commissioner” (Fabricius 2016), although the Presidency later queried the Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary accused of overzealously acting without directive from the official presidential quarters. Many Nigerians had recommended the boycott of South African companies doing business in Nigeria as a means of registering Nigeria's displeasure with the way her nationals and other Africans are been treated in South Africa. The more informed argued to the contrary noting that such is “more impulsive than strategic. And given how much this boycott could affect Nigeria and Nigerians it might well be a case of cutting our nose to spite our face” (Kazeem 2015).

The idea to boycott South African companies in Nigeria as a sign of protest to xenophobic attacks in South Africa was indeed foolhardy. Who losses? Definitely, both countries' interests would be compromised if such action was taken and it would hurt their economies and lead to a game of mutual loss. In a country in dire need of FDI and the accompanying benefits, investors' confidence of protection of their investments and guarantee of patronage is important to attracting and retaining foreign investments. Consequently, as stated above, the impact shall be mutual although may be higher on Nigeria. Indeed, any threat to the investments shall be of negative consequences to both countries - the companies, as well as the citizens. Thus,

boycotting South African businesses will severely hurt those companies, for instance Nigeria is MTN's largest market globally. But the fact these companies have created thousands of jobs in Nigeria cannot be

ignored. With a majority of their local employees being Nigerians, significant job losses will ultimately hurt the Nigerian economy with its already well documented unemployment issues (Kazeem 2015).

Indeed, the impact would be hard on Nigeria's economy that depends on such companies to maintain and sustain her economic diversification process relevant for economic growth and development. The companies may just look elsewhere for a more business friendly environment, relocate and continue with their businesses although with significant losses. Meanwhile, the fact that the xenophobic attacks target all Africans makes it more difficult for the South African businesses to relocate to other African states unless they would withdraw their businesses from Africa and invest elsewhere outside the African continent. The implication shall be significant in the negative; job losses, loss of interests/investments and business opportunities, and above all, the loss of an opportunity by South Africa to be relevant in such African states where their influence would diminish. To this extent, xenophobic attacks on African immigrants in South Africa and threats of reprisal attacks on South African businesses in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa, is counter-productive and inimical to their mutual bilateral and Africa's interests. Indeed, with xenophobia or Afrophobia occurring in South Africa, she "has lost its moral suasion to champion one of its most compelling entry points into African politics – the potential for an exemplary diplomacy based on domestic political tolerance and human rights" (Hengari 2016, 3). Equally, her hegemonic ambition in Africa is questioned since a hegemonic stabiliser has to provide common good. The good must be of common interest and that could be possible when the "other" is seen as a partner and not as a threat to the hegemon or her people.

II. Conclusion

In 1994, South Africa was received into the comity of nations as a foremost responsible and respectable country in Africa with a very promising constitution, leadership, and a vibrant and diversified economy. With such enticing credentials, many Africans desired and worked towards living and working in South Africa, the new desired home for all Africans. While many came in with lots of potentials, others brought in lots of baggage that caused social tension between them and their hosts, leading to Afrophobic attacks against foreign black nationals in the country. This work revealed that what has been happening in South Africa is a peculiar form of xenophobia - Afrophobia - which targets foreign black nationals in South Africa while welcoming others races, Whites and the Colored. Although this is not a government policy, but the inability the government to stop the attacks which is not in tandem with the stated vision, mission, and foreign policy objectives of South Africa in Africa and in the world leaves the country in a fix. Due to its emergence, South Africa has struggled to sustain its image and vision in Africa as a country that other Africans and the world could rely on to offer solutions to Africa's problems. Thus, her Africa's leadership potential, her exemplary ethical domestic and foreign policies embodied in an appealing constitution, etc. were questioned. This article concludes that, because of the image problem created by Afrophobia in South Africa, the hope entrusted in South Africa to be Africa's hegemonic leader after 1994 is seriously challenged. Her hegemonic ambition in Africa is questioned. The inability of the South Africa's government to stop the incessant Afrophobic attacks on other foreign black nationals resident in South Africa had introduced a new dimension to Africa's challenges. The hope placed on South Africa to lead Africa and indeed her desire to become the hegemonic moral leader in Africa has been soiled. This is because no one makes sacrifice for those he hates. Even Jesus Christ who is the moral example of the sacrificial lamb died for the sinners He loved not those He hated. To that effect, this work concludes that South Africa is not the Africa's hegemonic leader because her soft power potentials as a hegemonic leader has been weakened by Afrophobia. Her inability to display and sustain "exemplary diplomacy based on domestic political tolerance and human rights" (Hengari 2016, 3) is a major weakness towards her continental claim of a hegemon. This is because the burden of Afrophobia inhibits her from making sacrifices to tackle the challenges of other Africans and states, including those living in South Africa. That was what Nigeria did for Africa for which she prides herself as the "giant of Africa".

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